History versus nature : a reading of Aristotle, Hobbes, and Heidegger. by Shen, Tong,
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1995
History versus nature : a reading of Aristotle,
Hobbes, and Heidegger.
Tong, Shen
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shen, Tong,, "History versus nature : a reading of Aristotle, Hobbes, and Heidegger." (1995). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February
2014. 1956.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1956

[HISTORY VERSUS NATURE:
A READING OF ARISTOTLE, HOBBES , AND HEIDEGGER
A Dissertation Presented
by
SHEN TONG
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
September 1995
Department of Political Science
@ Copyright by Shen Tong 1995
All Rights Reserved
HISTORY VERSUS NATURE:
A READING OF ARISTOTLE, HOBBES , AND HEIDEGGER
A Dissertation Presented
by
SHEN TONG
Approved as to style and content by:
Nicholas Xenos, Chair
Roberto Alej^andro Rivera, Member
Eric S. Einhorn, Department Head
Department of Political Science
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Professor Nicholas Xenos is Chair of my Dissertation
Committee. His guidance and advice are always incisive,
concise, and thought-provoking. He has helped me so much not
only with my studies but also in many other ways. Without
his unfailing support, what I have done today would not have
been possible. Professor Xenos is an exceptional teacher. It
is my good fortune to have had the opportunity of studying
with him. I owe to him more than what a graduate student
normally does to his or her dissertation adviser.
As Members of the Dissertation Committee, Professor
Roberto Alejandro Rivera and Professor Luis F. Aviles have
read all the drafts of the manuscript, and made insightful
criticisms and valuable comments. I am deeply thankful to
them for what they have done for me.
Over the years Professor James Der Derian has been a
constant source of understanding and encouragement.
Professor Hao Wang of the Rockefeller University died
on May 13, 1995. During the last year of his life, he gave
caring and keen attention to my work on this dissertation.
Errors and weaknesses in this text are mine alone.
iv
ABSTRACT
HISTORY VERSUS NATURE:
A READING OF ARISTOTLE, HOBBES , AND HEIDEGGER
SEPTEMBER 1995
SHEN TONG
M.A., LONG ISLAND UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Nicholas Xenos
This dissertation is a reading of Aristotle, Hobbes,
and Heidegger in terms of the antithesis between the
concepts of "history" and "nature" in political thought.
"History" registers the entrenched reality of human
collectivity, viz., the fashion in which ethical identity
takes shape not in a universal cosmos of reason or nature,
but in a particularistic linguistico-ethical scheme.
Grounded on the interpretation of a historical people's
immediate experience, this Aristotelian milieu of cumulative
habituation has stood for millennia as the sole intelligible
locus of truth, and the exclusive source of ethical cohesion
and ultimate arbitration. Understood as such, politics
necessarily draws on ethical ity, not vice versa. Men can
never extricate themselves from their historicity by
rational choice or political institution. In contrast,
"nature" stands for a dehistoricized way of searching for
the source of politics in accordance with natural reason
ily. Proceeding from a critical reflection on humanon-
experience, the Hobbesian persuasion sees the Aristotelian-
Heideggerian mode of community as based on the multitude's
ignorant and irrational state of mind. The received spheres
of ethicality only make a packed space of injustice crowded
with unburdened claims, private measures, willful
manipulations, and hoarded wrongs. The exit on such a
miserable "war of all against all" lies in giving up the
attempt to find an ethical solution to the discords of
values, and reducing the irreducible evaluative
disparateness to public tranquility as the only ethico-
political test acceptable to all. Drawing on Plato, the
dissertation concludes that the rational solution predicates
itself not precisely upon metaphysical authenticity, but
rather upon a haunting distrust of the interpretative
relevance of what a people has experienced in the past.
Underlying Plato and Hobbes is the imperative that exposure
to the capriciousness of history is too much to bear.
"History" has its source in the irredeemable depravity and
incommensurable diversity ingrained deep in the kernel of
the human condition. Short of a fundamental recast of man's
soul and a clean, sustained break of the unbreakable ties to
the past, the Leviathan will remain a project next to
impossible. To the extent that "history" and "nature" are
two ultimate positions antithetic beyond rational knowledge,
a synthesis seems hard to conceive.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
. .
.
the task of working out,
positively and radically, the different
categorial structures of those entities
which are Nature and of those which are
history.
Martin Heidegger^
Niels Bohr once remarked: "It is wrong to think that
the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics
concerns what we can say about nature. Taking this insight
to its limit, the Danish physicist even doubted whether
electrons and protons were more than human inventions.
Bohr's doctrine of "complementarity" is echoed in Thomas
Kuhn's notion of "paradigm" which, in its critique of the
empiricist outlook of science, defines a way in which new
theories are viewed as being superior to and more refined
than those they usurp, not as standing in an authentic,
objective progression any closer to the cosmos of nature or
truth. Analogically, we may take thinkers in our field as
"paradigmatic" theorists, each inspiring a distinctive yet
partial way of looking at the world of ethics and politics.
The underlying theoretical constructs invariably are not
exclusive truth claims but rather linguistic inventions,
^. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , trans. John
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (New York: Harper & Row,
1962)
,
p. 451.
2. Abraham Pais, Niels Bohr's Times . (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1991)
,
p. 427.
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registering the pressing concerns of our moral experience
and collective existence. In such a perspective, the present
work is conceived to be a reading of Aristotle, Thomas
Hobbes, and Martin Heidegger. We attempt to examine the
concepts of "history" and "nature" as two antithetic
paradigms upon which ethical theory and political thought
inscribe the collectivity. We ask questions such as these:
Wherein does the locus lie on which ethical and collective
identity takes shape in real history as we have experienced
it? What is the source of Aristotle's community and
politics? How does the Philosopher evaluate the human
faculty of reason as possessing access to the truth? Why is
it, on the other hand, that Hobbes dislikes Aristotle so
much? How does Hobbes see the fundamental absurdity of the
Aristotelian emphasis on ordinary particularity and the
stake involved therein? What is the implicit reference, if
any, of Hobbes' s "war of all against all?" Does it refer to
a pre-ethical, pre-societal anarchy, belonging to a remote
past, which we leave behind once and for all the moment we
quit it? Or, could we read it as referring to a condition
closer and more value-loaded, more threatening and more
inexorable? Why does Hobbes insist on the senselessness of
historicity while he evidently is aware that historicity
commands an exclusive grip on the languages intelligible to
us in our received milieu of ethicality? Upon what does the
rational solution to the evaluative warfare predicate itself
if what it is meant to redeem humanity from happens
to be
unpleasantly true to the core of entrenched human
experience? And, are "history" and "nature" by definition
mutually exclusive? What could they imply for ethics and
politics? In view whereof, how do we assess the possibility
of a synthesis between the two ultimate persuasions? The
assumptions and concerns from which the present work will
proceed are as follows.
Community first can be paradigmatically engraved upon a
temporal space, upon accretions of antecedent experience. It
is informed by ethicality and intelligible with a general
soul. Central to this line of persuasion is a "hermeneutical
problem," underscoring our need to see the world as a
meaningful cosmos and ourselves as part of some larger
scheme. "Meaning" refers to some import, design, or purpose
that is meant to be understood, signified, or conveyed by
linguistic means, especially through an undertaking called
"interpretation." Language is the repository of tradition;
and tradition, the repository of truth. Sensible about
historical accumulations and innuendoes, the interpretative
modes of inquiry keep things in the world, and take
diversity and difference under their custody. Collective
life would be impossible without common references and a
shared sense of the past. Community can be seen as the
^. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics .
trans, and ed. David E. Linge, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1977), p. 3. And Max Weber, Economy and
Society , eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 2 Vols,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 499.
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hermeneutic interpretation of a history; and history, as the
locus on which the community transmits its identity, in
short, interpretation is history-preserving in character;
common life must be meaningful; and there therefore exists
an inherent link between language, history, and community.
The communitarian understanding of human collectivity
still subscribes to the Aristotelian concept of the human
good and the Greek confidence in a positive connection
between convention and nature. The "nature" of something
refers to its intrinsic end and the full realization of its
defining principle. Life is understood as a quest for human
telos, for a scale of strongly valued goods. Community
predicates itself upon a cohesive ethical consensus. And the
naturalness of the political association should be shored up
by the sufficiency of the ethico-linguistic convention.
Nevertheless, how to distinguish true histories from
fictions? There will be too many ultimate values and
exclusive identities. To commensurate radically
incommensurable traditions and allegiances, one has to find
an overarching standard of arbitration. The system must be
hierarchically organized with an ineliminable theological
dimension to command awe. The theistic solution calls back
the spectres of prejudice, bigotry, exclusion, and
destruction wrought in history. The terrain of ethicality
for ages has been haunted by a paradox that constructing
identity to make morality possible tends to do violence to
those to whom the historical constructions are applied.
community is a package inheritance; historicity means a
social space of wanton injustice crowded with fixed centers,
rigid boundaries, entrenched statuses, servile dependencies,
unequal power, and past wrongs. The communitarian quest for
strong moral sources and cohesion may involve a cost,
inescapable, forbidding, and appalling.
The other paradigm of political reflection finds a
progenitor in Hobbes, who draws sources of political
authority not upon history but upon a dehistoricized
abstraction, the myth of a timeless "nature." In Aristotle's
view, history is relevant with important lessons to
interpret. For Hobbes, fearful tales of the past arise from
ignorance, superstition, and irrationality. Encumbered with
too much passion and discordance to be meaningful, history
is a linguistic chaos; to read the bearings of the past is
to "decipher without a key."* Short of a sustained severance
of the inexorable links between the past, the present, and
the future, we could never escape the entrenched
encumbrances of history. In this sense, the moment of the
Leviathan marks a grand rupture, closing the prior
historical orders behind the "veil of ignorance," and
embracing the eternally contemporary cosmos of reason and
nature. The real world exists not beyond but by, within, and
through linguisticality . Truth is a function of language,
not of reality; human existence is essentially linguistic.
*. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan , ed. C.B. Macpherson, (New
York; Penguin Books, 1987), p. 83.
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All that is attainable is linguistic sobriety to keep the
unbridled tales of history at bay. The insufficiency of the
linguistic convention decides the limited purpose of it£
political equivalent. To maintain public tranquility,
agree to stay on the surface of incommensurability, get onto
the hypothetical "initial position," and institute the equal
conditions of entry. ^ Flawed and fragile though they are,
political institutions become the only sustenance we can
count on.
Such an exaltation of nature over history carries
implications, though. Alexander Hamilton inaugurates The
Federalist by identifying the fundamental question of
politics with whether societies are really capable of
establishing good government by "reflection and choice," or
they will remain condemned to "accident and force. "^ Yet
unforeseeable exigency legitimates discretional power.
Rational choice could mean "accident and force" all the
same, with consequences distasteful as well. Once the
attempts to fuse linguistic convention and nature are deemed
not only futile but also unnecessary, a firm apartheid
between private and public spheres of life comes to the
fore. However, such an ethicality-politics division is
unlikely to work well. For too many territories have simply
5. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice , (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 12, 11.
^. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The
Federalist . (New York: The Modern Library, 1937), p. 3.
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been claimed by both. Further, Hobbes concedes that justice
could be synonymous with cruelty, which he defines as
"Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, ...
proceeding from Security of their own fortune" ( Leviathan ,
pp. 109, 126). The potent feel comfortable with contingency
and freedom; the downtrodden prefer certitude and security.
It is always the former who, once free of the restraints
provided by some higher authority, tend to quit citizenry
first. The distrust of history's relevance implies an
understanding of community as merely the function of a
historically contingent language. The question left is who
has the sophistication and power to impose his vocabulary,
condemning the lot of the disprivileged to the ultimate
penalty of contingency. The schemes of historicity may be
unequal and unjust, but men living therein at least believe,
foresee, and know who they are and what they do. Indifferent
contingency could prepare stuff for, if not despotism, the
paralyzing despair, ineradicable suffering, and unconsoled
sorrow that Job endures.
History harbors "superstitious fear of Spirits," and
fosters resignation to social injustice ( Leviathan , p. 93) .
In defiance of rational vindication, historicity is unlikely
to solve the problem of ultimate incompatibility. On the
other hand, an ethics without a certain measure of sanction
might not be possessive enough. Morally insufficient,
"nature" begets utter power and sheer helplessness. The
Aristotelian persuasion would mean the paradox of ethicality
7
and the theistic solution; the Hobbesian argument could
entail cruelty and cynicism. Thus we seem stuck in a
predicament between "history" and "nature," community and
equality. Still more ominous, the resources of modern
science would be combined not only with the despotism of
rational organization but also with the forces of anti-
rational, mystical bigotry. How, then, should we live with
the tension between the truth in the Enlightenment's
aspiration to universal freedom and its legitimate protest
against hypocrisy and injustice, on the one hand, and the
truth in the communal traditions holding modernity's
arbitrary power in check, on the other? To what extent does
identity prepare privileged avenue to the truth? In what
sense should we take what we have undergone in the past
seriously? Would beliefs based on the rejection of the
interpretative relevance of our particularistic experience
give us a reliable source for identity and common action?
Could there be any alternative, when the apocalyptic hope
for a clean break with the past is dashed, to a relapse into
the dark abyss of history? The temptations may be deceptive;
the stake seems high; the implications are real. The
conceivability of any theoretical synthesis between
"history" and "nature," we therefore assume, presupposes an
understanding of what the two antithetic modes of
collectivity are all about.
The present work takes an interpretative approach. It
reads the thinkers in terms of their implications for our
8
concerns. The texts allow broad latitude for interpretation.
Presented here is an attempt merely to suggest one along
with other legitimate readings, not the exegesis of the
thinkers. The thinkers will not be addressed in a
comprehensive manner. The texts are cited only when deemed
relevant. When we do cite, we are not simply describing
their positions, nor are we necessarily endorsing what we
interpret as their positions. Selection and emphasis
inevitably involve comment, implicit though it may be. We
try throughout to marshal and orient the interpretation at
hand in the service of our larger, underlying argument,
viz., the exposure and analysis of the tension between
"history" and "nature." Our own preference as to the two
paradigms can hardly become more explicit until we move to
the Conclusion
. Even there we will remain interpretative in
approach. Moreover, the present work draws on the thinkers
as if they were engaging in an on-going dialogue with one
another. Being aware that such an assumption of linguistic
commensurability is itself theoretically problematic, we
elect to do so because other than the texts there is nothing
we can rely on as a measure of the trade. After all, the
thinkers themselves to variant extents perceived what they
were doing that way, as evident in the contrasting views
that Hobbes and Heidegger held on Aristotle. We choose
Aristotle, Hobbes, and Heidegger as the principal
interlocutors, therefore, not only because we recognize
their relevance on individual bases, but also because we
suspect that such a combination taken as an organic whole
may, more than others, furnish the locus intelligible to our
purpose. To be more specific, a treatment of the three
thinkers in this way will presumably shed light on the
following issues.
We read Aristotle (primarily the Nicomachean Ethics ^ in
terms of his underlying distinction between practical wisdom
and theoretical knowledge. Attention will focus, in Chapter
II, on the way in which Aristotle treats ethical conesion as
the source of community, and ethos as the fountainhead of
identity. Emerging from such accounts is historia
. a
distinctive sphere of collectivity which assumes the
standing of a paradigm independent of that of nature. The
essential understanding is that the Philosopher would
dismiss any attempt to disjoint the realm of collective life
from that of ethics, and that the solution to the evaluative
conflicts can be found not in politics but only in moral
disposition and identification. This Aristotelian formula
implies, though, that the ultimate criteria at bottom rest
with the arbitrary experiences prevailing since time
immemorial within the particularistic historical contexts,
for otherwise there is no way compelling enough to move men
beyond the domain of knowledge and onto that of moral
action.
Chapter III addresses Hobbes (mainly Leviathan) as an
ethical thinker engaged in a debate against Aristotle, we
are most interested in Hobbes 's invention of the state of
10
nature, its evaluative attribute, perpetual danger, and
arguably its reference to the Aristotelian paradigm of
historia. The chapter concentrates on Hobbes's assertion of
the insufficiency of language, his rejection of the
interpretative relevance of historical experience, his
attack on the traditional modes of collectivity as based on
ignorance, superstition, and injustice, and his formulation
of men's self-preservation as the sole eligible test of
public ethics. It is understood that, for Hobbes, the exit
on the linguistic and conceptual anarchy rests not with
ethical ity but with politics, which in turn draws on the
universal cosmos of reason and nature.
Chapter IV takes Heidegger ( Being and Time for the
main) as an explicative footnote to Aristotle, and meanwhil<
as a critique of Hobbes 's paradigm of nature. It draws on
Heidegger's distinction between the two basic modes of
existence, and investigates his treatment of interpretation
language, community, logos, and history. Such a reading
shows the way in which Heidegger exposes the derivativeness
and secondariness of the principium rationis and thereby
explodes the myth of man as the animal rationale . In doing
so, Heidegger lays bare what he calls "the hermeneutical
Situation," a primordial linguistico-ethical scheme wherein
and wherein alone, authentic collective identity is
constituted in the first place. The primacy of this
Heideggerian ontology of "history" over that of "nature"
construes Aristotle's emphasis on ethos and historia , and
11
undermines Hobbes's appeal to universal
for all its theoretical convincingness,
pre-rational, more mysterious, and more
mischievous implications might ensue.
reason. Only that,
it is so much more
intractable that
12
CHAPTER II
ARISTOTLE: ETHOS AND HISTORIA AS A SECOND NATURE
The prevailing theory ... [was]
commonly attributed to Aristotle — that
all knowledge consists of generalizations
from experience.
John Stuart Mill^
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics poses two crucial
questions without, in a somewhat puzzling way, giving
definite answers. The first issue relates to the definition
of the best life for man to lead; the second concerns how to
identify the criterion of moral virtue. The difficulty of
the former is not that Aristotle fails to discuss it, but
that in his discussions he provides two seemingly
conflicting answers. At the outset of the treatise,
Aristotle assumes that every activity aims at an ultimate
end, and that the goods arrange themselves in a hierarchic
order. Proceeding from this teleological assumption he moves
to the "ergon argument" in Chapter 7 of Book 1. The
"function" peculiar to man rests in a practical life as "an
activity of the soul in accordance with, or implying, a
rational principle (logos)," and the best possible life is a
life of eudaimonia (happiness, or "human flourishing"), "an
^. John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarianism
and Other Essays , ed. Alan Ryan, (New York: Penguin Books,
1987)
,
p. 184.
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activity of soul in accordance with virtue (arete) . "2 Human
nature, however, is composite, involving in an ensouled body
the interaction of the rational and irrational, nutrition
and feelings, habit and action (praxis). And virtue in the
Aristotelian sense of the term refers to a purposive
disposition (hexis)
,
a right state of character (ethos) that
lies in a mean. It is concerned with choice and defined by a
rational principle by which the man of practical wisdom
(phronimos) would determine it (EN. llOVal) . According to
this account of the ergon-virtue-happiness progression,
eudaimonia essentially covers the full range of human life
in accordance with the broad excellences of moral virtue and
practical wisdom (phronesis)
. Most of the Nicomachean Ethics
seeks to fill in this general formula, examining first the
moral characters and then the intellectual virtues. Toward
the close of the treatise, however, a change in tone occurs
in Chapter 7 of Book 10. Here the perfect eudaimonia
consists in a life of pure philosophical activity (theoria)
,
in which the mind contemplates eternal and unchanging
subject matters. Such a non-practical existence of
"contemplative activity" would be beyond human resources to
attain, for it is not insofar as we are human beings that we
will live so, but insofar as "something divine" is present
in us. It eclipses the civil and political life of practical
2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , trans. J.A.K.
Thomson, (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), (EN- hereafter),
1094al-25, 1098a8, 1098al6.
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wisdom (or prudence) that Aristotle commends up to this
point. Concerned with the muddle of change and chance in the
sublunary world, phronesis in comparison pales to an
existence of "secondary degree" (EN. 1177allff.). Aristotle
does not say in any direct way how the claims of virtuous
action and that of theoria are in principle to be reconciled
in the best human life. By the end of the Nicomachean Ethics
it remains unclear what exactly the summum bonum is. The
second unanswered question is raised explicitly at the
beginning of Book 6. Moral conduct, Aristotle believes,
should be regulated by his "doctrine of the mean" dictated
by "the right principle." "But," he points out,
although to say this is true, it is not at all
explicit, because as a matter of fact in all the other
occupations about which there is a science it is true
to say that one should exert oneself and relax neither
too much nor too little, but to a mean extent and as
the right principle dictates; but if you grasped only
this, you would know nothing more — e.g. you would not
know what remedies to apply to your body if someone
told you to take what medical science prescribes and as
a medical man prescribes it. Hence in the case of the
states of the soul also it is not enough to have this
precept truly enunciated; we need also to have it
determined what the right principle is, and what the
standard is by which it is established. (EN- 1138bl8-
34.)
Involved here is the issue of the final test or criterion of
moral action. Since there are a multitude of human
excellences, which type is the best and most complete? For
advice at the level of practical action, Aristotle suggests
that we go to the phronimos who, though not necessarily well
versed in theoretical knowledge, is by virtue and by
15
experience able to "see correctly" the truth in every kind
of particular situation (EN- 1113a31-34, ll41b8-20, Il43bl0-
14). But by reference to what ultimate goal does the
phronimos decide what ought to be done? Aristotle in the
Nicomachean Ethics never subsequently takes up this question
and tackles it head-on to state what specifically "the right
principle" is.
Nevertheless, the Eudemian Ethics seems to have
provided us with an unequivocal answer. This other
Aristotelian treatise on ethical theory likewise exhibits an
indecision, similar to that in the Nicomachean Ethics ,
between the two accounts of eudaimonia
. and assigns most of
the work to the comprehensive exposition of practical action
in the imperfect world. The difference is that the switch of
tone at its close to the divine part of man appears to be
starker with unmistakable explicity:
Therefore whatever mode of choosing and of
acquiring things good by nature — whether goods of
body or wealth or friends or the other goods — will
best promote the contemplation of God, that is the best
mode, and that standard is the finest; and any mode of
choice and acquisition that either through deficiency
or excess hinders us from serving and from
contemplating God — that is a bad one. This is how it
is for the spirit, and this is the best spiritual
standard — to be as far as possible unconscious of the
irrational part of the spirit, as such.
Thus Aristotle conceives of his system by bringing God into
the scene. He goes on to conclude the treatise as follows:
"Let this, then, be our statement of what is the standard of
16
nobility and what is the aim of things absolutely good. "3 m
one word, Aristotle's ethics purports to test theodicy. With
such an assertion of the positive connection between the
attributes of God and the present order in the world,
Aristotle at once answers the second question and clears
away his indecision about the first question. The
perplexities seem to have been relieved in the hierarchic
system of goods with the divine test imposed upon it as the
summum genus. However, the reason behind this appeal to the
ultimate theistic solution is not simple; it bears upon a
tension underlying Aristotle's ethical and political theory
between theoria and phronesis
. universality and
particularity. Our concern is to understand where Aristotle
posits himself in this tension, and assess the way in which
he articulates his position through it.'*
3
. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics , trans. H. Rackham,
(London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1938), (EE. hereafter),
1249bl6-25.
4
. When we first set about the present work, we asked
the question why it was that Thomas Hobbes disliked
Aristotle so much. There must be some weighty reason behind
it, we suspected. The present work is conceived, then, not
as a study of Aristotle per se . but as an investigation of
the antithesis between Aristotle and Hobbes. This is the
major difference between the present work and most other
studies on Aristotle. When we read Aristotle, we also keep
Plato in the back of the mind, assuming, as Martha Nussbaum
does, that the two Greeks view human experience and politics
in ultimately distinctive perspectives. Martha C. Nussbaum,
The Fragility of Goodness . (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992) . This is why we feel it necessary to return to
Plato in the Conclusion of the present work. And we differ
from the commentators who in this regard assume otherwise,
as Alasdair Maclntyre does when he poses the choice
"Nietzsche or Aristotle," and as Bernard Williams does when
he maintains that, as against Sophocles and Thucydides,
17
"Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel are all on the same side "
Si?ve?sitfo^M^^' (Notre Dame, Indiana?'Uni ersity f Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 109-119 256-259-and Bernard Williams, Shame and N.n.i^^^^^, (Berkel4v?
university of California Press, 1993), pp. ies, 166 At thebeginning of Aristotle's Parts of Anir^.V^ the^e is a longpassage (644b23-645a30) which, we believe, pierces to thecore of the Aristotelian position vis-a-vis the Platonic
aversion from, and contempt for, ordinary humanity: "Of
substances constituted by nature some are ungeneratedimperishable, and eternal, while others are subject togeneration and decay. The former are excellent and divinebut less accessible to knowledge. The evidence that might'throw light on them ... is furnished but scantily by
sensation; whereas respecting perishable plants and animals
we have abundant information, living as we do in their
midst, and ample data may be collected concerning all their
various kinds, if only we are willing to take sufficient
pains.
... In certitude and in completeness our knowledge of
terrestrial things has the advantage. Moreover, their
greater nearness and affinity to us balances somewhat the
loftier interest of the heavenly things that are the objects
of the higher philosophy. Having already treated of the
celestial world, as far as our conjectures could reach, we
proceed to treat of animals, without omitting, to the best
of our ability, any member of the kingdom, however ignoble.
... We therefore must not recoil with childish aversion from
the examination of the humbler animals. Every realm of
nature is marvellous: and as Heraclitus, when the strangers
who came to visit him found him warming himself at the
furnace in the kitchen and hesitated to go in, is reported
to have bidden them not to be afraid to enter, as even in
that kitchen divinities were present, so we should venture
on the study of every kind of animal without distaste; for
each and all will reveal to us something natural and
something beautiful. ... If any person thinks the
examination of the rest of the animal kingdom an unworthy
task, he must hold in like disesteem the study of man. For
no one can look at the elements of the human frame — blood,
flesh, bones, vessels, and the like — without much
repugnance." Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle , ed.
Jonathan Barnes, 2 Vols, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1991), pp. 1003-1004. We take these remarks as the
lead for our reading of Aristotle. And in our examination of
the concepts of "history" and "nature," we deem Nussbaum's
conclusion alarming, i.e., "We do live in the world that
Aristotle describes," and consider her question to the
point, i.e., "Whether we really wish to live in this
Aristotelian world." The Fragility of Goodness , pp. 421,
399. Reading the Aristotelian texts, this chapter relies in
the main on the following as secondary literature: J.L.
Ackrill, Aristotle the Philosopher . (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1991); W.F.R. Bardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory,
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A. Arete Independent of Logos
We begin with the assumption that Aristotle in his
ethics is to an extent arguing against Socrates' equation of
virtue with knowledge and Plato's metaphysical doctrine of
the otherworldly Form of the Good.^ Philosophy, as Socrates
sees it, refers primarily not to a profession, discipline,
or preoccupation, but above all to a specific way of life,
an intransigently nonutilitarian form of human existence. We
the mortal creatures are ignorant as to the true answers to
the most important questions such as "what is good" and "how
one ought to live." The keen awareness with which the
philosopher perceives this ignorance leads to the discovery
that "the greatest good of man" resides in a persevering
(Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1968) ; R.G. Mulgan,
Aristotle's Political Theory
,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1977); Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, (ed.). Essays on Aristotle's
Ethics
.
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980)
;
and Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji,
(eds.), Articles on Aristotle . 4 Vols, (especially Vol. 2,
Ethics and Politics ) , (London: Gerald Duckworth & Company
Limited, 1975-1979)
.
^. Ascription of the authorship of doctrines in the
Platonic dialogues is beyond our central concern here. We
just take the generally recognized understanding that the
Socrates in the earlier dialogues such as the Apology ,
Crito, Euthvphro , and Gorgias is Plato's representation of
the historical Socrates, while the Socrates in the dialogues
of the middle and later periods is a nom de plume for Plato
himself. Probably registering views current in the Academy,
Aristotle, as we shall see in what follows, allocates the
identification of virtue with knowledge to the real
Socrates. And in his Metaphysics , 1038bll, 1078b9-32,
1079b36-1080a2 , Aristotle gives testimony to Plato's
exclusive authorship of the theory of the Form. The Complete
Works of Aristotle, pp. 1639, 1705, 1707.
19
undertaking of "examining myself and others," an existence
"daily to discourse about virtue." Hence the Socratic
aphorism that "the unexamined life is not worth living."*
Aristotle in his theoria argument subscribes to a comparable
view, but he seems aware with sharper acuteness of the self-
evident undesirability, for us the thriving earthworms in
the Cave, of that contemplative way of existence. In the
Eudemian Ethics , he indicates his recognition that the
temptation of the sensual delights tends to be so inviting
that devotion to theoria makes one look like "an odd sort of
person.
"
While there are many different things as to which
it is not easy to make a right judgement, this is
especially the case with one about which everybody
thinks that it is very easy to judge and that any body
can decide — the question which of the things
contained in being alive is preferable, and which when
attained would fully satisfy a man's desire. (EE.
1215b8-19.
)
On the basis of such doubt, Aristotle defines his own
position with the emphasis not so much on theoria as on
phronesis . viz., practical wisdom. This crucial shift of
stress signals the independence of ethics from philosophy.
*. The Four Socratic Dialogues of Plato , trans.
Benjamin Jowett, (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1961),
38a. See also Plato's Republic . 352d, "The argument concerns
no casual topic, but one's whole manner of living." Plato's
Republic , trans. G.M.A. Grube, (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1986). And the Gorgias . 500c, "The subject of our discussion
[is] what kind of life one should live." The Collected
Dialogues of Plato , eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington
Cairns, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p.
283 .
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And accordingly he introduces to the moral agency a
restrictive attribute "if not by everybody, at all events by
all of mankind who are worthy of consideration" (EE.
1216bl)
.
Then Aristotle moves to join issue with Socrates on
the latter 's equation of virtue to knowledge:
Socrates the senior thought that the End is to get
to know virtue, and he pursued an inquiry into the
nature of justice and courage and each of the divisions
of virtue. And this was a reasonable procedure, since
he thought that all the virtues are forms of knowledge,
so that knowing justice and being just must go
together.
What Aristotle is registering here is his grave
reservations: action cannot be equated with knowledge;
ethical pursuits are radically distinctive from science:
Although ... it is fine even to attain a knowledge
of the various fine things, all the same nevertheless
in the case of goodness it is not the knowledge of its
essential nature that is most valuable but the
ascertainment of the sources that produce it. For our
aim is not to know what courage is but to be
courageous, not to knov/ what justice is but to be just.
(EE. 1216b2-23.)
These lines contain, besides the essential distinction
between knowledge and action, probably the most
characteristic theme of Aristotelian ethical theory: the
need to ascertain the source of ethicality. As we will see,
Aristotle makes it his business to add this "most valuable"
supplement to the Socratic project. Comparable arguments are
present in Aristotle's debate with Plato. Preceding the
ergon argument in the Nicomachean Ethics , Aristotle observes
21
that Plato and his followers in the Academy believe in the
existence of a universal, self-subsistent entity of Good."^
"Over and above" the sublunary world of time and change, the
Form is the cause of all the particular goods such as
pleasure, wealth, or eminence. In contrast to the
metaphysical otherworldliness of Platonism, Aristotle
concerns himself with this real and substantial world.
According to his "first philosophy" (metaphysics) , forms are
inseparable from what they form. The Platonic notion of the
common Idea cannot escape what we may call "Aristotle's
Dilemma:" on the one hand, the particular human pursuits are
too plural and diverse to be covered by a single universal
good common to all; on the other hand, even if the Form
alone as the Good did have a separate existence of its own
in some supersensible realm, it could not be attained by the
ordinary man of practice. Indifferent to common sense and
clashing with phronesis , the representation of the Form
either as a temporal and perceivable object or as a
metaphysical property will be "purposeless" from the point
of view of action. Aristotle then asks:
See, for example, the Republic . 505aff. "In the
intelligible world," as Plato sees it, "the Form of the Good
is the last to be seen, and with difficulty; when seen it
must be reckoned to be for all the cause of all that is
right and beautiful, to have produced in the visible world
both light and the fount of light, while in the intelligible
world it is itself that which produces and controls truth
and intelligence, and he who is to act intelligently in
public or in private must see it." 517b-c.
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What advantage in his art will a weaver or aDoiner get from knowledge of this good-itself? Or how
tiiLS^^ ""^^^^^ ^ ""^^^^^ °f Id^^ itself becomehereby a better doctor or general? As a matter of factIt does not appear that the doctor even studies healthin this way; his concern is the health of a humanbeing, or perhaps rather of a particular patient,because what he treats is the individual. (EN. 1095a26-28, 1096al0-1097al4.)
The positive connection between knowledge and action is an
exaggeration. The question Aristotle asks instead concerns
what is humanly good in terms of human action. Through the
critique of Socrates' and Plato's intellectualism as an
empty abstraction, he shows that knowledge does not
subscribe to a unitary mode, and that ethics is independent
of metaphysics, arete of logos
. and, as we will argue,
history of nature.
B. Practical Particularity and Experience
Therefore, the central theme informing Aristotle's
position concerns the practical particularity of ethical
conduct based on a fundamental distinction between theoria
and phronesis . To proceed assessing the role that reason, or
logos, plays in moral action, Aristotle finds that as
peculiar human faculties, theoretical knowledge and its
practical counterpart both belong in the rational part of
the soul, and both assume "some similarity and affinity
between subject and object." But, according to his account,
these two principal sections of human knowledge differ
fundamentally from each other. Committed to demonstration
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and proof, theoretical sciences rely on disinterested
observation of the objects whose "first principles"
eternal, immovable, and of necessity. In contrast, phronesis
constitutes "one distinct part of the rational soul." The
practical inquiries deal with more contingent subject
matters which exhibit "much difference and variety," have
"little fixity," and are "irregular" and "not rigid" (EN.
1094bl5, 1104a4, 1137b30-32, 1139a3-16)
. It is impossible
for ethics to achieve the exactitude of, say, mathematics.
Knowledge that cannot be applied to the concrete situation
on the other hand remains meaningless. Among the practical
pursuits, production ("making") aims at an end other than
itself; purposive action ("doing") is for its own sake with
no end other than "merely doing well." Involved from the
very start therefore is a moral aim, a positive motif (EN.
1140b4-7) . Ethical conduct implies man's rational faculty of
choice; choice is based on deliberation. The object of
choice is not ends in their own right nor something beyond
our control, but practical measures within our power towards
an end, which we deem desirable by deliberation. When we
have reached a judgment as the result of deliberation, we
direct our aim in accordance with the deliberation (EN.
Illlb5-1113al4) . An act is done in a virtuous way not merely
because it carries a certain quality, but of necessity when
the agent does it knowingly, and chooses to do it for its
own sake and from a fixed disposition of moral character
(EN. 1105a28-34). This is the way Aristotle's "practical
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syllogism" works. The major premiss contains a universal
judgment of value ("dry food is good for every man"), and
the minor premiss states a particular connection ("this sort
of food is dry"). The key point is that the conclusion the
agent draws from the combination of the two premisses cannot
be merely another statement: "in the practical syllogism it
must immediately act on it" (the agent eats the food)
.
Unfortunately, Aristotle points out, there will be "an
immeasurable distance" between having knowledge of the
premisses and putting the knowledge into action. The working
of the "practical syllogism" more often than not may be
complicated by errors, desire, ignorance, incontinence, and
other circumstantial factors (EN. 1146b31ff.). The
irrational part of the soul constantly asserts itself, which
also consists of two parts, the vegetative and the
appetitive. By "vegetative" Aristotle means the biological
cause of nutrition and growth which, not peculiar to man,
has no association with reason. The appetitive part of the
soul on the other hand is receptive of and does participate
in reason in so far as it listens to and obeys it. Our
"appetition" (orexis, desire) is open to rational persuasion
in the way a child pays attention to its father (EN.
1102a26ff.). In an irrational being, however, the desire for
pleasure is insatiable even if it has tried every source of
gratification. If appetites are strong and violent they even
expel the power of reason. So the appetitive element ought
to be controlled by the rational principle (EN- 1119b7-14)
.
In this sense, the rational faculty of moral choice is "a
deliberate appetition" (EN. 1113all) . If the choice is to be
good, not only the reasoning needs to be true, but also the
desire must be right. Whereas the function of theoria is to
reach the truth (not falsehood) , that of phronesis is "to
arrive at the truth that corresponds to right appetition."
Therefore,
The origin of action (the efficient, not the final
cause) is choice, and the origin of choice is
appetition and purposive reasoning. Hence choice
necessarily involves not only intellect and thought,
but a certain moral state; ... choice is either
appetitive intellect or intellectual appetition; and
man is a principle of this kind. (EN. 1139a22-b4.)
Man is a causative union of reason with appetition. Aware of
the tension therein, Aristotle is anxious to maintain some
extent of necessary connection between knowing something to
be the best thing to do and actually doing it. At stake is
the intelligibility of human action. Yet he knows that the
link between reason and the good is a slender and delicate
one. On individual occasions merely a fleeting desire for
immediate pleasure may break it (EN- 1146b31ff.). For all
these reasons, moral inquiry deals not principally with
knowledge but with action. Knowing about the virtues as
states of character does not make one any more capable of
doing them. We inquire not to know what goodness is
theoretically, but to become good men in practice. And
practical actions are "concerned with particular facts" (EN.
1095a5, 1103b26-30, 1107a28-32, 1143b24-25) . The entire
concern of any account resides so much in "its application
to particular problems" that "the agents are compelled at
every step to think out for themselves what the
circumstances demand" (EN. 1104a5-9) . The radical
infiniteness and variability of the subject matter of
practical inquiry preclude the possibility of reducing
morals to a set of strict rules which hold in all individual
cases. Needed instead is the use of a "Lesbian rule" which,
of an indefinite shape, adapts itself to changing particular
circumstances (EN. Il37b31)
.
Virtue on Aristotle's account is twofold. Wisdom and
intelligence and prudence are among the intellectual
excellences; courage and liberality and temperance and
moderation, among the moral virtues. According to the
outline of the intellectual virtues in Book 6 of the
Nicomachean Ethics , the "Lesbian rule" involves primarily
not reason but experience, perception, intuitive judgment,
and, above all, practical wisdom. First, moral virtue is a
mean between two vices of excess and deficiency. But this
doctrine does not have much, if any at all, practical or
advisory force. It will be sooner said than done, especially
in particular cases, to find the right mid-point in feelings
and actions. It will be difficult to determine, for
instance, how and with whom, on what provocation and for how
long, one should be angry. Moral judgment is a question of
degree. Sometimes we praise those who fall short and call
them good-tempered, and sometimes we praise those who
get
27
angry and call them manly. "It is not easy to define by rule
for how long, and how much, a man may go wrong before he
incurs blame; ... Such questions of degree occur in
particular cases, and the decision lies with our perception"
(EN. 1109a20ff.). Second, the intellectual virtue of
intuition touches upon the tension underlying Aristotle's
ethical theory between theoria and phronesis
. for it
is concerned with ultimates in both directions; because
it is intuition and not reason that grasps both the
first and the ultimate terms: the intuition concerned
with demonstration having as its objects the primary
immutable terms, and the intuition that operates in
practical inferences being concerned with the ultimate
and contingent, i.e. the minor premiss. For these are
the starting-points for arriving at the end, because it
is from particular instances that general rules are
established. So these particulars need to be perceived;
and this perception is intuition. (EN. 1143a35-b5.)
Thus intuitive judgment functions in practice to link the
particular circumstances to the invariable first principles
of theoria . And universal rules derive from, and therefore
reside in, the particularity of real life.
Third, Aristotle attaches enormous importance to human
experience and affirms the interpretative relevance of it.
In the Metaphysics , he categorizes the faculty of experience
(empeiria) as coming from sensation and memory. "Many
memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for
a single experience." Experience in turn makes the
foundation on which science and art arise. Artists are wiser
than men of experience, because the former exercise
universal judgment and know the causes of things while the
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latter only know the facts. True knowledge therefore belongs
to science and art rather than to experience. Lastly,
philosophy (sophia) addresses first causes and principles,
and theoretical knowledge is more of the nature of
philosophy. "With a view to action," nevertheless,
experience seems in no respect inferior to art, and we
even see men of experience succeeding more than those
who have theory without experience. The reason is that
experience is knowledge of individuals, art of
universals, and actions and productions are all
concerned with the individual; for the physician does
not cure a man, except in an incidental way, but
Callias or Socrates or some other called by some such
individual name, who happens to be a man.®
In his ethical argument Aristotle underlines his trust in
empeiria even more markedly. Since experience deals with the
particular circumstances, with which moral actions are
concerned, intuitive insight depends upon experience. When
conflict arises in particular situations between a general
rule and an intuitive judgment, a man of age or experience
or prudence will be better able to deliberate than a general
principle.^ And since experience takes time to take shape,
one should in moral matters attend more to the opinions of
older and experienced men, unexamined though they are, than
to demonstrated theoretical knowledge. "We should
therefore," maintains Aristotle,
®. Metaphysics . 980b26-982a2 . The Compl ete Works of
Aristotle , pp. 1552-1553.
^. See also Aristotle, Politics , ed. Stephen Everson,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1286a21.
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pay no less attention to the unproved assertions and
n^il^lo'i'^^K^
experienced and older people [or of prudentpeop e] than to demonstrations of fact; because thevhave an insight from their experience which enablesthem to see correctly. (EN. 1143bl0-14.)
On such account, that is to say, Aristotle endorses
interpretation of past experience as a fundamental mode of
inquiry even though he clearly is aware that empeiria
.
predicated on sensation and memory, belongs in a
comparatively inferior category of human cognition, and that
interpretation, more often than not, is but "unproved
assertion" of truth, not scientific knowledge nor rational
argument. When tension mounts between theoria and phronesis .
Plato, deeply suspicious of the relevance of empeiria
. tends
to withdraw from the Cave.^° Due to his bent toward
In the Republic Plato does insist that the
philosopher must return to the Cave after the soul's upward
journey to the intelligible realm. Still, Plato makes no
secret of his poignant awareness of the "unwillingness," and
even likely "refusal," on the part of the philosopher to do
so and "occupy ... [himself] with human affairs." See the
Republic
,
517c, 519d, 520c. The philosopher's reluctance
betrays itself further in the astonishing abruptness with
which Plato closes his last dialogue, the Laws, 969c-d;
"Megillus: My dear Clinias, after all that has now been
said, we shall either have to abandon the foundation of your
city or else to be deaf to our friend's excuses, and try
every entreaty and inducement to secure him as a co-operator
in the foundation. / Clinias: Very true, Megillus. I will do
as you wish, and you must assist me. / Megillus: Count upon
me." The Collected Dialogues of Plato , p. 1513. In other
words, the Athenian Stranger eventually remains silent.
Presumably owing to the reserve and distrust with which he
views human experience, linguistic persuasion, and
conventional collectivity, Plato in the end never lets us
know whether or not his philosopher will agree to accept
political responsibility and involve himself in the founding
of the city.
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practical particularity, Aristotle is more willing to go
with phronesis in the imperfect world of common experience.
Finally, "prudence
... involves knowledge of particular
facts, which become known from experience" (1142al5)
. in
other words, the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom
(phronesis ) owes its taking shape to the accretions of
particularistic experience. Defined as "a true state,
reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that
are good or bad for man" (EN- 1140b5)
, phronesis
is not concerned with universals only; it must also
take cognizance of particulars, because it is concerned
with conduct, and conduct has its sphere in particular
circumstances. That is why some people who do not
possess <theoretical> knowledge are more effective in
action (especially if they are experienced) than others
who do possess it. (EN- 1141bl5.)
Here comes another theme, i.e., the central human virtues go
together as an interlocking whole. They are not only
compatible with but also intimately related to each other;
the presence of each requires the presence of all. Virtue,
good for its own sake "without qualification," is not merely
a state of character in accordance with "the right
principle," but a state that "implies" the presence of that
principle. In Aristotle's view, phronesis stands for the
summum bonum in the practical sphere of moral action.
In Plato's Protagoras , 329b-331e, Socrates
initiates the doctrine of moral unity that the seemingly
different virtues of courage, holiness, justice, temperance,
and wisdom are in some sense one and the same. The Collected
Dialogues of Plato , pp. 324-327.
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Therefore the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom, on
the one hand, and all moral virtues, on the other hand,
presuppose the presence of each other. Upon conclusion of
Book 6 he gets back to the question about the necessary
criterion for moral action:
The right principle in moral conduct is prudence.
. .
.
The possession of the single virtue of prudence
will carry with it the possession of them all. (EN.
1144b27-1145al. ) —
It is impossible to be good in the true sense of the word
without being intellectually wise in practical matters. And
it is equally impossible to be a phronimos without being
morally virtuous. Aristotle illustrates this theme by
describing a man of "unscrupulousness" (deinotes) as the
debased version of the phronimos . The man of deinotes stands
for the most appalling evil precisely because he is well
versed in rational deliberation and choice, and fully
"capable" of finding the correct means to attain whatever
end he pursues. Be the mark noble, the cleverness is
laudable; if ignoble, unscrupulous. The only test that works
against this dangerous type of human monstrosity lies in the
unity of the virtues. For the "practical syllogism" works
such that it always starts with a correct discernment of the
major premiss, viz., "the Good, that is the supreme good"
(EN. 1144a23-35, 1094a22) . This notion of moral coherence
and inseparability between moral and intellectual goodness
explains why Aristotle finds it impossible to single out
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from among the moral virtues one specific criterion for
moral judgment, and instead advises consulting the
phronimos. Only the man with the intellectual virtue of
practical wisdom can exercise intuitive judgment to bridge
the gulf between universal principles and particular
circumstances. The Aristotelian system has to be understood
as a unitary, hierarchic structure in which a cosmic order
dictates the place of each virtue in a harmonious fashion.
Truth in the ethical sphere consists in the conformity of
practical activity to that cosmic order, and is linked to
the divine as its highest cause and ultimate resort. This
notwithstanding, the theistic principle is not an empty
abstraction beyond the sublunary world of common sense. "All
the virtues ... imply prudence" (EN- 1144b22-24) . The
intellectual excellence of practical wisdom functions on its
behalf as the final yardstick of moral action. Since
empeiria makes the source of phronesis , Aristotle seems to
be saying that particularistic human experience and its
interpretation underlie both the soul's moral drive for the
good and its intellectual quest for the truth.
C. Conflict and Coherence
Aristotle feels it necessary to appeal to the ultimate
divine criterion and to insist on the totality of the
virtues precisely because he knows that arete is plural,
and
that its perception, diverse. It can be generally
agreed
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that the highest of the goods is happiness, "but when it
comes to saying in what happiness consists, opinions differ"
(EN- 1095a20)
.
The good life moves to a climax in the
contemplation of the divine. Nevertheless, theoria stays
situated within phronesis in which a variety of secondary
human excellences have to obtain at the various relevant
stages. The telos as a certain kind of life is to be
achieved in the way life as a whole is constructed. In Book
VII of the Politics . Aristotle assumes that there are
external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. A
man cannot be happy unless he acquires all the three
categories. A virtuous life must be equipped with external
goods as instruments. This includes political life in the
city, and thus those are wrong who regard the life of a
practical politician as degrading. "But," Aristotle remarks,
"men differ about the degree or relative superiority of this
or that good" ( Politics . 1323a35) . So he presents the
plurality and diversity of the virtues, and the problem of
their hierarchic ordering in the good life. Rival standards
of moral action arising therefrom may be mutually
incompatible and exclusive. Theoretically we can all agree
on the "doctrine of the mean," but in practice we may
disagree entirely on the issue of degree as to where to draw
the line.^^ To solve this problem of incompatibility, some
^2 Aristotle would underwrite with caution the
Socratic view that divergence in evaluative claims as to
"just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable"
creates "enmity and anger" because of our inability to
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thesis compelling enough to command awe becomes
indispensable. Thus, Aristotle goes on to argue, happiness,
whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both, is more
often found with those who are most highly cultivated in
their mind and in their character, and who have only a
moderate share of external goods, than among those who
possess external goods to a useless extent but are
"deficient in higher qualities" ( Politics . 1323a40-b6) . The
important word here is "deficient." We choose what we best
know to be good, but the choice is based solely on our
opinion which, due to our deficiency in moral character, we
do not in the least know to be good. We are not equally good
at making the best choices and forming the best opinions.
Some may have fairly good opinions, but "through a moral
defect fail to make the right choices" (EN. 1112al0)
.
Aristotle treats conflict as an evil, but it is an evil
eliminable in principle. He does not view the dilemmatic
situation of incompatibility as an irremediable dilemma. "A
choice is more properly praised for choosing the right
object than for being correct in itself" (EN. 1112a5) , and
"goodness is the cause of the End aimed at by choice being
right" (EE- 1228al) . Thus virtue prepares the ground for,
and facilitates, the correctness of the purposive choice's
"measure" them "by resorting to a weighing machine." The
Four Socratic Dialogues of Plato . 7, pp. 18-19. But, due to
his emphasis on the variety of particular circumstances, he
most certainly would reject Plato's commensuration that the
king experiences 729 times more pleasure than the dictator.
Republic . 587d-588a.
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end, though the choice itself is not of the end but of the
means adopted for the sake of the end. Becoming a virtuous
man renders it possible for one to make "correct" choice in
the Aristotelian sense. In other words, human flaws should
and could be corrected. The theme of human deficiency
appears in the Poetics where Aristotle addresses a
distinctive view of life presented by tragedy.
The social orders and institutions of the Greek world
from which the Aristotelian account of justice and phronesis
emerges are not an arena of harmony. They make a milieu of
conflict within which plural and opposing modes of values,
outlooks, claims, and actions engage in argument, rivalry,
and, at extremes, war.^^ Such a general state of
heterogeneity and incoherence in the use of evaluative
language in Athenian culture has been addressed for example
by Sophocles. In the Philoctetes , the fifth-century
tragedian uses Odysseus and Neoptolemus to present two
antagonistic standards of honorable conduct, two
incompatible conceptions of the way in which all Athenian
citizens have to confront the issues raised by their common
history. In the Antigone , the demands for allegiance to the
family and to the polls assert themselves in a comparable
"One must know that war is common and right ( dike ,
justice) is strife and that all things are happening by
strife and necessity." Heraclitus, The Cosm ic Fragments, ed.
G.S. Kirk, (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1954), p.
238. Aristotle quotes part of this statement at the outset
of his treatment of friendship. He dismisses it as
"belong [ing] to natural philosophy" and therefore
"irrelevant" to his purpose there. See EN- 1155b8.
way as mutually antagonistic
. The existence of
incompatible conceptions of the virtues is presented as a
matter of fundamental reality of life. There always are bad
fortunes that happen to human beings through no fault of
their own. The situation is tragic in that the conflict is
conflict of good with good, and human beings have to
recognize the authority of all claims and sacrifice some.
Either they blunt their ethical sensibilities, or they bear
the inevitable costs of their attempt to eliminate
evaluative equivocation. It is crucial to the structure of
the tragedy that Sophocles provides no rational solution to
the conflict in the Philoctetes; the action, rather, is
interrupted by a verdict of the semi-divine Heracles and an
intrusion of the justice of Zeus, leaving the gap between
rival allegiances unbridged. So the appeal to divine
intervention is made in a particular way merely to recognize
the tragic impasse, having little to do with the
metaphysical contemplation located at the pinnacle of the
Aristotelian hierarchy of the goods.
The life of theoria as the ultimate telos would be
inconceivable in the Sophoclean world. This inconceivability
explains Aristotle's insistence on the human ergon and moral
coherence and inseparability. Proceeding from these
compelling theses, he regards virtue and conflict as
14^ See The Complete Greek Tragedies , eds. David Grene
and Richmond Lattimore, (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1991 and 1969), Sophocles. I, pp. 159-212;
Sophocles. II , pp. 189-254.
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mutually exclusive. There should be no rival goods at war
with each other. The tragic situation does not occur from
incommensurability of evaluative claims inherent in the
essential human condition. It is enacted only when there is
a hero flawed due to inadequate possession or exercise of
some virtue. That the tragic choice is unavoidable is itself
a symptom that the consensus on the use of evaluative terms
in an ethical community is falling apart. If everyone were
good enough, there would be no such tragic choice to make
nor such a hero to portray. The primary source of the
underlying conflicts is then identified with some failure of
their own, as a result of immaturity, lack of education, or
incontinence, to understand the way in which goods are rank-
ordered. This precludes tragedy that does not arise from
flaws of individual characters or unintelligible ethical and
political arrangements. "For the finest form of Tragedy,"
Aristotle maintains in the Poetics
,
the Plot . . . must imitate actions arousing fear and
pity, since that is the distinctive function of this
kind of imitation. It follows, therefore, that there
are three forms of Plot to be avoided. (1) A good man
must not be seen passing from happiness to misery, or
(2) a bad man from misery to happiness. The first
situation is not fear-inspiring or piteous, but simply
odious to us. The second is the most untragic that can
be; it ... does not appeal either to the human feeling
in us, or to our pity, or to our fears. Nor, on the
other hand, should (3) an extremely bad man be seen
falling from happiness into misery. Such a story may
arouse the human feeling in us, but it will not move us
to either pity or fear; pity is occasioned by
undeserved misfortune, and fear by that of one like
ourselves; ... There remains, then, the intermediate
kind of personage, a man not preeminently virtuous and
just, whose misfortune, however, is brought upon him
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not by vice and depravity but by some error ofjudgement,
... The perfect Plot, accordingly, must have
a single, not (as some tell us) a double issue; the
change in the hero's fortunes must be not from misery
to happiness, but on the contrary from happiness to
misery; and the cause of it must lie not in any
depravity, but in some great error in his part; the man
himself being either such as we have described, or
better, not worse, than that.^^
Tragedy imitates moral agents in action, which in turn must
arouse the emotions of pity and fear in the spectator. Those
plots which are morally unambiguous and thereby fail the
subtle test of pity and fear cannot produce the tragic
effect in the Aristotelian sense of the term. That a good
man through no fault of his own falls is not distinctively
tragic. For, undeserved though the misfortune is, the
situation is "simply odious;" it does not furnish the
cathartic experience of pity and fear on the spectator's
part. Obviously the crucial ethical concept concerning the
"intermediate" tragic personage here is "error" (hamartia,
mistake) , which Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics defines
in terms of its distinction from accident ("Misadventure"):
Aristotle, Rhetoric and Poetics , trans. W. Rhys
Roberts and Ingram Bywater, (New York: The Modern Library,
1954), 1452b30-1453al8. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle further
defines pity as "a feeling of pain caused by the sight of
some evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who
does not deserve it, and which we might expect to befall
ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover to befall us
soon. ... In order to feel pity we must also believe in the
goodness of at least some people; if you think nobody good
vou will believe that everybody deserves evil fortune.
And
he defines fear as "a pain or disturbance due to a
mental
picture of some destructive or painful evil in the
future.
Rhetoric . 1385bl2-1386a2 , 1382a21-23.
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Those that are done in ignorance are Mistakes ~
when the patient or the act or the instrument or the
^v.""^^
different from what the agent supposed, ...When the injury occurs contrary to reasonable
expectation it is a Misadventure; but when it occurs
not contrary to reasonable expectation but without
malicious intent it is a mistake (for the agent makes a
mistake when the origin of the responsibility lies inhimself; when it lies outside him his act is a
misadventure). (EN. I135bll-19.)
Elsewhere, Aristotle further qualifies that the type of
ignorance which excuses wrongdoing and warrants pity is
not ignorance in the choice (this is a cause of
wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal (for this
people are blamed), but particular ignorance, i.e. of
the circumstances and objects of the action; for it is
on these that pity and pardon depend. (EN- 1110b31-34.)
And, in the Eudemian Ethics
. Aristotle provides a definition
of luck or chance ("fortune") as "a cause incalculable to
human reasoning" (EE. 1247b7)
.
Therefore, Aristotle sees the tragic "error" (hamartia )
as rationally accountable. Bad luck is not the stuff of
tragedy. Nor certainly is vice, evil, or culpability
implied. The tragic protagonist is supposed to expect and
calculate the causally coherent sequences of moral action.
He is not simply the victim of some arbitrary force beyond
his control, even though he does not deserve what he endures
afterwards. He by his erroneous action contributes to his
own destruction, even though he might not have been, not
even in hindsight, in any position to act otherwise. Choice
is informed by opinions and confounded by desires and
passions. Things tread awry easy. Eudaimonia depends on
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successful action. "Failure is possible in many ways, but
success is only one" (EN. 1106b29) . The tragic calamity
therefore should always be explained in terms of the
hamartia in the form of one or more blemishes, excesses,
slips, follies, misapprehensions, or misjudgments in
practical rationality. What is piteous of the situation for
Aristotle lies in the sad failure on the tragic figure's
part to see what (in theory) is accessible to the light of
human reason, in his undue suffering consequential, and in
his ruin as a dreadful reminder of the vulnerability of the
rest of us all. The tragic resides, that is to say, with the
underlying imperfection and fallibility of humanity, from
which even the wisest and most decent are not immune.
Aristotle insists on making sense of our ethical relations
to the world, nevertheless. The point of tragedy in his view
is not to present a blind, capricious, and hostile milieu in
which a faultless person may be exposed to fundamentally
irreconcilable and destructive demands. Within the
Aristotelian system there can be at any particular juncture
only one right action to perform, and the premisses of a
practical argument of necessity cohere with all other
truths. It is then possible for man to avoid reversal and
conflict. But such self-sufficiency is conceivable only by
an appeal to the unity of the virtues, and only within a
totalizing hierarchy with the divine summum genus as its
ultimate resort. The burden of the tragic reversal rests on
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the rational moral agent; the world in its intelligible
entirety is absolved.
D. Phusis and Nomng
The problem of ethical plurality and incompatibility
relates to the antithesis in political reflection between
the concepts of convention and nature. Aristotle touches
upon the connection at the outset of the Nicomachean Ethics :
Instances of morally fine and just conduct —
which is what politics investigates — involve so muchdifference and variety that they are widely believed to
be such only by convention and not by nature. (EN.
1094bl5.)
Here Aristotle does not give his own view explicitly as to
whether ethics comes into being by convention or by nature.
Yet we can read a clear bent out of the text in its
entirety. For all his dissent from Plato's otherworldliness
and his attempt to regain the standpoint of common sense and
practical experience, Aristotle never ceases to be a
Platonist to the extent that his philosophy remains one of
final causes. And such a teleological position asserts
itself in his view of the moral nature of man. In the
Aristotelian vocabulary, the concept of "nature" ( phusis )
implies the existence of a cosmic order. It is defined in
the Physics as
The word "nature," as John Stuart Mill observes, is
among the most slippery terms in the lexicon of philosophy.
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a principle or cause of being moved and of being at
nr^i-^^'i^
which it belongs primarily, in virtueof Itself and not accidentally.^^
Nature refers to that which keeps the world in motion and
makes all creatures grow and function. It covers everything
that, in exhibition of such an intelligible order, contains
in itself a principle of movement by the ultimate reality
and pure form. "Everything contains by nature something
divine" (EN- 1153b33)
.
The unmoved First Mover does not
concur with the v/orld of chance and change externally and
"accidentally;" it is the inner source of it. "The nature of
a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully
developed, we call its nature" ( Politics . I252b33) . Thus the
nature of something refers not to the spontaneous raw stuff,
which constitutes it the way the wood is to the furniture,
but to its intrinsic end and the full realization of its
defining principle.
And the confusion arising therefrom is such that it
constitutes "one of the most copious sources of false taste,
false philosophy, false morality, and even bad law." As Mill
sees it, "nature" has only two principal meanings: first, it
covers the sum of all phenomena, both actual and possible,
either in the outer or in the inner world, with the
aggregate of all their causes and properties; or secondly,
it refers to whatever takes place, the way it is of itself,
without voluntary human agency, design, or intervention. For
Mill, it is false to give "nature" a third meaning by
defining it not in terms of what is but in terms of what
ought to be. Accordingly he sees it as "irrational and
immoral" to make Nature a moral test of right and wrong, an
evalutative criterion of good and evil. John Stuart Mill,
"Nature," Three Essays on Religion . (London: Longmans, Green
and Co, 1923) , pp. 3-65.
Physics, 192b21-23. The Complete Works of
Aristotle , p. 329.
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such a teleological, systematic, and quasi-biological
notion of nature may account for the reason why Aristotle
feels the necessity to identify eudaimonia with theoria
toward the close of the Nicomachean Fi-hir^c= ^nd it is this
unexpected exaltation of the purely contemplative existence
over the life of phronesis that leads him to conceive a God,
an ultimate court of divine arbitration. Opposite to nature,
"convention" (nomos) refers to the existing laws, rules, or
customs which owe their existence to man-made institution in
different states and cultural traditions. Aristotle
distinguishes between justice as virtue in its entirety and
"political justice" as a particular item of virtue. In the
sphere of collectivity, moral coherence assumes the form of
justice (dikaiosune) in the former sense of the term.
Aristotle calls any acts just that tend to develop and
preserve eudaimonia and its components for the political
association. "In justice is summed up the whole of virtue"
(EN* 1129a26ff.). Justice in this sense is not an item of
virtue but virtue entire. The only difference between virtue
and justice is that the former refers to a right state of
character without qualification, while the latter, defined
as lawfulness and fairness, stands for that moral state in
its agent's dealings with his neighbors in the community. As
a particular virtue, on the other hand, "political justice"
is found among free and equal citizens who share their life
with a view to self-sufficiency. Of political justice there
are two parts, one natural and the other legal. The former.
"natural law" as Aristotle calls it, has the immutable
validity and the same force everywhere. The latter, viz.,
legal conventions, originally takes one form or another
indifferently, but, once laid down, they become indifferent
no longer. Such are the laws and decrees adopted for
particular cases; for example, a prisoner's ransom shall be
a mina, a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed,
sacrifice shall be made in honor of Brasidas, and so forth.
What Aristotle sets out to do here is to reject a view that
all enactments for particular circumstances are of this kind
since notions of legal justice are variable, whereas natural
laws are immutable "as fire burns both here and in Persia."
This contention is true, Aristotle explains, only in the
sense that among the gods justice presumably never changes
at all. "But in our world," he argues,
although there is such a thing as natural law,
everything is subject to change; but still some things
are so by nature and some are not, and it is easy to
see what sort of thing, among those that admit of being
otherwise, is so by nature and what is not, but is
legal and conventional, assuming that both alike are
changeable. (EN- 1134b31-36.)
Clearly, Aristotle is not simply making the distinction
between the unchangeability of natural law and the
changeability of man-made regulations. He confines the
absolutely unchangeable natural law to the gods. Among men,
however, convention and justice are changeable, the "thing
as natural law" in our world as well as positive law.
Aristotle gives two examples to support his argument. First,
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by nature the right hand is stronger, yet it is possible
that all men should come to be ambidextrous. Secondly, the
rules of justice by convention and expediency may be
compared to the standard measures used in the wine and corn
trades which are not everywhere equal but larger in
wholesale and smaller in retail markets. It is not that the
tradespeople are tricking the customers, but that there is
always the area of free play permitted within the set limits
of justice. Human reality is necessarily imperfect in
comparison to the ordered world of justice, and hence allows
of no simple application of the law. Every enactment is in a
necessary tension with particular action, and hence cannot
contain practical reality in its full particularity. The
"thing as natural law" asserts itself in so constant a
fashion that it is quite legitimate to call such things
"nature law." In other words, life is variable by nature;
the "thing as natural law" does not have a timeless place in
the universe but resides right in the changeability and
particularity of our world.
Aristotle concludes his exposition of political justice
by deciding that the rules of law and convention are related
to the actions performed in accordance with them in a way in
which the universal is to the particular, because
particularity is plural, but each of the conventional rules,
being universality, is only one (EN. 1134a23ff.). The
entire
Aristotelian project can be seen as an attempt to find a way
to realize nature's intention, to establish
a positive
46
connection between convention and nature. But the realm
beyond our world is for the gods only. What Aristotle has in
mind is not any endeavor to transcend the Cave. This is
summed up in the dictum that "the state is a creation of
nature" ( Politics . 1253al) . Central to Aristotle's theory is
a natural impulse toward political association predicated
upon his teleological notion of nature. Hence his account in
Book 1 of the Politics on which the state, the highest form
of human community, consists of villages which in turn
consist of households. The household exists to satisfy man's
daily wants; the village, to supply a wider range of needs;
and finally the state, to achieve the ultimate end of human
action, eudaimonia or the good life. These forms of
conventional collectivity, Aristotle takes great pains to
maintain, are arranged "by nature." But what he has is not a
"natural" bent away from convention; it is the other way
round. In other words, the ethical languages and political
institutions in the imperfect world are an integral part and
intelligible agency of the higher scheme of nature.
E. Language
The naturalness of the polls is proved and supported by
its linguistic convention, which enables man to develop and
give expression to the distinctively human capacity of
moral
judgments. The sufficiency of language finds illustration in
Aristotle's treatment of rhetoric, not as a mere
skill
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(techne) but as the essential human capacity (dunamis)
. Man
as the rational being possesses the faculty of speech which
can be mastered in a persuasive way so that arguments are
always appropriate to the specific receptivity of the
contemporary audience. As practical refinement of sensations
and public opinion, truth is deemed accessible by the locus
of speech as such in all its immediacy. According to
Aristotle, rhetoric as the art of public speech is defined
as "the faculty of observing in any given case the available
means of persuasion" (Rhetoric . 1355b26-27)
. Then, the
argumentative modes of persuasion as the essence of rhetoric
are "clearly a sort of demonstration." The rhetorical form
of demonstration is in turn "an enthymeme, ... the most
effective of the modes of persuasion." Further, the
enthymeme is a type of syllogism which, as the agency of
rhetorical proof, stands as the middle ground between the
truth and the plurality and expediency of the real life. He
who is best able to see the way a syllogism is produced will
also be best skilled in the enthymeme. Finally comes the
underlying thesis of human sufficiency that man gains access
to the truth and justice by the medium of language.
The true and the approximately true are
apprehended by the same faculty; . . . men have a
sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and
usually do arrive at the truth. (Rhetoric , 1355a3-18.)
Political persuasion by means of linguistic syllogism is
useful, Aristotle continues.
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(1) because things that are true and things that arejust have a natural tendency to prevail over their
opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not
what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the
speakers themselves, and they must be blamed
accordingly. Moreover, (2) before some audiences not
even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make
it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For
argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and
there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here then,
we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument,
notions possessed by everybody, as we observed in the
Topics when dealing with the way to handle a popular
audience. (Rhetoric . 1355a21-29
.
) ^®
Thus Aristotle dwells in full confidence in the capacity of
language first to bring access to the truth and second to
refine public opinion and convince the audience. The abuse
of language is in his view caused by some "error" on the
part of the speaker; it does not indicate limitations of
language itself and therefore presents no argument against
its proper employment for the sake of truth and justice.
Linguistic convention as the moral agency seems to suffice
to bridge action to knowledge, life as it is to life as it
ought to be. The sole precondition is the existence of the
polls. Only as a member of the genuine political association
The observation in Aristotle's Topics . 101a31-34,
mentioned here refers to the passage that "When we have
counted up the opinions held by most people, we shall meet
them on the ground not of other people's convictions but of
their own, shifting the ground of any argument that they
appear to us to state unsoundly." The Complete Works of
Aristotle , p. 168.
Plato is more aware of language's limitations. For
him public speech merely can be "a creator of a conviction
that is persuasive but not instructive about right and
wrong." See the Gorqias . 455a. The Collected Dialogues of
Plato , p. 238.
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can man employ language, become self-sufficing, and achieve
his "flourishing." He is naturally disposed to live in this
highest form of human community; and the polls, the
convention by nature, allows man to fully realize his
natural dispositions.
On the other hand, nevertheless, Aristotle recognizes
that tension exists between linguistic convention and
nature. He is aware that the world does not fit his notion
of nature squarely. Early Greek medicine sees nature as
aiming at the perfect growth and functioning of the body,
but admittedly such a total harmony scarcely obtains. In the
nomos-phusis controversy, the Greeks attribute to nature the
existence of certain ethical principles which, though not
identically formulated or applied, seem to be recognized as
valid everywhere. Meanwhile, conventions with their
inevitable imperfection exist not necessarily but only in
very limited degrees "by nature." "Nature intends to do this
often but cannot" (Politics, 1255b3) . Conceived as such,
nature does not stand beyond the sublunary world; it is
rather the collective response of it to the divine Mind. All
creatures are drawn towards the perfection of their own
"natural" state, but that state hardly, if ever, has its
way. This acute awareness directs Aristotle's attention to
In the "Funeral Oration," for instance, Pericles
attributes the moral glory of the Athenians to their
obedience to "those unwritten laws which it is an
acknowledged shame to break." Thucydides, History of the
Peloponnesian War , trans. Rex Warner, (New York: Penguin
Books, 1985) , p. 145.
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the ethical and political problems of the world as it
actually is. in the concluding lines of the Nicomachean
Ethics, he outlines his extensive empirical project to study
a large variety of actual Greek conventions. The purpose of
the undertaking is to investigate "what influences are
conservative and what are destructive of a state; and which
have these effects upon each different kind of constitution;
and for what reasons some states are well governed, while in
others the contrary is the case" (EN. 1181bll-23)
. What is
under way is an explicit shift of emphasis from phusis to
noinos. The "perfect happiness" is possible only through
devotion to pure theoria
. but such a life is beyond the
reach of common human disposition. In so far as we are
"composite" creatures, the good life can be determined only
by an account of phronesis and the other virtues of
secondary importance (EN. 1177al0ff.). As the closing
statement of the Nicomachean Ethics implies, the "best
state" is no longer the sole or even the principal concern.
At least equal importance now goes to the question of what
type of linguistic conventions are most suitable to the
given situation of particular circumstances. Aristotle's
project is not only empirical but also historical; it is
conceived of "to review any valid statements (about
particular points) that have been made by our predecessors"
(EN. 1181bl5) . At the concluding juncture therefore the
Nicomachean Ethics returns to the issue of historical
experience and its interpretation.
F. History
Aristotle defines the concept of history in terms of
the antithesis between universality and particularity. The
classical definition can be found in a famous passage in the
Poetics :
The distinction between historian and poet is ...
that the one describes the thing that has been, and the
other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is
something more philosophic and of graver import than
history, since its statements are of the nature rather
of universals, whereas those of history are singulars.
( Poetics . 1451a39-b8.)
As we have seen, Aristotle in the Metaphysics makes it clear
that, based on sensation and memory, human empeiria is of an
inferior category as compared with sophia . Whereas
philosophy addresses the universal, history (experience)
deals with the particular circumstances; therefore the
former is "of graver import" than the latter. As often as
not, attempts to make sense of what men had experienced in
the past can produce but "unproved assertions" of truth, not
demonstrated knowledge. To such an extent, Aristotle is not
unaware of the problematic involved in historical
interpretation as a basic mode of inquiry. He draws
attention to the ease with which one may err by confusing
accidental coincidences of the past with historical
experience which has deeper meanings. "An instance," he
explains in the Rhetoric ,
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IS what Polycrates says of the mice, that they "came tothe rescue" because they gnawed through the bowstrings.Or It might be maintained that an invitation to dinneris a great honour, for it was because he was notinvited that Achilles was "angered" with the Greeks atTenedos. As a fact, what angered him was the insultinvolved; it was a mere accident that this was theparticular form that the insult took.
Such misinterpretation of history "represents the accidental
as essential." It is a consequence of abuse of language on
Aristotle's account. When one degenerates into "Spurious
Enthymeme" or "syllogisms that look genuine but are not,"
one reads what one thinks are true meanings of universal
bearing out of particular past events which, being mere
contingent accidents, contain none whatsoever (Rhetoric,
1401bl4-19, 1400b34-1401al) . In order, therefore, to be able
to discard the dross of such unintelligible coincidences and
select the essentials, one must have a correct command of
the linguistic tool of historical interpretation. As
Aristotle in the Poetics reflects upon a narrative genre of
epic poetry:
They (the stories) should be based on a single
action, one that is a complete whole in itself, with a
beginning, middle, and end, so as to enable the work to
produce its own proper pleasure with all the organic
unity of a living creature. Nor should one suppose that
there is anything like them in our usual histories. A
history has to deal not with one action, but with one
period and all that happened in that to one or more
persons, however disconnected the several events may
have been. Just as two events may take place at the
same time, e.g. the sea-fight off Salamis and the
battle with the Carthaginians in Sicily, without
converging to the same end, so too of two consecutive
events one may sometimes come after the other with no
one end as their common issue. (Poetics. 1459al8-29.)
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Nevertheless, what we have seen thus far is only
Aristotle's view of "usual f sunetheis . '^vulgar' or
'ordinary'] histories;" it is not what we in the present
work take as the Aristotelian concept of "history"
(historia) which predicates itself upon an underlying trust
in the interpretative relevance of human experience. Whereas
theoretical knowledge concentrates on the object eternal,
invariable, and of necessity, phronesis must take cognizance
of particularity, since it is concerned with action, and
action has its sphere in the particular circumstances.
Precisely, as argued in the Metaphysics and the Nicomachean
Ethics, because past experience deals with the particular,
Aristotle insists on its interpretative relevance, and even
on its epistemological primacy, in ethical and political
matters, though knowing the mischievous exposure involved
therein. As the above citation seems to imply, some
historical events, particularistic though they still are,
may possess within themselves a unity of moral action. These
events may arrange and assert themselves in such a fashion,
that is to say, that they thereby carry a certain measure of
intelligibility which is utterly absent in the mere "usual
histories." Alongside events occurring in the coincidental
manner with no inner connection whatsoever, there may be
less "usual" accounts of the past which possess in
themselves "all the organic unity of a living creature," and
each contains among its components "one end as their common
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issue." With "its own proper pleasure" to offer, this other
category of "extraordinary" history must have certain
bearings on universality.
The disparagement of the "usual histories," we
therefore assume, does not necessarily evoke a denial
outright of particularity itself as the basic Aristotelian
principle, nor of history itself as an important source of
truth. Here, one may notice, Aristotle is speaking not of
narrative poetry in general but of a particular genre of
poetry which, he explains, "has several points in common
with Tragedy." Although Aristotle stops short of sharing the
fundamentally tragic view of human life, he takes tragedy
very seriously as a mode of historical interpretation. In
the Poetics he provides the classical definition that
A tragedy, then, is the imitation of an action
that is serious and also, as having magnitude, complete
in itself; in language with pleasurable accessories,
each kind brought in separately in the parts of the
work; in a dramatic, not in a narrative form; with
incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to
accomplish its catharsis of such emotions. ... Tragedy
is essentially an imitation not of persons but of
action and life, of happiness and misery. All human
happiness or misery takes the form of action; the end
for which we live is a certain kind of activity, not a
quality. Character gives us qualities, but it is in our
actions — what we do — that we are happy or the
reverse. ( Poetics , 1449b23-1450a20
.
)
On Aristotle's account, therefore, a tragic drama imitates a
human moral action done in the past. Tragedy appeals to the
emotions of the audience and thereby strikes a sympathetic
chord in them, achieves a "cathartic" experience of pity and
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fear on the spectator's part and thereby produces tragic
pleasure. Further, the tale of the ethical experience which
is depicted in tragedy possesses the important "organic
unity" with all its seriousness and magnitude; it concerns
no small matter but has a direct bearing on eudaimonia
versus misery, the fundamental "common issue" of human
existence. When the poetic tragedian imitates the authentic
experience as such, he is "at the same time learning —
gathering the meaning of things." Thus the special human
activity of imitation is cognitive and interpretative in
nature, with each drama dramatizing its own "single issue"
(Poetics, 1448b5-17). Aristotle presumably has this concept
of tragedy in mind when he makes the poetry-history
distinction. Poetic tragedy does only imitate a particular
action experienced in the past. But the experience is such
that it meanwhile assumes universal significance. The "usual
histories" deal merely with "what, say, Alcibiades did or
had done." In contrast, poetic tragedy not only performs
that function but more importantly tells us "what such or
such a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do"
today and in the future. And therefore its "universal
statement" carries "something more philosophic and of graver
import" (Poetics, 1451a36-bll) . The poet addresses moral
action of universal "probability" or "necessity." As a
matter of fact, Aristotle goes on to relate tragedy to
history in more explicit terms,
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If he should come to take a subject from actualhistory he IS none the less a poet for that; since
occurrences may very well be in theprobable and possible order of things; and it is in
^45^b28?32 0° ^^^"^ ^^^^ ^^^^"^ (^^^^i^'
It is to such an extent, we suspect, that Aristotle sees
historia (not the "usual histories") as an intelligible
locus of moral truth with laws to search for and meanings to
interpret. After all, the Aristotelian belief in the
interpretative relevance of historical empeiria accords with
the underlying Aristotelian argument that the universal
derives from the particular. History therefore constitutes
an important source of truth, "unproved assertion" though
its interpretation may remain. Independent of logos , this
locus of truth exists in its own right because, as the
phronesis-theoria antithesis shows, man stops short of being
a pure animal rationale , and there always are areas of human
affairs which are never governed by the universal
prescriptions of reason.
2 1
. History can be a source of truth. This notion finds
itself a footnote in Book 5 of the Politics . Sardanapalus
,
mid-seventh-century king of the Assyrians, was murdered by
an assassin who had seen him carding wool with his women.
Here Aristotle remarks: "If the story-tellers say truly; and
the tale may be true, if not of him, of someone else"
(Politics, 1312a2-3) . It obviously has occurred to Aristotle
that the story may not be a true one. But he chooses to
raise history above its factual details: the immanent moral
remains the same anyway. What is important for him is to
uncover the political lesson buried in the narrative, that
is, contempt constitutes one of the motives to overthrow the
monarchies. Aristotle does not invent stories, but, working
in a historical landscape devoid of landmarks, he does tend
to accept more willingly the heritages which fit his
theories, and interpret those heritages in that direction.
When Aristotle toward the conclusion of the Nicomachean
57
G. Identity
There is another and maybe more profound sense,
nevertheless, in which we can relate Aristotle to the
concept of "history." Such a reading brings together the
emphasis on phronesis in suspicion of logos, the resort to
the theistic solution, the bent toward nomos . the
(in) sufficiency of the linguistic convention, and the
definition of history as intelligible singularity vis-a-vis
the universality of philosophy. The underlying issue is the
source of ethical and collective identity. Specifically
involved are the notions, in the Nicomachean Ethics , of
practical particularity, responsibility, friendship,
community, and the source of ethical ity. This account seeks
to reveal the way phronesis operates in the real world, and
it concludes that, for Aristotle, evaluative conflict can be
solved not by means of politics but only through ethical ity.
Human nature, as Aristotle sees it, resides in action
of the soul in accordance with logos, which we can perform
excellently either through leading a perfect life of theoria
or, the second best, by acting morally in our common sense
Ethics plans to launch the project of collecting historicpal
material for theoretical reflection, he evidently has this
type of authentic past experience in mind. As was shown in
the Athenian Constitution , the societal and political
conventions that Aristotle disinters from the graveyard of
history correspond more or less to his categorizing m the
Politics both in terms of the formation of the city and
across different forms of state constitutions.
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experience. This typically human ergon can be done badly
however with a wrong disposition as well as excellently with
the right disposition of virtue. If we are by nature good-
oriented, we are also by nature different in our moral,
intellectual, and, one may suspect, even genetic makeups. We
thereby define the telos in different ways. Aristotle does
not apply his universal ergon theory universally: a
multitude of human beings are left outside his account of
the fully human. While he identifies eudaimonia with the
human good in the self-sufficient life of phronesis or
theoria, he maintains that the "generality of mankind" take
it instead to be either pleasure or wealth or eminence. For
"cultured people" and "men of affairs," the sovereign good
is honor, while "the utter servility of the masses comes out
in their preference for a bovine existence" (EN. 1095al8-20,
1095bl4-23) . Beyond the frontiers of the Greek world live
the category of "barbarians," "non-Greek races" that is,
among whom "brutishness is commonest." As one of the three
abnormal states of character (the other two being vice and
incontinence) to be avoided, Aristotle explains, brutishness
is a less evil than vice, though no less alarming, because
it is not that the better part (intelligence or reason) has
been perverted or corrupted: the barbarians simply have no
better part (EN- 1145al5-33, 1149b25-1150a8) . Therefore, as
"a community of slaves, male and female," with no natural
ruler among themselves, they should be ruled by the Hellenes
( Politics . 1252b5-8). Finally Aristotle notoriously states
that "some men are by nature free, and others slaves," and
that "for these latter slavery is both expedient and right"
(Politics, 1255al-3)
. Between master and slave there can be
no justice, because "there is nothing common to both
parties: the slave is a living tool in the same way that a
tool is an inanimate slave" (EN- 1161bl) . Still more, "the
male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the
one rules, and the other is ruled." This principle of
subordination and domination, Aristotle goes on to explain,
of necessity, extends to all mankind. Where then there
is such a difference as that between soul and body, or
between men and animals (as in the case of those whose
business is to use their body, and who can do nothing
better) , the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is
better for them as for all inferiors that they should
be under the rule of a master. (Politics, 1254bl4-21.)
Therefore, human beings by their moral makeups and
capabilities of collective existence fall into hierarchic
categories. Accordingly their political relationships are
that of exclusion based on fixed boundaries and servile
dependencies. "Almost all things rule and are ruled
according to nature" ( Politics . 1260a8) . Inequality is
fundamentally real; the unfairness of life finds its roots
in the core of the human condition.
The question of moral responsibility arises here: if
the hierarchic categories exist "by nature," should those of
"lower moral character" be held responsible for their
actions resultant of their natural dispositions? Aristotle
bases his view of this problem on a distinction
between
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voluntary and involuntary actions. Only for what he has done
"voluntarily" should a man be held responsible and liable to
be praised, blamed, or punished. Strictly speaking, what a
man can be said to have done, without qualification, not per
accidens but per se
,
is what he has done unforced and
knowingly. Actions are considered "involuntary" when they
are performed under compulsion, through ignorance, or from
an outside origin to which the agent contributes nothing. An
action is regarded as "mixed" when, though unwelcome in
itself, it may be acceptable and even welcome under such
special circumstances that the only alternative is much
worse (EN. 1109b30-1110a20) . Only ignorance of the
particular circumstances makes an action involuntary,
however. Ignorance of universal principles does not excuse
the wrongdoing, since "every bad man is ignorant of what he
ought to do and refrain from doing." Nor is ignorance
citable if the offenders are thought to be responsible for
it, for it was in their power to take care. "^Well, probably
he is the sort of person that doesn't take care.' But people
get into this condition through their own fault, ... in
every department of conduct moral states are the result of
corresponding activities." Once formed, a bad moral state is
no longer open not to be such (EN- 1110b25-35, 1113b30-
1114al0) . It may be further objected that everyone aims at
an end appearing to him to be good, but over this appearance
men have no control. The moral state of an individual is
itself a gift of nature, not a matter of his choosing, of
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which he is ignorant and therefore involuntary, and for
which therefore he should not be held responsible.
To this objection Aristotle answers that liability to
blame and liability to praise go together: we cannot excuse
one's bad action on the ground of natural disposition and
yet still praise another for his good action on the same
ground
.
Whether (a) the individual's view of the end —
whatever it may be — is not supplied by nature, but
depends partly on himself, or (b) the end is the gift
of nature, but virtue is voluntary because the good man
performs voluntarily all the means towards the end —
in either case vice will be no less voluntary; because
the bad man has just as much <scope for> independence
in his actions, even if not in his choice of the end.
So if, as is asserted, our virtues are voluntary
(because we ourselves are in a sense partly responsible
for our dispositions, and it is because we have a
certain moral quality that we assume the end to be of a
certain kind) , our vices will be voluntary too; the
cases are similar. (EN. 1114bl5-25.)
In other words, we are held responsible for what we do
because, due to a certain a priori "moral quality," we are
"in a sense partly" accountable for who we are. In
consideration of moral responsibility, the fact that for
that pregiven disposition we are not responsible will not be
taken into account. Human beings are by nature superior or
inferior in moral character, but they are, also by nature,
equally capable of choosing in the light of reason. This
equal endowment of reason implies that we identify with
ourselves the "independent" source of our main aims and
desires; we do not look upon them as dependent upon,
or
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handed down to us by, for instance, inheritance, upbringing,
or tradition. Thus we all (from a certain age on) assume
answerability for conduct. Generally, therefore, if one is
by nature inferior in moral character, one must bear
responsibility for his action.
But another question follows: if, according to
Aristotle, such a person, like all of us, cannot deliberate
about the end but only about the means, how can we expect
him to exercise his "independence" of action and thereby
choose differently? Does this doctrine of deliberation not
imply that his conception of eudaimonia depends solely on
his genetic makeup? Aristotle is silent on this question; it
seems that he just assumes, but does not really see the need
to warrant, that expectation. One is held accountable, to be
plain, only because one is by nature not merely a man but
also the particular type of man; no further justification is
given. Moreover, if we cannot deliberate about what the best
life would be without employing some criteria, how are the
criteria themselves obtained and ready for use in the first
place? To this question Aristotle does supply an answer. The
tests will be provided by the rare species of the phronimos
in the settings of particular experience. The structure of
political relationship in this sphere of particularity may
have a bearing upon the true meaning behind the Aristotelian
argument that "man is by nature a political animal."
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is like the
who by nature and not by mere accident is
a state, is either a bad man or above humani
Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,
whom Homer denounces — the natural outcast isforthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to anisolated piece at draughts. ( Politics . l253a3-6.)
Although Aristotle here is elaborating on his thesis of the
political animal in universal terms ("by nature"), he makes
it clear that identity rests on the finitude and certitude
of particularity. At the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics
he raises the question of whether we should argue from or to
first principles. And his position is that "the starting-
point is the fact." A serious study of ethics or politics
must proceed, he argues unequivocally, not from "what is
known absolutely" but rather from "what is known to us" (EN.
1095bl-6)
.
In his subsequent criticism of the Platonists'
doctrine of the universal good, Aristotle asks:
What on earth do they mean by speaking of a thing-
itself? — assuming that the definition of man is one
and the same both in man and in man-himself; for qua
man they will not differ at all, ... if a long-lasting
white thing is no whiter than an ephemeral one.
"On this point," he continues,
the Pythagoreans (followed apparently by Speusippus)
seem to have a more plausible doctrine, for they place
unity in their column of goods. (EN- 1096a35-1096b6 .
)
Instead of asserting an atomistic doctrine of man, Aristotle
insists that man is a political animal whose self-
sufficiency lies only in his concrete locality and social
entirety. The abstract view of the "long-lasting" man qua
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on
a
man is rejected. His concern rests with the particular
the "ephemeral," or historical, basis. Every man, as
particular type of human being, lives in a local community
where he knows who he is by knowing his particular place in
the hierarchic structures of that community. He is what he
does in accordance with a clear understanding of his social
status. After all, one deliberates not about ends but about
means, not about things that cannot be otherwise but about
things that lie in one's power. "No past event is an object
of choice,
... and it is impossible for what has happened
not to have happened" (EN. 1139b5-10)
. History is invariable
and of necessity. One does not deliberate about it, nor can
one act on it. The framework of the basic values cannot be
chosen. Identity has been predetermined.
H. Friendship and Community
Justice as virtue in its entirety refers to the correct
state of character in its agent's association with others.
Interestingly, however, the Nicomachean Ethics treats the
concept of community not in Book 5, which addresses justice,
but mainly in Books 8 and 9, where the subject matter is
friendship. As human beings differ in kind, so do their
outlooks and preferences of life. According to Aristotle,
friends are those who are mutually recognized as bearing
goodwill and wishing well to each other either based on
utility, or for the reason of pleasure, or on the ground of
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goodness. The first two reasons of friendship are accidental
and transient since they change according to circumstances.
Friendship based on such non-essential ground of utility or
pleasure is of a lower rank, prevalent among those of "low
moral character." Only the friendship among men who are good
in themselves, alike in virtue, and wish well to each other
qua good can be regarded as the perfect friendship, since
these friends desire the good of each other for what they
essentially are and for their own sake, not for any
circumstantial or incidental quality, friendship of this
rare kind is reasonable enough, absolute, enduring, and of
the highest moral state. Thus friendship in the true
Aristotelian sense of the term exists only among good men in
accordance with a moral state (EN- 1156a5ff.). Further,
since eudaimonia as a kind of activity is not a piece of
property already in one's possession but needs to be
developed, then friendship is necessary for that
development. Since, also, man is not a solitary creature but
"by nature a social being," it is "impossible to secure
one's own good independently of domestic and political
science" (EN- 1169bl5-1170al2
,
1097bl0, 1142a9) . Therefore
eudaimonia requires both friendship and community. How is
friendship related to community? Aristotle takes it that
collective identity is informed by ethicality, and that a
small group of "friendly" men of moral superiority set the
ethical grammar for it. "The term of the friendship is that
of the association, for so also is the term of their form of
justice.
... It is natural that the claims of justice should
increase with the intensity of friendship" (EN. 1159b30-
1160a7). The constitutive "terms" of a community and its
justice are defined in terms of what type of friendship it
is that constitutes it. The identity of the community is
determined by the quality and "intensity" of its ethical
convention.
Aristotle's thesis of the unity of the virtues implies
that the phronimos is necessarily the good man qua good.
Only the ties among that category of men can deliver
intelligibility to the community. Proceeding from here,
Aristotle provides his "correct formula" for the ethical
constitution of the community, i.e., "the good man's view is
the true one," therefore he functions as "a sort of standard
and yardstick" (EN- 1176al5, 1113a33) . So "the good man" is
the canon of ethical norms to which the citizens of a state
accommodate their lives. The particularistic perceptions of
the morally superior men set the standards for the rest of
the community, and friendship in the Aristotelian sense of
the word serves as the core of its ethical cohesion. Just as
friendship for the reason of utility or pleasure ranks
secondary to friendship based on goodness, all limited
associations, which aim at partial advantages of the moment,
are subordinate to the political community, the end of which
is the common good over the entirety of life. In the ergon
argument, Aristotle maintains that the social nature of man
must be limited in scope so as not to let it "proceed to
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infinity" (EN. 1097bl4)
.
Ties of utility normally engender a
non-essential business relationship, and "friendships with
foreigners are generally included in this class" (EN.
1156a30). In other words, the genuine political association
informed by the good necessarily takes place within a
particularistic local community, relatively small, closely
knit, and all-embracing. The coherence of the virtues
implies that the criterion of goodness lies in a complex
measure in virtue's entirety. The application of that
complex measure in a political community presupposes in that
community a considerable extent of collective consensus on
goods and virtues. And that shared commitment Aristotle
calls "concord" which, based on "the same outlook" of the
morally superior, is defined as "friendship between the
citizens of a state." A community achieves concord when its
members agree about their interests, adopt the same actions;
when, for example, "the people and the upper classes both
think that the best men should govern" (EN* 1167a20-bl5) . In
other words, they must speak a same language; the ethical
criterion should find support and expression in a linguistic
convention, the sufficiency and intelligibility of which, in
turn, presuppose a shared evaluative vocabulary.
The interdependence between language and ethical ity
explains Aristotle's seemingly paradoxical position on
rhetoric: the linguistic convention suffices only when there
is ethical concord. When the ethical scheme corrupts, the
evaluative persuasion in the polls declines into
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unintelligible rhetoric. Ethical disarray leads to
linguistic chaos, it is not utility nor pleasure but the
rare category of genuine friendship based on the shared
commitment to the good in its entirety that, as the
necessary bond of membership, constitutes the polls. Once
thus constituted, the good of the community
is clearly a greater and more perfect thing to achieve
and preserve; for while it is desirable to secure what
is good in the case of an individual, to do so in the
case of a people or a state is something finer and more
sublime. (EN- 1094b8-ll.)
Thus, in Aristotle's view.
Friendship also seems to be the bond that holds
communities together, and lawgivers seem to attach more
importance to it than to justice; because concord seems
to be something like friendship, and concord is their
primary object — that and eliminating faction, which
is enmity. Between friends there is no need for
justice, but people who are just still need the quality
of friendship; and indeed friendliness is considered to
be justice in the fullest sense. It is not only a
necessary thing but a splendid one. (EN. 1155a20-29.)
Either distributive or rectificatory
,
justice as a
particular item of virtue is concerned with rewarding one's
due or desert and repairing failures within an already
constituted community; friendship is essential and primary
to that initial act of constitution. Being "only a necessary
thing," justice is not possessive enough; Aristotle goes for
"sublimity" and "splendor" by insisting on the more
compelling thesis that collective identity must be grounded
on a shared recognition of the good. In brief, community
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must be linked not to justice but to ethicality. More
accurately, the particularistic communal structure and its
ethical vocabulary are not only always tied to each other
but, in essence, are one and the same. A community stands
for a language, an ethicality incarnate, the way in which a
conceptual scheme of particularistic virtues and
accountability exists externally in collectivity.
I . Ethos
Here we are back to the fundamental question, which
Aristotle raises in his critique of the Socratic position on
moral knowledge, concerning the locus on which the right
state of character takes shape. When we speak of a man's
character (ethos) we mainly refer to his moral disposition.
If, according to Aristotle, community is informed by
ethicality, what then on his view is the essential source of
ethicality? The answer to this question comes explicitly at
the outset of Book 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics . Intellectual
excellences owe both their birth and their growth to
"instruction," and therefore require experience and time.
"Moral goodness, on the other hand," Aristotle goes on to
argue,
is the result of habit, from which it has actually got
its name, being a slight modification of the word
ethos. This fact makes it obvious that none of the
moral virtues is engendered in us by nature, since
nothing that is what it is by nature can be made to
behave differently by habituation. (EN- 1103al4-20.)
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The term "ethics" originates from ethikos . the
adjective form of the Greek word ethos which denotes an
accustomed place or habitation. From this original meaning
derive "habit," "custom," and, finally, "character." Taken
as a whole, then, ethos refers to collective identity, to
the essential principle or dominant characteristic of a
community or a people, as expressed in their experience,
habits, tastes, customs, traditions, etc. There are,
according to Aristotle, three things which make man good:
reason, nature, and habit (Politics, 1332a40) . Among these
reason ( logos ) is peculiar to man. However, the faculty of
reason has no bearing upon moral character. As the case of
deinotes reveals, reason can cut both ways with regard to
moral action. A morally evil man is the worst of all
animals, who will do "infinitely more harm" than a subhuman
brute, precisely because the former has the "active
principle" of logos, whereas the latter is not equipped with
that weapon ( Politics . 1253a31-37; EN- 1150a8) . In the
above-quoted passage, on the other hand, Aristotle makes it
unequivocal that moral virtues do not arise by nature. Human
beings do not become virtuous and achieve eudaimonia the way
fire goes up or a stone goes down; they instead move towards
what they believe is some good as the result of habit, of
repetition of the corresponding actions. Nature, Aristotle
continues, endows us with the potentialities of some
faculties, the actualization of which is later on effected
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by our first exercising them. Anything we have to learn to
do we learn by actually doing it. Like actions engender like
states of character. Hence, he concludes, the actions we
exhibit must be of "a certain quality," because the
resulting dispositions of character correspond to the
differences between our actions (EN. 1103a25-b25)
. Where
this "certain quality" will come from Aristotle does not
say. But it reminds us of the a priori "certain moral
quality" which we have quoted in the discussion of moral
responsibility. At any rate, we acquire virtue not by our
rational faculty, nor by any universal "nature," but by our
particularistic habituation and customs. Ethos is the single
decisive factor in ethical disposition. Since, as we have
seen, man is "a principle of intellectual appetition," and
what phronesis is all about is to bring forth right
appetition, therefore ethicality rests on orexis
^
on
striving, and on its development into a fixed demeanor, a
settled disposition (hexis ) , a right state of character.
This process, as Aristotle describes it, necessarily takes
place in such a context of practical particularity. In that
context the law of nature does not operate much, yet it is
by no means a state of lawlessness. For, in Aristotle's
view, to entrust to chance what is greatest and most noble
would be a very defective arrangement (EN- 1099bl3-25) . This
is a realm where capacities and powers do not simply work
themselves out, where instead man becomes what he is through
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what he does in a certain way in accordance with the
particularistic human schemes.
Proceeding from the critique of Plato's view of the
Good, Aristotle's concept of practical knowledge describes
ethics as a mode of inquiry which cannot be based in any way
on scientific objectionability
. Phronesis moreover deals not
only with particularity but also with the self (EN.
1141b30)
.
Moral knowledge is self-knowledge. However,
reflection may threaten habituation. Correct appetition
leaves little need for theoria . Understanding must be
conceived not as any observation from outside but as
interpretation, as an integral part of the event in which
the meaning of all statements is formed and actualized.
Collective identity, as Aristotle sees it, presupposes an
initial schematization of an ethical vocabulary, and we are
always already involved in the situation of having to act
from a received standpoint. As members of our particular
community, we are inescapably what the community's past has
made us, with no means of viewing ourselves and the world
beyond the frame of mind provided by the enacted narrative
of ethical ity. Informed exclusively by that particular
account of ethical conduct and accountability, we do not
ourselves aspire to universality, nor do we have any doubt
that reality is as the conceptual scheme represents it to
us. Within our own context of ends and through our own
concrete practice, we claim truth for that arbitrary and
unexamined view of the world. On such an account, identity
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rests on prejudice, not reason. It is prejudice that makes
us act before we calculate rationally. It is not so much our
judgments as it is our prejudices that constitute our being,
since prejudice, not necessarily erroneous and illegitimate
so that it distorts the truth, registers the
anthropologically finite, historically situated modes of our
existence. In other words, ethical schematization preempts
the possibility of evaluative deliberation, and thereby
denies that of fundamental choice. Aristotle grounds arete
not precisely on phusis but on nomos , not so much on theoria
as on phronesis . Ethicality rests on hex is ; collective
identity refers to ethos. In a nutshell,
The moral virtues, then, are engendered in us
neither by nor contrary to nature; we are constituted
by nature to receive them, but their full development
in us is due to habit. (EN. 1103a24-25.)
J. Historia
Neither by nor contrary to nature. To put it another
way, ethics comes from a province independent of, and
parallel to, that of nature; the immediacy and determinacy
are such that our ethos has emerged to assume the standing
of a second phusis . This is a temporal sphere wherein
22 nit is easier to alter one's habits than one's _
nature.* in fact even habit is hard to change because
it is
a sort of second nature, as Evenus says: tell
you
friend, 'tis practice long pursued,/ And this at lasr
becomes a man's own nature.'" EN- 1152a30.
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antecedent encumbrances accrete into common references and a
shared sense of the past. The common language communicates a
collective identity and grants access to the truth.
Inscribed upon such a finite, intelligible, and thick space,
community necessarily embodies an ethical scheme. It is in
this sense of finitude, intelligibility, and received
thickness that we relate Aristotle to the concept of history
(historia n .^^
2 3
• In The Fragility of Goodness . Martha Nussbaum draws
our attention to the following passage with which Aristotle
begins Book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics : "Here as in all our
other discussions we must first set out the evidence
(phainomena ) , and then, after calling attention to the
difficulties, proceed to establish, if possible, all the
received opinions about these affections, or failing that,
as many as we can of those that are best supported. For if
the discrepancies are resolved and received opinions left
validated, the truth will be sufficiently demonstrated" (EN.
1145bl-7) . Nussbaum renders the key word, phainomena
^
as
"appearances" which should be understood, she argues, to be
"our beliefs and interpretations, often as revealed in
linguistic usage," and "the way(s) a human observer sees or
^takes' the world, using his cognitive faculties." In her
Aristotelian account of ethical issues and dilemmas,
Nussbaum observes that Aristotle "presents us with a great
deal of structure" while seeking to destroy the Platonic
"houses of cards." "When we knock down the houses of cards,"
Nussbaum paraphrases her reading of Aristotle, "we are still
left with a lot of order and structure — the order that is
in our language and in the world around us as we see and
experience it. The order that is in the digestive system of
a crayfish; the structure of a well-told joke; the beauty of
a close friend's actions and character. What is left would
include houses; it would also include laboratories —
structures used by human beings in their efforts to know the
place where they live. ... This place needs to be
perspicuously mapped by serious researchers, so that we will
not lose our way in it or from it." The Fragility of
Goodness , pp. 244, 261-262. Nussbaum' s book addresses the
extent to which an existence of eudaimonia is vulnerable to
contingencies beyond the moral agent's control. It wherefore
accentuates Aristotle's caution in the Nicomachean Ethics
that good moral character alone is insufficient to achieve
eudaimonia. Such a life also takes, according to Aristotle,
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The world that Aristotle watches with apprehension is
one of evaluative warfare, political turmoil, and social
disintegration. Central to which, as he perceives it, is
moral deficiency, deterioration, and the discord of the day.
When the true political community is falling apart, public
persuasion follows into "spurious enthymeme." In the
concluding chapter (Chapter 9 of Book 10) of the Nicomachean
Ethics
.
we encounter another remarkable shift of undertone
from the pride of the theoria argument to a note of
resignation. Executing the transition as he is from his
ethical theory of human eudaimonia to his art of politics,
Aristotle emphasizes once again that theoretical arguments
by themselves are not sufficient for the purpose of "putting
our knowledge into practice." In a disturbing way, he even
retreats from the confidence, registered in the Rhetoric , in
the adequacy of language to persuade the contemporary
audience. Theory and rhetoric are deemed insufficient due to
the reality that
they are incapable of impelling the masses towards
human perfection. For it is the nature of the many to
be ruled by fear rather than by shame, and to refrain
from evil not because of the disgrace but because of
the punishments. Living under the sway of their
feelings, they pursue their own pleasures and the means
of obtaining them, and shun the pains that are their
"the addition of external goods" as "resources" of one's
evaluative pursuits, primary among which is the "good
fortune" of "the help of friends, or wealth, or political
influence" (EN- 1099a32-b8) . Truth comes from
interpretation; collectivity is linguistically constituted.
The "phainomena ." "order," "structure," "place," and
"resources" in Nussbaum correspond to what we call 'history
in the present work.
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opposites; but of that which is fine and truly
hi^r;^ K^^^^ ^^""^ ^ conception, since theyave never had a taste of it. What discours4 could ever
^on^'^.r^S^
like that? To dislodge by argument habitsl ng embedded in the character is a difficult if notimpossible task. (EN. 1179bl-19.)
"Humanity is subject to many kinds of corruption and
perversion" (EN. 1176a20)
. Discussion and teaching can
hardly impress the multitude of men when it comes to
governing the refractory pull of the appetitive part of the
soul. "The man who lives in accordance with his feelings
would not listen to an argument to dissuade him, or
understand it if he did" (EN- 1179b26) . For such a state of
evaluative wasteland Aristotle does not trust the
possibility of a political solution. He particularly casts
the sufficiency of law as the product of politics into
serious doubt:
Laws represent the products of the art of
politics: how then can <a collection of> laws teach a
man the art of legislation, or help him to pick out the
best of them? . . . collections of laws and constitutions
may be serviceable to those who are capable of
examining them critically and judging what is rightly
enacted and what is the opposite, and what sort of
legislation is suitable for different circumstances.
But those who go through such collections of examples
without possessing a formed habit of mind cannot assess
merit correctly, except by a kind of instinct, although
they may perhaps improve their understanding of the
subject. (EN. 1181a22-bl2
.
)
I have revised the last sentence of the Thomson
translation of this passage (pp. 341-342) both in accordance
with the context and in reference to the Ross and Rackham
translations. The Nicomachean Ethics , trans. David Ross,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 275; The
Nicomachean Ethics , trans. H. Rackham, (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 641-643.
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Hence Aristotle's conclusion:
"^^^ """^^ "° power to command obedience exceptthat of habit, which can only be given by time
( Politics
,
1269a20-22.)
Medical men are not made by reading textbooks, which can be
useful to the experienced practitioner but valueless to the
inexperienced. Only the expert well versed in the practical
experience of a given art can apply the works produced in it
correctly to concrete cases. Therefore, the necessary
tension between general enactment and the particular
circumstances calls for adequate understanding and informed
judgment based on practical experience of those
circumstances. After all, the ultimate task in moral and
political inquiry is not knowledge but action, not to know
what the human good is but to become a good man in moral
action. It is for that purpose crucial, as Aristotle
explains, to nurture "a formed habit of mind." The perceived
insufficiency of politics and its resort to compulsion and
punishment impels Aristotle therefore to appeal to the
stronger intuitive sources of moral motivation and ethical
conformity. The ideal solution, he agrees, would be a right
measure of public supervision and education of the young so
as to prepare a suitably receptive character to work on.
Regrettably, "convention" as the way it actually is seems
not up to the standard. In Sparta alone, or almost alone,
Aristotle observes, the legislator has paid attention to
questions of upbringing and daily life. In almost all other
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states concerns in this regard have been completely
neglected, and every man adopts whatever way of life as he
pleases (EN- 1180a25)
.
If the public institutions continue
to neglect their part of ethical education and supervision,
the only way left is moving the task to the private circles.
Among friends or in the household, more accurate treatment
of particular cases based on greater individual attention
may, as a matter of fact, prove to be even more effective
than public education. In other words, Aristotle sees
helping the young "on the way to goodness" as not a public
business in essence. This is a domain wherein
The instruction and habits prescribed by a father
have as much force in the household as laws and customs
have in the state, and even more, because of the tie of
blood and the children's sense of benefits received;
for they are influenced from the outset by natural
affection and docility. Moreover, individual tuition,
like individual treatment in medicine, is actually
superior to the public sort. (EN- 1180a28-b9.)
The state of disarray is evaluative in character. Values and
identities breed in the received thickness of hexis . ethos,
and historia . Politics by its means of coercion may be able
to produce effects on those who are "tribeless, lawless,
hearthless," on the "isolated piece at draughts." But
historia is at bottom a prior-claimed territory, a private
sphere of influence, cemented by "the tie of blood" and
"sense of benefits received." It is habitual allegiance,
affection, and prejudice that hold the essentially organic
and unamenable community together, and allow government to
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exercise authority over willing subjects. With the phronimos
entrenched therein to apply his intuitive yardstick in the
last instance, the law of public justice is simply too thin
and not compelling enough "to command obedience."
Accordingly, the solution Aristotle formulates instead is of
necessity a strong ethical one, sufficiently possessive to
reduce the irreducible heterogeneity to homogeneity, to
correct men's incorrigibly flawed understanding of the rank
order of the human ends, and to "place unity in their column
of goods."
We ought not to listen to those who warn us that
"man should think the thoughts of man" , or "mortal
thoughts fit mortal minds"; but we ought, so far as in
us lies, to put on immortality, and do all that we can
to live in conformity with the highest that is in us;
for even if it is small in bulk, in power and
preciousness it far excels all the rest. (EN. 1177b30-
1178al.
)
The Aristotelian injunction is: maximize the
possibility of theoria; for the rest act morally. The human
ergon rests in action of the soul in accordance with logos .
There are two ways in which the soul can act rationally:
either through the disposition of intellectual excellence to
hit the truth, or through the disposition of moral rectitude
to choose the mean. We achieve eudaimonia when we activate
either one of the two dispositions. Aristotle distinguishes
between the portion of happiness which is divine and the
portion of happiness which is human. If we cannot travel the
high road of theoria . we, as pis aller, can still be happy
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by leading an existence of phronesis. However, phronesis as
the ultimate standard of moral action remains private in
essence; at its bottom are random experiences, arbitrary
practices, and unexamined traditions prevailing for ages
within the particularistic anthropological settings and
historical contexts. This is necessarily the case because,
as Aristotle shows, there is otherwise no way possessive
enough to command men's "formed habit of mind," compelling
enough to move them beyond the domain of knowledge onto that
of moral action. We are all egoists. With our logos
enlightened, we would be able to care for our human nature
on Aristotle's terms. On the other hand, Aristotle in his
undertaking of enlightening does not though evince much
contempt, saying that those of us who prefer the easier
sensual delights to the austere pleasures of eudaimonia
abjure our humanity for a bestial life. He understands that
"To dislodge by argument habits long embedded in the
character is a difficult if not impossible task." If we
choose to remain unimpressed anyway after acquainting
ourselves with Aristotle's elucidation, if the world chooses
to be stubborn and go its own way, then there is in the
final analysis no argument on Aristotle's part which
convinces us that we are foolish, imprudent, irrational, or
acting against our self-interest. For the wicked and
intemperate world may still ask why it should bother to aim
at an unexciting, unsatisfying summum bonum when it finds
satisfaction in its more engaging bestial existence. The
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Philosopher reminds us of our human ergon, and urges us to
make our best endeavors in its performance so as to lead an
intelligible existence as truly a man. Nevertheless he is
poignantly aware that those of us who live as passion
dictates will not listen to an argument of correctness that
dissuades us, nor understand it even if we do. The
connection between reason and the good as often as not is a
myth. With ethos and historia instead, he has defined the
best hope for an ethics that is practical, realistic, and
well-grounded; he has approached as close as humanly
possible to the reach where moral knowledge can be
transformed into moral action. In doing so, on the other
hand, Aristotle keeps us where we have been as we have known
it. Divinity and "nature" are imposed to back up the unitary
hierarchy of the conventions. Theoria is channeled into the
right course of phronesis ; and the possibility of
reflection, foreclosed. While the likelihood of our moral
enlightenment remains uncertain, the darker side of historia
for sure stays possessive of us.
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CHAPTER III
HOBBES: FROM SOCIAL ORDER TO SOCIAL ANARCHY
Rousseau, quand il dit: "L'homme
est ne libre, et partout il est dans les
fers",
... Dire: les moutons sont nes
carnivores, et partout ils mangent de
I'herbe, serait aussi juste.
Emile Faguet^
Community then is a linguistico-ethical scheme
inscribed upon a space of historical accretions. Aimed not
at the thin protection of public justice but at possession
of ethical identity, the communitarian mode of collectivity
takes the form of conceptual repositories of shared
references which claim exclusive access to a higher order of
truth. Ethical cohesion and linguistic sufficiency
presuppose each other in the community. When one corrupts,
the other deteriorates into unintelligible disarray,
ushering in the social and political disorder of the day.
The burning crises and ultimate catastrophe of the
Greek world had occurred in this fashion, and found their
way into historiography through Thucydides's History of the
Peloponnesian War . In a celebrated passage, the fifth
century historian depicted the ethical and linguistic
aftermath of the Civil War in Corcyra as follows:
^. Emile Faguet, Politiaues et Moralistes , (Paris:
Societe Francaise D'Imprimerie et de Librairie, 1899), p.
41.
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To fit in with the change of events, words, too,
had to change their usual meanings. What used to be
described as a thoughtless act of aggression was now
regarded as the courage one would expect to find in a
party member; to think of the future and wait was
merely another way of saying one was a coward; any idea
of moderation was just an attempt to disguise one's
unmanly character; ability to understand a question
from all sides meant that one was totally unfitted for
action. Fanatical enthusiasm was the mark of a real
man, and to plot against an enemy behind his back was
perfectly legitimate self-defence. Anyone who held
violent opinions could always be trusted, and anyone
who objected to them became a suspect. . . . Love of
power, operating through greed and through personal
ambition, was the cause of all these evils. ... As the
result of these revolutions, there was a general
deterioration of character throughout the Greek world.
^
Thucydides's depiction of the conceptual-political
disarray anticipated the thinker who coined the term "state
of nature" upon the advent of another wave of upheaval when
the old world was "running up like parchment in the fire and
wearing away."^ Unless, Thomas Hobbes admonished us during
the great turmoil of the seventeenth-century English Civil
War, we created a political sovereign and submitted
ourselves to it for protection, we would get stuck in "the
state of meer Nature," "the condition of Warre" (Leviathan,
pp. 253, 395). "In such condition," writes Hobbes in Chapter
13 of Leviathan ,
there is no place for Industry; because the fruit
thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of
the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities
that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; nc
Instruments of moving, and removing such things as
2 Historv of the Pe l
o
ponnesian War , pp. 242-244.
. A.S.P. Woodhouse, (ed.), Puritanism and Liberty
tot The University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 3/y.
3
(Chicag :
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require much force; no Knowledge of the face of theEarth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; noSociety; and which is worst of all, continuall feare,
and danger of violent death; And the life of man
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. (Leviathan,
p. 186.)
AS we have seen in the last chapter, Aristotle maintains the
thesis that politics should be informed by ethical ity, and
he attributes political legitimacy to moral correctness
rooted in the private sphere of ethos . Therefore
Aristotelian politics essentially draws on the particularity
of history, not on any universal principle of reason or
nature. Bearing Aristotle's solution in mind, this chapter
examines the way in which Hobbes perceives the moral and
political experience of his time, and assesses his response
to the dangers to men's collective existence.
We begin with a note on the way Hobbes in his
translation of Thucydides renders the first sentence of the
passage we have quoted above:
The received value of names imposed for
signification of things was changed into arbitrary.^
Thus Hobbes 's rendering highlights the evaluative attribute
of the corruptions and absurdities, and underlines the
connection of language to the accustomed ethical scheme of
the polls. ^ Evaluative concerns are central to Hobbes 's
*
.
Thucydides; The Complete Hobbes Translation ,
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 204.
^. John Wilson points out that the Warner translation
of the sentence is misleading, and argues that a better
rendering should be "They changed their accustomed verbal
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politics. The subject matter of Leviathan
, as Hobbes
conceives it, is "not of Fact, but of Right" (Leviathan, p.
727)
.
Treatment of natural right, according to De Give , is
called "morals." And he takes it that the laws of nature
"are the sum of moral philosophy."^ Political philosophy is
but ethics applied to collective life. In this sense, we may
regard "the Beast of Malmesbury" as a traditional political
philosopher concerned with ethical issues, not a political
scientist engaged in behavioral analysis in the modern
"value-free" sense of the term. Similar to the case of
Aristotle, we therefore assume, the central problem with
which Hobbes 's works on politics are concerned is a Socratic
one, viz., the existence or non-existence of common ethical
standards by which we can settle our evaluative conflicts
and live our lives together in peace.
^
evaluations of things." Wilson in his essay does not mention
Hobbes 's translation. John Wilson, "^The Customary Meanings
of Words Were Changed' — Or Were They? A Note on Thucydides
3.82.4," Classical Quarterly
. (32)1982, pp. 18-20.
^. "The laws of nature, therefore, are the sum of moral
philosophy; whereof I have only delivered such precepts in
this place, as appertain to the preservation of ourselves
against those dangers which arise from discord." Thomas
Hobbes, Man and Citizen , ed. Bernard Gert, (Gloucester,
Mass.: Peter Smith, 1978), pp. 91, 152.
This chapter draws on, among other secondary
materials, Leo Strauss' reading of Hobbes. We share his
understanding that underlying Hobbes 's political theory is
not modern science but rather his fundamental view of human
life and experience. This view, in turn, must be traced back
to an "original moral attitude." There are some of Strauss'
remarks which we find particularly interesting. Addressing
Hobbes 's assertion of the interpretative irrelevance of
historical experience, Strauss points out that the so-called
"patriarchal theory" is not only no refutation of Hobbes 's
conception of "war of all against all," but actually a
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support of It. As he cites Hobbes, "For Germany, being
antiently, as all other Countries, in their beginnings,divided amongst an infinite number of little Lords IrMasters of Families, that continually had wars one'with
another" ( Leviathan , p. 158). On Strauss' account, Hobbes
conceives of the "state of nature" as "a typical history" toexpose the "completely defective state of mankind." Thishaving been said, "the state of nature ... takes on anhistorical significance — not, indeed, as a condition of
absolute lack of order, but as a condition of extremelydefective order." Whereas Strauss stops here, we, based onthe scheme of the present work as a whole, go further,
arguing that the Hobbesian state of nature refers,
specifically and mainly, to historia . the Aristotelian
paradigm of human collectivity. Furthermore, we agree with
Strauss that Hobbes, comparable to Plato, means "to
distinguish sharply between what is and what should be." As
he also cites Hobbes, "For though in all places of the
world, men should lay the foundation of their houses on the
sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to
be" (Leviathan, p. 261). "Whereas Plato frees himself from
the spell of words," observes Strauss, "Aristotle remains
under that spell." These notwithstanding, Strauss' central
argument is that Hobbes, through his replacement of
objective natural law by subjective natural right, stands
for the fountainhead of "peculiarly" modern political
thought, originating a radical break with traditional
political philosophy founded by Plato and Aristotle. Leo
Strauss, The Political Philosophv of Hobbes . trans. Elsa M.
Sinclair, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966)
,
pp. X, 170, 102-104, 106-107, 97, 140-141, vii-viii, xv, 1.
We differ from Strauss mainly in that we demarcate the
scene, as the present work unfolds, not between the modern
and the ancient, but between Aristotle and Heidegger, on the
one hand, and Plato and Hobbes, on the other. And we see the
basic difference between the two distinctive lines of
ultimate persuasion as resting with the contrasting views
with which they perceive the ( ir) relevance of human
experience. In this regard, we share Michael Oakeshott's
rendering that the human situation is essentially not a
feast but a predicament, and that politics is the attempt to
tackle it. "Man," reflects Oakeshott in his interpretation
of Hobbes, "is the dupe of error, the slave of sin, of
passion, of fear, of care, the enemy of himself or of others
or of both — O miseras hominum mentes. O pectora caeca —
and the political order appears as the whole or a part of
the scheme of his salvation." Leviathan , ed. Michael
Oakeshott, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), pp. x-xi. The
present work benefits also from Sheldon Wolin's reading that
Hobbes 's state of nature stands as "a recurrent human
possibility" which is "eternally contemporary and urgent."
We share Wolin's interpretation, however, mainly in the
sense that the state of nature is not intended by Hobbes
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A. The Sceptical Turn
Aristotle's philosophy had fallen into disfavor later
in the ancient world; but, when rediscovered in Western
Europe in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, many of his
works provided the basis for the most sophisticated medieval
scholarship, known as "scholasticism." In his early years,
Thomas Hobbes had received a "standard Aristotelian
education," but, against the background of a sceptical turn
in the intellectual climate, he conceived along the way a
violent dislike for the Philosopher.® In his view, "scarce
merely as an anarchy chronologically prior to civil society.
While Wolin sees the condition as a suspended moment between
order and restoration, a breakdown of social existence which
threatens a reversal of time, he does not identify the
reference of the "chaos of violence" more specifically. On
the one hand, Wolin points out that the state of nature is
for Hobbes "a distillation of experience"; on the other
hand, he suggests that the bleak condition is "essentially
ahistorical" and "severed from history." Sheldon S. Wolin,
Politics and Vision , (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1960), pp. 264-265. By contrast, we assume here that the
frame of reference into which Hobbes places his state of
nature is a condition emphatically historical, and starkly
real
.
®. See James Jay Hamilton, "Hobbes 's Study and the
Hardwick Library," Journal of the History of PhilosoTphv,
October 1978, pp. 445-453. The philosophical scepticism and
moral relativism of Hobbes 's times can be attested by one of
Montaigne's passages: "What am I to make of a virtue that I
saw in credit yesterday, that will be discredited tomorrow,
and that becomes a crime on the other side of the river?
What of a truth that is bounded by these mountains and is
falsehood to the world that lives beyond?" Michel de.
Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne , trans. Donald
M Frame, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), p.
437. In Brief Lives , John Aubrey recalls having heard Hobbes
say that "Aristotle was the worst Teacher that ever was, the
worst polititian and ethick." John Aubrey, Brief Lives , ed.
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any thing can be more absurdly said in naturall Philosophy,
than that which now is called Aristotles Metaphysiques ; nor
more repugnant to Government, than much of that hee hath
said in his Politiques; nor more ignorantly, than a great
part of his Ethiques" ( Leviathan
, p. 687). The "absurdity,"
"repugnance," and "ignorance" are perceived as such that
Hobbes starts Leviathan at once with an attack on
Aristotle's general philosophy. The "Philosophy-schooles" of
Christendom, charges he in "Of Sense," Chapter 1 of the
treatise, are "grounded upon certain Texts of Aristotle"
which claim a positive, authentic connection between man's
cognition within a perceptual and linguistic scheme and the
objective world in the cosmos of nature (Leviathan, pp. 85-
87) . To be seen or heard or understood, the external object
sends forth "visible species," "Audible species," or
"intelligible species" over to our related sense, upon the
receiving of which we see or hear or comprehend that object.
According to this account, human perceptions of the world
are correct: if an object looks white to a normal observer,
then that object is white. The classes of predicates do
correspond to the classes of things in reality. There is no
room in this account for a significant divergence between
the way the world is sensed and conceptualized, on the one
hand, and the world as it independently is, on the other.
Andrew Clark, (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1898) , p.
357.
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In rejection of such Aristotelian cognitive positivism,
Hobbes stresses the fundamentally unreliable character of
man's sense-perception. Human thoughts are everyone
"Apparence" or "Accident" derivative of our faculties of
cognition; each sense is caused by the pressure of a body
external which, upon delivery, "seemeth to be some matter
without." The object is one thing; the perception, another.
If, Hobbes argues, the image were immanent to the body, it
could not be severed from it and reach us. As Hobbes puts it
emphatically in the Elements of Law , the first of his three
treatises on ethical and political theory, "whatsoever
accidents or qualities our senses make us think there be in
the world, they are not there, but are seemings and
Q
apparitions only."' So senses are in all cases nothing else
but "seemings," "apparitions," or "fancy." The sensation of
white color is a mere illusion under a pulse of influence
from something external which we have no way whatsoever to
know whether or not it is itself white color. Therefore, the
truths under explanation are assumed to be truths relative
to our ways of conceiving natural objects and of naming
them. Neither the content of our conceptions nor our naming
conventions are supposed to be reliable indicators of the
way in which things objectively and authentically exist in
Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Law. Natural and Politic ,
ed. Ferdinand Tonnies, (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.,
1984)
,
p. 7.
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nature. There is, on Hobbes's account, no safe inference
from convention over to nature.
B. Language
By virtue of such general epistemological scepticism,
Hobbes believes that our language does not mirror the world,
but is instead constitutive of it. By acting with, upon, and
through our language, we continually constitute and
reconstitute the world. As action of mind upon mind through
speech, ethical and political reality is linguistically
made. Through the medium of speech we do all sorts of things
with words: we measure, teach, command; we authorize, swear
oaths, accuse, excuse, recall, incite; we boast, insult,
employ metaphors, lie, and so on ad infinitum . As "the most
noble and profitable invention," "speech" is defined in
Chapter 4 of Leviathan as "consisting of Names or
Appellations, and their Connexion; whereby men register
their Thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also
declare them one to another for mutuall utility and
conversation" ( Leviathan , p. 100) . The keynote Hobbesian
theme runs as follows: "True and False are attributes of
Speech, not of Things. And where Speech is not, there is
neither Truth nor Falshood." Names are not imposed on the
named objects from their natures, nor do we give names on
the basis of a priori knowledge of those natures. Truth is
linguistic in essence without any bearing upon objective
reality in the metaphysical sense of the term. We may or may
not make linguistic errors, but in neither case can we be
charged with making an (un) truth. "Seeing then," Hobbes
further explains,
that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in
our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth, had
need to remember what every name he uses stands for;
and to place it accordingly; or else he will find
himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs;
the more he struggles, the more belimed. And therefore
in Geometry, . . . men begin at settling the
significations of their words; which settling of
significations, they call Definitions; ... So that in
the right Definition of Names, lyes the first use of
Speech; which is the Acquisition of Science: And in
wrong, or no Definitions, lyes the first abuse; from
which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets.
Between ourselves and reality, there is always an
impenetrable, insuperable medium of names, words, and
language. Definition of this medium is an ever-present
necessity. To define a word is to endow it with a clear and
unambiguous meaning. In doing so one does not go any farther
beyond that word to reach the nature that it is supposed to
represent. Objective and authentic truth does not, as
Aristotle believes it does, have "a natural tendency to
prevail;" nor do we have "a sufficient instinct" to "arrive
at the truth." All that is attainable is linguistic
austerity, sobriety, precision, and certainty.
Since Hobbes has no interest, as Aristotle does, in
advancing a view of language to undergird his ethical
thesis, he expounds such necessity of right and
unequivocal
definition largely in terms of what would happen
in its
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absence. The abuse of language starts with wrong or no
definitions, from which proceeds all the linguistic damage
that Hobbes sets out to redress. For the errors of
definitions multiply, and lead men to absurdities, "as birds
that entring by the chimney, and finding themselves inclosed
in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glasse window,
for want of wit to consider which way they came in." As
faculties of human nature, our sense and imagination do not
necessarily produce absurdity. Nature cannot err by itself.
However, if we "abound in copiousnesse of language," our
potential madness would very possibly assert itself and
render us "excellently foolish" ( Leviathan , pp. 105-106)
.
Ingrained with pride and dignity and envy, each of us, the
language-using and -abusing animals, attempts to speak a
private language in a bid to make words mean whatever he
wishes them to mean. Interpretation can produce no clear
meaning acceptable to all. Linguistic competence does not
necessarily engender comprehensibility . Nor does our
capacity to speak exempt us from speaking loosely,
erroneously, insincerely, self-interestedly , and
deceitfully. Without sober use of language, Hobbes warns,
"There had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor
Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst
Lyons, Bears, and Wolves" (Leviathan, p. 100). Reminiscent
of the "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short"
depiction in Chapter 13, these lines may be regarded as the
occasion where Hobbes 's notion of language and his theory of
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ethico-politics converge in Leviathan . The condition of war
takes the form of linguistic disorder. Absurd definitions
constitute the linguistic state of nature, which, as a
veritable Babel of mutually incomprehensible tongues, a
condition of conceptual breakdown, corresponds with the
condition of war. The essentially linguistic basis of ethics
and politics therefore decides that conceptual confusion
necessarily contains political implications. Hobbes's state
of nature echoes Thucydides's portrayal of the conceptual
aftermath of the Corcyraean revolution. Absurd speech
ferments the first stirrings of sedition and discord, and
therefore is politically dangerous. Wrong definition and the
forbidding condition of war are the two sides of the same
single anarchy.
For Hobbes, the only way to set language aright resides
in man's reason which, as the sole basis of the certain
"Articles of Peace" (laws of nature) , refers on his account
to "Reckoning (that is. Adding and Substracting) of the
Consequences of general 1 names agreed upon, for the marking
and signifying of our thoughts" (Leviathan, P- HI)- The
crucial question here is "Of whose Reason it is, that shall
be received for Law" (Leviathan, p. 316). Hobbes agrees with
Aristotle on the necessity of finding a reliable source for
the common measure. But the answer he gives to this crucial
problem is poles apart from Aristotle's phronesis solution,
in Hobbes 's view, we cannot afford grounding "Right
Reason"
on temporal accumulation of habits, customs, and
tradition,
nor on the private experience of any men, not even the
wisdom of Aristotle's phronimos . For, fallible without
exception as they are, even the "ablest, most attentive, and
most practiced men, may deceive themselves, and inferre
false Conclusions." As Hobbes puts it, "No one mans Reason,
nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes the
certaintie," and the test "is not that Juris prudentia . or
wisedome of subordinate Judges" (Leviathan, pp. Ill, 316).
The right reason, he argues,
is not meant of any private Reason; for then there
would be as much contradiction in the Lawes, as there
is in the Schooles; nor yet, ... an Artificiall
perfection of Reason, gotten by long study,
observation, and experience, ... For it is possible
long study may encrease, and confirm erroneous
Sentences: and where men build on false grounds, the
more they build, the greater is the ruine: and of those
that study, and observe with equall time, and
diligence, the reasons and resolutions are, and must
remain discordant. (Leviathan, pp. 316-317.)
Susceptible to discordance and interested biases, phronesis .
private reason, and tradition fail to meet the standard of
linguistic precision, clarity, and certainty. Therefore they
are all rejected as unreliable for the purpose of
unequivocal definition. This rejection clears the path
toward Hobbes 's system.
The only cure for the conceptual-political chaos is to
be found in a scientific purgation of the tainted ethical
and political language. Citizenry cannot live together
without sharing a common vocabulary fixed once and for all
in advance. The first step therefore is to silence
the
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insanity and clamor, and undo the damage done at Babel. Into
the fire go "obscure, confused, and ambiguous Expressions,
also all metaphoricall Speeches, tending to the stirring up
of Passion" ( Leviathan , p. 307). A sober language for a
sober citizenry. It is by linguistic artifice that the great
Leviathan is supposed to be created. Needed is creation of a
public reason to replace the private ones.^° When a legal
controversy arises, Hobbes suggests, the conflicting parties
must "by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the
Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they
will both stand." And such a common power of arbitration can
only be "constituted by Nature" (Leviathan, p. Ill) . In the
same manner, the only reliable resort for redressing the
linguistic anarchy is "the Reason of this our Artificiall
Man the Common-wealth, and his Command, that maketh Law,"
which is "in all Common-wealths inseparably annexed ... to
the Soveraign Power Civill" ( Leviathan , pp. 317, 567). The
public reason resides in the judgment of the sovereign, the
sovereign definer of the public meanings that, being beyond
the Aristotelian categories of normal and perverted, is
itself the agency of the ultimate moral good. Only that
judgment is in a disinterested position to constrain the
possibilies of wanton interpretation and to provide the
^0. A question arises herefrom: If the private reason
is flawed, incorrigible, and intractable, as Hobbes asserts
it is, upon what basis is the public reason constituted? How
could the transition from one to the other take place? This
is Hobbes's ultimate problem. We will address it when we get
to "the Fool's Question" toward the close of this chapter.
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common measure necessary for the definition and enforcement
of the community's public language. Once again the
linguistic and political routes of Leviathan converge. Here
the convergence takes place upon the sovereign.
C. Natural Reason and Fear of Death
The next question then is: what is the source of the
political authority of Hobbes's sovereign? "I have," he
states in Leviathan ,
derived the Rights of Soveraigne Power, and the duty of
Subjects hitherto, from the Principles of Nature onely;
... that is to say, from the nature of Men, known to us
by Experience, and from Definitions (of such words as
are Essentiall to all Politicall reasoning) universally
agreed on.
And "I ground the Civill Right of Soveraigns, and both the
Duty and Liberty of Subjects, upon the known naturall
Inclinations of Mankind, and upon the Articles of the Law of
Nature" ( Leviathan , pp. 409, 725).^^ Hobbes relates the
political sovereign to "the Principles of Nature onely."
Thus emerges, distinctive from Aristotle's construct of
historia , Hobbes 's paradigmatic inscription of ethics and
politics on the universal cosmos of nature. Two Hobbesian
1^ See also Leviathan , p. 407: "Thus farre concerning
the Constitution, Nature, and Right of Soveraigns; and
concerning the Duty of Subjects, derived from the Principles
of Naturall Reason. ... I consider again, that the Science
of Naturall Justice, is the onely Science necessary
for
Soveraigns .
"
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traits are visible here: the abstract, unhistorical
character of his system, and special emphasis on the
necessity of a sober common language. Hobbes believes in the
materialistic unity of the world. The entire universe, he
maintains, is no more than an aggregate of innumerable
"bodies" external to man, not an intelligible cosmic order
of which humanity is one subordinate part. The material
objects exist objectively, for they all share the
characteristic dimensions of corporeality. As Hobbes puts it
in Leviathan,
The world, (I mean not the Earth onely, that
denominates the Lovers of it Worldly men, but the
Universe, that is, the whole masse of all things that
are) is Corporeal 1, that is to say. Body; and hath the
dimensions of Magnitude, namely. Length, Bredth, and
Depth: also every part of Body, is likewise Body, and
hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part
of the Universe, is Body, and that which is not Body,
is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is
All, that which is no part of it, is Nothing; and
consequently no where. (Leviathan, p. 689.)
On this view, the world should be explained only in
mechanistic and geometric terms, and change be understood
merely as mechanistic motions effected by external actions.
Hobbes defines "nature" not in terms of any "final
cause" of it but solely in terms of "efficient cause." "The
variations ... of the phenomena of nature, have all of them
one universal efficient cause, namely the variety of
motion." God's plan, if any at all, is inscrutable. Attempts
to assign final causes to natural phenomena beyond that of
motion are attempts vainly to comprehend God's way. In other
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words, to know the efficient causes of things, motion "is
all that is expected," for "there is no effect in nature
which the Author of nature cannot bring to pass by more ways
than one." For Hobbes, motion is but change of place.
Since incorporeal and immaterial substances such as divine
or spirit or soul are incapable of place, they accordingly
do not exist. In brief, "Nature worketh by Motion; the
Wayes, and Degrees whereof cannot be known, without the
knowledge of the Proportions and Properties of Lines, and
Figures" ( Leviathan , p. 686) . Thus Hobbes conceives the
concept of nature wholly within the framework of his
mechanistic physics and materialistic ontology. His
philosophy of "natural causes" reveals no intelligible
"first cause" in the capital-letter sense of the phrase. He
does not recognize, as Aristotle does, the possibility of a
"first science" (metaphyics) dealing with a higher order or
divine substance.
Proceeding herefrom, men are by nature equal both in
their physical strength and in their faculty of mind. This
underlying equality of capability renders everyone apt to
invade and destroy everyone else for the attainment of his
own ends. "Man to man is an arrant wolf" (Man and Citizen,
p. 89). Without a common power "to keep them all in awe,"
^2. "Decameron Physiologicum, " The English Works of
Thomas Hobbes , ed. Sir William Molesworth, Bart. Vol. VII,
(Reprint of the edition 1839, Scientia Aalen, 1962), pp. 82
83, 88. See also Leviathan , p. 430: "The nature of
God is
incomprehensible.
"
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men live in the fundamental direness of their species, which
Hobbes calls "Warre of every man against every man"
(Leviathan, pp. 183-185). By human nature, viz., the
"natural Inclinations of Mankind," Hobbes means above all "a
perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that
ceaseth onely in Death." Men are by nature desirous of
wealth, knowledge, honor, and power, he adds, not so much
because their appetites are insatiable as because they are a
perpetually endangered species and they psychologically will
not feel secure unless they indefinitely acquire more
(Leviathan, pp. 139, 161). Hobbes is arguing for, instead of
against, the strong passions of man, as a matter of fact.
Even when speaking of the "Warre of every man against every
man" derivative of such passionate human disposition, he
still takes the trouble to clarify that these desires, and
actions motivated by them, "are in themselves no Sin," for
there is no common power to make law concerning where the
passionate actions should stop (Leviathan, p. 187) .
According to Hobbes 's notion of human nature, man is
ethically neutral with a high degree of inner heterogeneity
and plasticity, which would admit of little likelihood for
Aristotle's unity of the virtues: "The secret thoughts of a
man run over all things, holy, prophane, clean, obscene,
grave, and light, without shame, or blame" (Leviathan, p.
137) . Therefore, he believes, even
the most sober men, when they walk alone without care
and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the
100
vanity and Extravagance of their thoughts at that time
should be publiquely seen: which is a confession, thatPassions unguided, are for the most part meere
Madnesse. ( Leviathan
^ p. 142.)
Nor could Aristotle's test, phronesis . help much to keep the
refractory passions under discipline. Practical wisdom, or
"prudence" as Hobbes more often calls it, is "but
Experience; which equall time, equally bestowes on all men."
Hobbes harbors an acute, underlying distrust of the
relevance of human experience. In his view, "through the
difficulty of observing all circumstances," prudent
conjectures based on a reading of past experience are "all
uncertain" and even "very fallacious." As mere presumption
of the future, prudence may fail, whereas reason and science
are infallible (Leviathan, pp. 97, 98, 117, 138, 183).
Philosophy is understood as the knowledge acquired by
reasoning, thereof experience has no part. For prudence
is not attained by Reasoning, but found as well in
Brute Beasts, as in Man; and is but a Memory of
successions of events in times past, wherein the
omission of every little circumstance altering the
effect, frustrateth the expectation of the most
Prudent: whereas nothing is produced by Reasoning
aright, but general 1, eternal 1, and immutable Truth.
( Leviathan , p. 682.)
Hobbes 's view of human nature also rejects the doctrine of
the mean as a wrong yardstick to measure virtue or vice, for
on his account the only test acceptable for moral judgment
is reason:
As for the common opinion, that virtue consisteth
in mediocrity, and vice in extremes, I see no ground
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for it, nor can find any such mediocrity. Courage may
be virtue, when the daring is extreme, if the cause be
good; and extreme fear no vice when the danger is
extreme. To give a man more than his due, is no
injustice, though it be to give him less; and in gifts
it is not the sum that maketh liberality, but the
reason. And so in all other virtues and vices.
And he goes on to underline what he sees as the unexamined
nature of Aristotle's ethics: "I know that this doctrine of
mediocrity is Aristotle's, but his opinions concerning
virtue and vice, are no other than those which were received
then, and are still by the generality of men unstudied; and
therefore not very likely to be accurate" ( Elements of Law ,
p. 94). What is needed then is a project of education to lead
the "generality of men" in a "steddy direction to some
approved end." Without such enlightenment in reason, he
warns, "a great Fancy is one kind of Madnesse; such as they
have, ... that they utterly lose themselves" (Leviathan, pp.
134-135, 136). In the absence of a sovereign power, the
potential "madness" inherent in all of us will function as
one of the root causes of the miserable state of nature.
Hobbes does not subscribe to the "political animal" wisdom;
instead he believes that "man is made fit for society not by
nature, but by education" (Man and Citizen , p. 110)
.
Politics draws not on what historically we have been, but on
what rationally we should all become.
Fortunately, there is one item of passion, namely,
fear, which in Hobbes 's project of "education" can be
reckoned upon and turned to good account ( Leviathan , pp.
188, 200). Though radically passionate, avaricious,
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egoistic, and refractory, we are not, or at least should not
be, fearless creatures, it is our fear of violent and
untimely death that compels us to covenant the Hobbesian
commonwealth, and, after its creation, it is our fear of
punishment that enforces obedience to the laws that the
sovereign promulgates and thereby maintains public
tranquility. ^3 Obviously the Aristotelian thesis of
friendship has no place in Hobbes's system. He makes it
unequivocal, "the original of all great and lasting
societies consisted not in the mutual good will men had
towards each other, but in the mutual fear they had of each
other" (Man and Citizen , p. 113). Essential to the escape
from the dire condition of war, fear of death is notably
part of our "naturall Inclination." "Every man," remarks
Hobbes,
13 Does Hobbes 's "fear of death" refer to death per se
or only to violent and untimely death? This crucial concept,
argues Leo Strauss, covers neither death in general nor even
agonizing death in itself. Hobbes is thinking exclusively of
a violent death which, as the result of primarily evaluative
discord, threatens a man at the hand of other men. The
Political Philosophy of Hobbes , pp. 15-17. We in the present
work share Strauss' reading. Under the envisaged civil
commonwealth men agonize and die all the same; the great
Leviathan does not lengthen our life-span. Hobbes is
concerned not with medicine, but with ethics and politics.
In the Chapter 13, Leviathan , passage which we have cited at
the outset of this chapter, Hobbes makes it explicit that
his "fear of death" means "continuall feare, and danger of
violent death." Elsewhere, he observes that "death is the
greatest of all evils ["qua quisque mortem violentam tanquam
summum naturae malum studet evitare"] (especially when
accompanied by torture)." Man and Citizen , p. 48. Such being
the case, Hobbes considers as the supreme evil only violent
and untimely death, which takes place when we murder each
other in the state of nature.
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is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is
evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which
is death; and this he doth by a certain impulsion of
nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves
downward. (Man and Citizen , p. 115.)^^
Aristotle treats man not as man gua man, not as a pure
animal rationale , but as the way he actually is in the
sphere of historia
. In rejection of reason and nature as the
primary source of virtues, he holds that moral goodness
essentially arises from habits, customs, and, in a word,
ethos . The possibility of a scientific explanation of
rational action is thereby, if not precluded, diminished. On
this crucial guestion of ethical source, Hobbes 's agenda is
to reverse the Aristotelian formula, and to put man back to
the cosmos of nature with fear of death recognized both as
"the chiefest of natural evils" and as the ultimate moral
driving force. The inhabitant of that cosmos is treated
scarcely as more than a body bent upon preserving itself
from annihilation. One inescapably avoids harm and death,
for that general avoidance is inescapable so long as one is
a living creature. Man qua man is thus man qua body, which,
like the falling stone, thereby becomes amenable to the
natural-scientific laws governing matter in motion. This
fundamental shift from historia to nature constitutes the
cornerstone underlying Hobbes 's system. Yet he is amply
Hobbes is using the metaphor of the falling stone
obviously with Aristotle's lines in mind: "A stone, which
has a natural tendency downwards, cannot be habituated to
rise, however often you try to train it by throwing it
into
the air." EN- 1103a21-23.
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aware that Aristotle inscribes ethical and political
collectivity upon what has been holding sway over men's
identity and moral action in the real world, and that,
formidable and almost irrefragable as its logic is, the
Aristotelian paradigm therefore will not go away in any eai
manner. The way Hobbes sets his hand to cleanse the Augean
stables of historia will be examined in the latter half of
this chapter.
D. Moral Relativism
The Hobbesian approach to language and politics
involves ethical implications. Proceeding from his general
epistemological scepticism, Hobbes subscribes to a line of
moral relativism, according to which "there are no
authentical doctrines concerning right and wrong, good and
evil" (Man and Citizen , p. 98) . There are no objective,
authentic moral properties, approval or disapproval is to be
understood as feelings engendered by the impact of something
external on our system of passions and wants, and what seems
good is but what pleases us or what we think is good for us.
Aristotle equates the ultimate human good with eudaimonia .
and identifies the highest form of such an existence with a
life of theoria . Hobbes rejects such teleological doctrine
categorically. By ethicality he means merely "those
qualities of man-kind, that concern their living together in
Peace, and Unity." Felicity, as he calls it, "consisteth not
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in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such
Finis ultimus
,
(utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonim
,
(greatest
Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Moral
Philosophers" (Leviathan, p. 160). The ethical index that
Hobbes the moral philosopher consults instead rests entirely
with the sensuous desires or appetites underlying men's
worldly pursuits:
Continuall successe in obtaining those things
which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say,
continuall prospering, is that men call FELICITY; I
mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such
thing as perpetuall Tranquillity of mind. ( Leviathan ,
pp. 129-130.)
Whereas Aristotle assumes the possibility of general ethical
agreement based on ethos , and attributes evaluative
conflicts to defects in moral dispositions, Hobbes argues
that disagreement is not the exception but the rule. In the
Introduction to Leviathan . Hobbes affirms that human
emotions are comparable because, as the psychological
faculties, they are identical across men. But he is quick to
point out that this is the case only when men live in the
abstract. Since men do not live in the abstract, particular
circumstances present the problem of diversity:
I say the similitude of Passions, which are the
same in all men, desire, feare, hope, &c; not the
similitude of the objects of the Passions, which are
the things desired, feared, hoped, &c: for these the
constitution individuall, and particular education do
so vary, and they are so easie to be kept from our
knowledge, that the characters of mans heart, blotted
and confounded as they are, with dissembling, lying,
counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible
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onely to him that searcheth hearts. ( Leviathan , pp. 82-
83.)
Given the diverse and unknowable nature of what we approve
or disapprove, we deem things good or evil solely in terms
of the sensuous effects they produce upon our subjective
faculties; attempts to find out what authentically those
things are make no sense. This argument logically leads to
Hobbes's conclusion as to the (non-) existence of common
ethical criteria:
Whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or
Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good:
And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill; And of
his Contempt, Vile, and Inconsiderable. For these words
of Good, Evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with
relation to the person that useth them: There being
nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule
of Good and Evill, to be taken from the nature of the
objects themselves. (Leviathan, p. 120.)
So concludes Hobbes that there can be no rational basis to
believe in the existence of any measure of moral action
which is acceptable to all and which corresponds positively,
authentically, and exclusively to the scheme of objective
nature.
This relativist proposition that good and evil merely
are functions of our feelings appears also in the Elements
of Law . There can be no common distinction between those
functions because there is no "such thing as . . . <agathon
haplos >. that is to say, simply good. For even the goodness
which we attribute to God Almighty, is his goodness to us"
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(Elements of Law, p. 29) . Therefore, even the Divinity
cannot serve as the ultimate standard of moral judgment.
Aristotle believes in the sufficiency of the linguistic
convention, along with a genuine ethical consensus, to bring
the contemporary audience over to the truth. Hobbes seems to
be adopting a similar line of reasoning when he suggests the
reverse, that the state of nature takes the form of a
linguistic disorder. Nevertheless, the parallelism is only
apparent. The unity in the community between ethical ity and
language in the Aristotelian sense is not Hobbes 's theme but
rather a target of his attack. The ways in which the two
thinkers define the ethico-linguistic relationship are
fundamentally different. Proceeding from his notion that
ethics studies the supreme good for man, Aristotle's project
seeks to uplift rhetoric to the level of ethical cohesion.
With the denial of the existence of such a highest human
good, Hobbes reduces values to the level of mere linguistic
clarity. Ethical ( in) coherence is for him only a matter of
" (in) constant signification." When we perceive the world
differently from one another, we can hardly avoid a
different "naming" of it. For
though the nature of that we conceive, be the same,-^ yet
the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of
different constitutions of body, and prejudices of
opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different
passions. And therefore in reasoning, a man must take
heed of words; which besides the signification of what
^5 Aristotle rejects such an approach explicitly in
the Nicomachean Ethics . 1094bl2-27, 1181al2-17.
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we imagine of their nature, have a signification also
of the nature, disposition, and interest of the
speaker; such as are the names of Vertues, and Vices;
For one man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth
feare; and one cruelty, what another justice; one
prodigality, what another magnanimity; and one gravity,
what another stupidity, &c. And therefore such names
can never be true grounds of any ratiocination.
( Leviathan , pp. 109-110.)
Virtues and vices are linguistic, not metaphysical, in
character. Ethics, as Hobbes thus takes it, is itself
susceptible to discordance and interested biases. For that
reason, it cannot function as the source of politics.
What these passages provide is an angle from which we
may define the paradigmatic construct of the state of
nature. How should we understand the bearing that this
thesis of the metaphysically groundless nature of ethics has
upon Hobbes 's political thought? In Chapter 13 of Leviathan .
Hobbes locates three principal causes of the ill condition
of war, viz., competition for gain, diffidence about safety,
and glory. The first two are explained in material and
physical terms. The third source of conflict is clearly
evaluative in nature, however. In the absence of a power "to
over-awe them all," Hobbes observes.
every man looketh that his companion should value him,
at the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all
signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally
endeavours, as far as he dares ... to extort a greater
value from his contemners, by dommage; and from others,
by the example. ... as a word, a smile, a different
opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either
direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their
Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession,
or their Name. ( Leviathan , p. 185.)
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In Be Give
,
he affirms explicitly that the natural
proclivity of men to hurt and destroy each other is derived
"from their passions, but chiefly from a vain esteem of
themselves" (Man and Citizen , p. 117). This further implies
the "chiefly" evaluative source of men's natural condition
of war. At the conclusion of Chapter 13 of Leviathan
. Hobbes
suggests that the way out of the state of nature lies in our
fear of death, desire of "commodious living," and, above
all, the set of rational "Articles of Peace" upon which "men
may be drawn to agreement" (Leviathan, p. 188) . The word
"agreement" here sounds ambiguous in meaning. It can refer
to the mutual covenant through which we set up the Hobbesian
commonwealth to attain external security, but it can also be
read as implying a solution to our "glory" problem, viz.,
the acquisition of a common standard by which we settle our
conflicts over rival values and truth claims. Upon
concluding the article-by-article explication of the 19 laws
of nature in the following two chapters, Hobbes goes on to
argue that the science of those laws constitutes the "true
and onely" moral philosophy. "Good, and Evill," he explains.
are names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions;
which in different tempers, customes, and doctrines of
men, are different: And divers men, differ not onely in
their Judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and
unpleasant to the tast, smell, hearing, touch, and
sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable
to Reason, in the actions of common life. Nay, the same
man, in divers times, differs from himselfe; and one
time praiseth, that is, calleth Good, what another time
he dispraiseth, and calleth Evil: From whence arise
Disputes, controversies, and at last War. And therefore
so long a man is in the condition of meer Nature,
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(which IS a condition of War,) as private Appetite is
the measure of Good, and Evill: and consequently all
men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore
also the way, or means of Peace, which ... are Justice,
Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the
Laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, Moral
1
Vertues; and their contrarie Vices, Evill. ( Leviathan ,
pp. 215-216.)
Hence Hobbes identifies the primary source of the bellum
omnium contra omnes with application of private measures to
rival and incompatible evaluative traditions and claims. The
only solution lies in the sole possibly agreed-upon
yardstick, viz., public peace. In De Give Hobbes gives the
identical view that, because of their diverse constitutions,
customs, and opinions, men differ from one another not only
in senses and feelings, but "much more in those which
pertain to the common actions of life." What one man
"commends" and "calls good," the other "undervalues, as
being evil." "Whilst thus they do," he points out,
necessary it is there should be discord and strife.
They are, therefore, so long in the state of war, as by
reason of the diversity of the present appetites, they
mete good and evil by diverse measures. (Man and
Citizen, p. 150.)
Clearly, it is not so much with conflicts over wants or
needs as with quarrels over what to praise or dispraise, or
ethically to approve or disapprove, that Hobbes identifies
the true source of discord, strife, and the bleak condition
of war. In other words, the state of nature, as Hobbes 's
rendering of Thucydides suggests, is to a larger extent an
evaluative, conceptual disarray. And the root cause of this
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resides in men's appeal to diverse private measures to judge
moral issues, as much as, if not more than, in quarrels
about property and ordinary material goods.
What most frighten Hobbes, we may assume, are
evaluative chaos such as the Wars of Religion; not, for
instance, class conflicts. "Whence comes it," Hobbes asks
when he reflects on the spiritual darkness in history,
that in Christendome there has been, almost from the
time of the Apostles, such justling of one another out
of their places, both by forraign, and Civill war? such
stumbling at every little asperity of their own
fortune, and every little eminence of that of other
men? and such diversity of ways in running to the same
mark. Felicity , if it be not Night amongst us, or at
least a Mist? wee are therefore yet in the Dark.
( Leviathan , p. 628.)
The reason for such a reading of the state of nature, as we
infer from Hobbes 's argument, lies in the contrast that in
clashes over property and material goods, at least the
yardsticks are far clearer, much more agreed-upon, and much
less incommensurable, whereas in the quarrels over values,
where private appetites run wild, measures acceptable to all
are lacking, and the warring sectarians contend "yet in the
Dark.
"
E . Self-Preservation and Public Judgment
To the multiplicity and incompatibility of human
beliefs and customs, Aristotle's response lies in moral
correctness and ethical conformity in the historical
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community. The hope is that eventually most men would come
rationally to see the authentic moral facts. Hobbes cannot
resort to hopes of this kind because there are in his view
no such facts whatsoever to see, no independent moral
properties to serve as common measures. The solution to
moral conflicts, he believes, can be found not in ethicality
but only in politics. Since we all fear violent and untimely
death, there exists one common denominator on which even in
the state of nature we presumably can all agree, and that
denominator is the recognition that everyone has a right to
defend himself against attack in a dangerous world. "In the
first place I set down for a principle," Hobbes writes in De
Give,
by experience known to all men and denied by none, to
wit, that the dispositions of men are naturally such,
that except they be restrained through fear of some
coercive power, every man will distrust and dread each
other; and as by natural right he may, so by necessity
he will be forced to make use of the strength he hath,
toward the preservation of himself. (Man and Citizen ,
p. 99.)
Hobbes presents this principle of self-preservation as the
common measure not just in political but also in ethical
terms. In the Elements of Law , he provides the ethical test
for his politics by suggesting that even those who live in
the state of nature would agree to take death as the worst
of all evils; and avoidance of death as the ultimate
denominator of all moral driving forces:
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Forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to
will and desire bonum sibi . that which is good for
themselves, and to avoid that which is hurtful; but
most of all that terrible enemy of nature, death, from
whom we expect both the loss of all power, and also the
greatest of bodily pains in the losing; it is not
against reason that a man doth all he can to preserve
his own body and limbs, both from death and pain. And
that which is not against reason, men call RIGHT, or
jus
.
or blameless liberty of using our own natural
power and ability. It is therefore a right of nature:
that every man may preserve his own life and limbs,
with all the power he hath. ( Elements of Law , p. 71.)
In Leviathan , he further clarifies that this right of nature
is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as
he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own
Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and
consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own
Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the
aptest means thereunto.
The natural right of self-preservation is of a category
of liberty, viz., "the absence of externall Impediments"
( Leviathan , p. 189) . On Hobbes's account, there will be in
the state of nature a large number of cases where "every man
by right of nature is judge himself of the necessity of the
means, and of the greatness of the danger." They must be
their own judge as to how to assess the situation of danger,
and when and how to exercise their right of self-defense.
And each of them is free to act in any way he deems
necessary for, and conducive to, the end of his survival.
The problem is the underlying equality across men: "Nature
hath given all things to all men," and "Every man by nature
hath right to all things." "But," Hobbes further points
out
in the Elements of Law ,
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that right of all men to all things, is in effect no
better than if no man had right to any thing. For there
is little use and benefit of the right a man hath, when
another as strong, or stronger than himself, hath right
to the same.
There is no clear and authentic truth about the external
world. The measures that men resort to remain private ones,
about which they can still disagree utterly. Consequently,
despite their agreement about the general right of self-
preservation, in practice conflict will arise all the same
over what counts as a danger. Everyone will act on the basis
of his own private judgment of the situation, and as the
result a radical extent of instability remains unaddressed.
A mere ethical appeal to men's right of self-preservation,
the only criterion acceptable to all, cannot do away with
the private measures, the true source of the state of
nature. We remain in the private sphere of collectivity. In
Hobbes 's words, "the estate of men in this natural liberty
is the estate of war" ( Elements of Law , pp. 72-73)
.
Therefore, the grimmest version of sceptical relativism
seems after all to be the only possible ethical version.
That is to say, without the intervention of politics, ethics
alone cannot settle conflicts arising from rival and
incompatible evaluations. The stronger the evaluative claim,
the worse the chaos. Thus the problem, to which there is no
ethical solution, can be solved only by political means.
1« In Leviathan Hobbes does not use much of the word
"Dolitical" or "politics." The term however does appear
in
the "introduction" to the treatise, where Hobbes
calls his
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In their more reflective moments, according to Hobbes,
men in the state of nature presumably will come to their
reason and realize that the law of nature obliges them to
renounce their right of private judgment as to what is to
count as dangerous in dubious cases, and to accept for their
own self-interests the judgment of a common authority. For
"these laws of nature, the sum whereof consisteth in
forbidding us to be our own judges, and our own carvers"
(Elements of Law, p. 92) . A common power is created through
a transfer of plurality into singularity when everyone in
the state of nature agrees "to submit their Wills, every one
to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgment"
( Leviathan , p. 227) . Accordingly, the sovereign of the
commonwealth is but "Gods Lieutenant; to whom in all
doubtfull cases, wee have submitted our private judgments"
( Leviathan , p. 477) . This solution is obviously a political
one, but what it is designed primarily to settle are
evaluative conflicts. Hobbes conceives of his system not
just in politico-juridical terms, but ultimately in moral
terms: "What the legislator commands, must be held for good,
and what he forbids for evil" (Man and Citizen , p. 244) .
As we have seen, the Aristotelian emphasis on practical
particularity assumes that ethics and politics are not exact
commonwealth "this Body Politique," and in the concluding
Chapter 47, where he calls his entire theory "the Doctrine
of the POLITIQUES." A definition can be found in Chapter 22:
"Politicall (otherwise Called Bodies Politique, and Persons
in Law,) are those, which are made by authority from the
Soveraign Power of the Common-wealth." Leviathan, pp. 82,
274, 715.
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sciences. Accordingly, in discussions of right conduct we
cannot expect clarity and precision any more than the nature
of the subject matter permits. Instead we must be content to
draw conclusions about the truth roughly and only in broad,
ambiguous outlines. By contrast, Hobbes demands, and claims
to be supplying, an ethical language rigorously exact,
unequivocally clear, and relentlessly precise. Degree of
precision relates in inverse proportion to extent of
coverage. A collectivity that seeks to rule human affairs in
an exhaustive and compelling fashion necessarily compromises
precision and acts arbitrarily; a body politic that attempts
to be unbending in language has to be surer and more limited
in governance. Aristotle purports to govern men's moral
conduct extensively, and puts their theodicy to the test;
Hobbes leaves much territory out of his concern, and
distinguishes between private and public spheres of life.
Hobbes assumes that men are inwardly obstinate, depraved,
rebellious, averse, and, most crucially, threatening against
each other's life. Yet he paradoxically bases his politics
of the common good precisely on that assumption of human
capacity for evil. Hobbes solves this paradox by creating
the ethicality-politics apartheid "to distinguish well
between what is, and what is not Necessary to Eternall
Salvation." What we owe to God is our "Faith in Christ" to
remit all our own transgressions of the divine intents.
Besides this private inner concern, Hobbbes goes on to
explain, all that is necessary to moral salvation is
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"Obedience to Laws" promulgated by the civil commonwealth
( Leviathan
,
p. 610). This public virtue, he emphasizes, is a
wholly external matter. Since the bodies of the faithful are
"grosse, and corruptible," the mundane existence, including
the public part of the spiritual life, must be governed only
by the state artificially set up by law. Otherwise, he
warns,
there must needs follow Faction, and Civil war in the
Common-wealth, between the Church and State; between
Spiritualists, and Temporalists ; between the Sword of
Justice, and the Shield of Faith; and (which is more)
in every Christian mans own brest, between the
Christian, and the Man. ( Leviathan , p. 499.)
Insisting on such combination of political and
ecclesiastical powers in the civil sovereign of a temporal
Christian commonwealth, Hobbes makes it clear that it is
only "for the government of mens externall actions" that the
sovereign acquires the dual jurisdiction. Profession "with
the tongue" of religious belief "is but an externall thing,
and no more then any other gesture whereby we signifie our
obedience." And baptism does not constitute any authority
"by which our externall actions are to be governed in this
life." As "a gift of God," on the other hand, religious
faith cherished by the subject "is internall, and
invisible." He obeys his sovereign "not in order to his own
mind, but in order to the laws of his country, that action
is not his, but his Soveraigns." And it therefore makes no
sense for a subject of any Christian commonwealth, who is
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"inwardly in his heart of the Mahometan Religion," to die
for his Mohometan faith in disobedience to a command of his
lawful sovereign" ( Leviathan , pp. 527-529, 533, 575, 625).
Hence there should be two distinctly differentiated realms
of life. Gods takes care of men's pursuits of "sublimity"
and "splendor" in the inner, private sphere, leaving
governance of their external action, either civil or
ecclesiastical, either in policy or in religion, to the
sovereign power in the public sphere. In short, Hobbes
maintains that men's private commitments should be separated
entirely from their collective existence, the tranquility of
which constitutes the sole concern of the artificial
sovereign power:
In every Common-wealth, they who have no
supernaturall Revelation to the contrary, ought to obey
the laws of their own Soveraign, in the externall acts
and profession of Religion. As for the inward thought,
and beleef of men, which humane Governours can take no
notice of, (for God onely knoweth the heart) they are
not voluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but of the
unrevealed will, and of the power of God; and
consequently fall not under obligation. (Leviathan, pp.
500-501.
)
Or, as he puts it: "It is to no purpose to be bidden in
every thing to do right, before there be a certain rule and
measure of right established, which no man hitherto hath
established."^"^ What makes certain patterns of action
virtuous, charitable, modest, and so on, while others
"Elements of Philosophy, The First Section,
concerning Body." The English Works of Thomas Hobbes,
I, p. 9.
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vicious, malevolent, vainglorious, etc., is reduced to the
formula that certain patterns promote civil order or peace,
while others produce discord or war. The pre-eminent and
ultimate Hobbesian test of moral judgment, therefore,
resides in obedience to law, and in justice, or the keeping
of covenants one has entered into, not in any possessive,
compelling Aristotlelian theses such as ergon, eudaimonia .
theoria, phronesis
.
or friendship. Toward the conclusion of
the Elements of Law
. Hobbes summarizes the core of his moral
and political philosophy into one passage:
In the state of nature, where every man is his own
judge, and differeth from other concerning the names
and appellations of things, and from those differences
arise quarrels, and breach of peace; it was necessary
there should be a common measure of all things that
might fall in controversy; as for example: of what is
to be called right, what good, what virtue, what much,
what little, what meum and tuum . what a pound, what a
quart, &c. For in these things private judgments may
differ, and beget controversy. This common measure,
some say, is right reason: with whom I should consent,
if there were any such thing to be found or known in
rerum natura . But commonly they that call for right
reason to decide any controversy, do mean their own.
But this is certain, seeing right reason is not
existent, the reason of some man, or men, must supply
the place thereof; and that man, or men, is he or they,
that have the sovereign power, as hath been already
proved; and consequently the civil laws are to all
subjects the measures of their actions, whereby to
determine, whether they be right or wrong, profitable
or unprofitable, virtuous or vicious; and by them the
use and definition of all names not agreed upon, and
tending to controversy, shall be established. As for
example, upon the occasion of some strange and deformed
birth, it shall not be decided by Aristotle, or the
philosophers, whether the same be a man or no, but by
the laws. ( Elements of Law , pp. 188-189.)
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F. The State of Nature: Historia?
Another question arises: if, on our reading, Hobbes's
state of nature refers not so much to the primitive as to
the evaluative "Warre of every man against every man," if
the core feature of it is not so much the absence of ethical
measures themselves as the absence of a common measure, what
then is the main frame of reference in which it is
conceived? What does the assumption imply that the state of
nature stands not just for situations of social and
political anarchy in the normal sense of the term, but more
profoundly for a condition of ethical disarray and
conceptual farragoes? Hobbes in his texts does give some
examples to support his theoretical inference that men in
mere nature are constantly at war with one another. In
Leviathan, he ponders that "It may peradventure be thought,
there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this;
and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world:
but there are many places, where they live so now." He then
suggests that for a glimpse of such appalling condition the
reader may consult his daily experience of insecurity, the
savagery "in many places of America," and the anarchy in
international politics (Leviathan, PP- 186-187). In the
Elements of Law , he reflects in even broader terms, with a
direct reference to history as well as to his own times. We
know about the state of nature, he writes,
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by the experience of savage nations that live at thisday and by the histories of our ancestors, the oldinhabitants of Germany and other now civil countrieswhere we find the people few and short lived, and
'
without the ornaments and comforts of life, which bypeace and society are usually invented and procured:
( Elements of Law
, p. 73.)
From these examples we sense that Hobbes's state of nature
is not the figment of a wayward imagination. Nor is it
designed as merely a fundamental myth, an extended metaphor,
in which men are beasts, life is war, war is hell, and so
on, in order to command our awe, to secure our one-sided
pledge to the Leviathan. It is a real condition. Our
concerns then rest with the scope of it, i.e., whether, be
these lines taken literally, it confines itself to
situations of pre-societal anarchy, or, as Hobbes's work as
a whole seems to be implying, it goes onto a more general
scale.
Now considering the extent to which the inhabitants of
the state of nature are speakers of ethical languages, we
assume that the condition of war, as Hobbes conceives it,
must distinguish itself perceptibly both from the
chronologically pre-ethical wilderness in the remote past
and from any strictly philosophical abstraction of such
primordial condition of chaos. And that the inhabitants
therein could not primarily in Hobbes's mind be those who
inhabit the primeval woods without being bound to one
another by any relationships and conventions. Rather,
ethicality is not, as Rousseau thinks it is, an invention of
the political society. The men of the state of nature, moral
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agents as they are, more likely than not are men of all
subsequent times who, with some previous knowledge, have
already lived in a prior claimed territory of entrenched
social dependence and ethical obligation. On such an
assumption, what is absent in the anarchy is not necessarily
relationships of coercion and subordination, but a clear-cut
common ethical measure. Accordingly, the picture that Hobbes
places into the immediate background of the account of his
state of nature may bear a stronger resemblance to the
Aristotelian paradigm of historia than to the primitive
landscape of Rousseau's state of nature.^® In other words,
the Hobbesian state of nature stands for a particular
paradigmatic mode of ethico-political existence, which
belongs not solely to the past, nor which will stop even at
the present. It is a certain state of conceptual, ethical,
and social (dis) order, or a serious threat of such disorder,
not only historical but rather universal, not merely real
but also ever-present. Such being the case, the stake
becomes much higher, demanding that it be taken more
seriously.
According to Rousseau, "Men are not naturally
enemies, for the simple reason that men living in their
original state of independence do not have sufficiently
constant relationships among themselves to bring about
either a state of peace or a state of war. It is the
relationship between things and not that between men that
brings about war." Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Basic
Political Writings , trans, and ed. Donald A. Cress,
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), p. 145.
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G. Ignorance and Superstition
Whereas Aristotle links conflicts of values to defects
of men's moral dispositions, Hobbes by contrast attributes
his evaluative war of private measures to a completely
different source: ignorance (want of scientific knowledge of
natural causes) and superstition (irrational fear of things
incorporeal)
.
Leviathan distinguishes itself from the two
previous treatises by addressing not one but two distinctive
categories of fear. One is rational fear of death, the sole
crucial element of human passion that, guided carefully by
our faculty of reason, will be tapped to overcome our
offensiveness to one another in the state of nature. Yet, a
great deal of Leviathan ' s attention is focused on the other
type of the passion, viz., the "superstitious fear of
Spirits" on the part of the multitude. As an outgrowth of
ignorance and gullibility, this second type of fear is
placed in contrast to the ambition, cunningness, and self-
interest on the part of the potent and powerful.
Hobbes 's system is based entirely on a prescriptive
premise of rationality. It assumes that man is by nature
rational and egoistic, and that the final goal of every
man's voluntary actions is always his own good, ultimately
his self-preservation. Yet Leviathan also presents a
contrasting, descriptive portrait of man in the way he
really is: an irrational, ignorant, superstitious, and often
stupid creature. Hobbes is aware that what sways men's
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choices has not been what is truly good for them so much as
what "appeareth" to them to be so. "For it is evident to the
meanest capacity," he points out, "that mens actions are
derived from the opinions they have of the Good, or Evill,
which from those actions redound unto themselves"
(Leviathan, pp. 339, 567). What Hobbes is obsessed with is
the ways in which human faculties, once possessed by
irrational "opinions," can go wrong. Under the grip of
invisible powers, sense perception gives rise to errors,
absurdities, and illusions that tend to deceive men,
compound their ignorance of natural causes, and lead them
into superstition.
On Hobbes 's account, the universe consists only of
inanimate bodies set into motion by outside activation. Once
a body moves, it can be stopped not instantly but only "in
time, and by degrees." Human senses function likewise. After
an object is removed, or the eye shut, an image of it
remains in one's mind. Hence Hobbes's definition, as
"decaying sense," of fancy or imagination when men are
awake, and of dream when sleeping ( Leviathan , pp. 88-91)
.
His concern rests with the difficulty with which men
rationally tell such fanciful images or dreams from the
sober senses or visions. "A man full of fearfull thoughts"
will easily have trouble understanding that some "fearfull
apparition" that he thinks he saw has been but a short dream
while he slept or "noddeth in a chayre." This "ignorance of
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how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong Fancies, from
Vision and Sense" is for Hobbes "no very rare Accident," for
even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous,
and supperstitious, possessed with fearfull tales, and
alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies, and
believe they see spirits and dead mens Ghosts walking
in Churchyards; whereas it is either their Fancy onely,
or els the knavery of such persons, as make use of such
superstitious feare, to passe disguised in the night,
to places they would not be known to haunt.
Such ignorance of the natural causes of human sense and
imagination forms the entire source of "the opinion that
rude people have of Fayries, Ghosts, and Goblins; and of the
power of Witches." All of these fearful spirits are in
reality the fantastic products of men's vivid, irrational,
and uncontrolled imaginations ( Leviathan . pp. 91-92)
.
"Ignorant, and superstitious men make great Wonders of those
works, which other men, knowing to proceed from Nature, ...
admire not at all" ( Leviathan , p. 471) . Thus the distinction
between genuine miracles and mere deceptions is spurious.
The fearful spirits are but the concoctions of the ignorant
and superstitious state of mind.
The antithesis between ignorance and superstition, on
the one hand, and reason and science, on the other, comes
through clearly in Hobbes 's treatment of madness:
The opinions of the world, both in antient and
later ages, concerning the cause of madnesse, have been
two. some, deriving them from the Passions; some, from
Daemons, or Spirits, either good, or bad, which they
thought might enter into a man, possesse him, and move
his organs in such strange, and uncouth manner, as
mad-
men use to do.
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For Hobbes, madness can be explained sufficiently in terms
of its natural causes as some simple disorder or excess of
one of the passions. Absurd as it is, the magical account of
the phenomenon as possession of men by demons or spirits may
itself "be numbred amongst the sorts of Madnesse." Madness
as a natural phenomenon is not beyond human control. Getting
rid of ignorance and superstition, and bringing in reason
and scientific knowledge, anyone is capable of seeing the
true nature of it and effect a cure. Hobbes supports his
position by recounting an ancient story:
There raigned a fit of madnesse in another
Graecian City, which seized onely the young Maidens;
and caused many of them to hang themselves. This was by
most then thought an act of the Divel. But one that
suspected, that contempt of life in them, might proceed
from some Passion of the mind, and supposing they did
not contemne also their honour, gave counsell to the
Magistrates, to strip such as so hang'd themselves, and
let them hang out naked. This the story sayes cured
that madnesse. ( Leviathan , pp. 142-143, 146.)
Therefore, only ignorance and superstition can account for
the irrational fear of spirits, which is otherwise totally
groundless. Yet for Hobbes the imaginary and irrational
nature of this category of fear does not diminish its
danger, perniciousness, and harmfulness. Ignorance and
superstition have very real and, if sufficiently powerful,
mortal effects on moral and political matters.
As Hobbes sees it, diverse claims concerning right and
wrong perpetually clash with one another, "both by the Pen
and the Sword," not only because there exist no authentic
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moral properties, but more importantly because too much
self-interest is involved in those ultimate claims. Grown
strong and stubborn, men "appeale from custome to reason,
and from reason to custome, as it serves their turn."
"Whereas," explains Hobbes,
the doctrine of Lines, and Figures, is not so; because
men care not, in that subject what be truth, as a thing
that crosses no mans ambition, profit, or lust. For I
doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any
mans right of dominion, or to the interest of men that
have dominion, That the three Angles of a Triangle
should be equall to two Angles of a Square; that
doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the
burning of all books of Geometry, suppressed, as farre
as he whom it concerned was able. (Leviathan, p. 166.)
Since ethicality harbors men's interested intents on
"dominion," then some for that purpose have an interest in
perpetuating the ignorance, superstition, and madness of
others. For ignorance by its nature serves the agenda of
"disposition": it "disposeth" a man to be credulous, to
depend on the advise and authority of others in his
immediate locality, to adhere to private influence and "find
fault with the publike Government," and, finally, to "make
Custome and Example the rule of his actions" (Leviathan, pp.
164-166) . Obviously this sort of immediacy accords admirably
with the way Aristotle's ethical solution of hexis and ethos
operates. In other words, Hobbes takes it that Aristotle
appeals to nothing else but men's ignorance and stupidity.
"From intention to deceive by obscurity," the "Schoole-men"
have executed a cunning design to confuse, deceive, and
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hence achieve control over the gullible multitude. "When men
write whole volumes of such stuffe," Hobbes suggests, "are
they not Mad, or intend to make others so" ( Leviathan , pp.
146-147)? From such hidden, insidious intention arises the
entire world of ethical schemes and social estates which, in
dismaying contrast to the cosmos of reason and science, have
shaped the way men interpret the meaning of their life and
lead their collective existence. Therefore, the ignorant and
superstitious state of mind on the part of the "rude people"
not just fosters irrational fear, but underpins the schemes,
makes the traditional modes of collectivity possible, and
constitutes the essential foundation of "the greatest part
of the Religion of the Gentiles in time past" (Leviathan, p.
93) .
Most vitally, irrationality can exercise such a
powerful hold over the popular imagination as to divert the
multitude from pursuing the ends prescribed to them by
nature, even including their ultimate good of self-
preservation. The test of human good lies in self-
preservation, and therefore the worst of all evils is death.
However,
though death is the greatest of all evils . . . , the
pains of life can be so great that, unless their quick
end is foreseen, they may lead men to number death
among the goods. (Man and Citizen, pp. 48-49.)
Whereas rational fear of death can be rendered amenable to
maintenance of civil peace, irrational fear of spirits is
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purely inimical and pernicious to that overriding Hobbesian
concern. Hobbes is aware of the potent threat of human
irrationality to his political system, for, as the story
about the collective suicide epidemic among the young Greek
women implies, superstitious fear of spirits can, ultimately
and paradoxically, "induce simple men into an obstinacy
against the Laws and Commands of their Civill Soveraigns
even to death" ( Leviathan , pp. 707-708). In other words,
irrationality breeds in the "simple men" "contempt of life"
and makes them fearless of death. This is the single worst
nightmare for Hobbes. It occurs most typically in the
context of a difficulty, in Christian commonwealths, of
obeying at once both God and the civil sovereign when their
commands contradict one another. When men are commanded in
the name of God to "Fear not those that kill the body, but
cannot kill the soule," they are not in a position to know
whether the command does come from God, or whether those who
issue it are but abusing God's name to further their own
private ends. Thus for Hobbes the irrational fearlessness of
death serves as "the most frequent praetext of Sedition, and
Civill Warre:"
When a man receiveth two contrary Commands, and
knows that one of them is Gods, he ought to obey that,
and not the other, though it be the command even of his
lawfull Soveraign. (Leviathan, pp. 609-610.)
What makes things grave is the stubborn reality of human
life that irrational fear of spirit almost always prevails
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over rational fear of death. As Hobbes puts it, "The fear of
Darknesse, and Ghosts, is greater than other fears"
( Leviathan , p. 371)
.
A state of affairs in which men do not fear death
renders Hobbes 's system utterly impossible. For without the
rational fear of death, there could be no such system in the
first place. Secondly, maintenance of civil society depends
on justice; and justice, on the power over life and death by
means of reward and punishment. Hobbes emphasizes that
It is impossible, a Common-wealth should stand,
where any other than the Soveraign, hath a power of
giving greater rewards than Life; and of inflicting
greater punishments, than Death. ( Leviathan . p. 478.)
In this way, the ignorant and superstitious state of mind
seriously imperils the interests of public tranquility, and
destroys the ultimate basis of the envisaged Leviathan.
H. Ecclesiasticism
Obstructions to the creation of Hobbes 's sovereign
power, as he perceives it, "proceed not so much from the
difficulty of the matter, as from the interest of them that
are to learn." There are, on the one hand, the entrenched
positions of "the Rich, and Potent Subjects of a Kingdome,"
and "those that are accounted the most Learned."
Potent men, digest hardly any thing that setteth
up a Power to bridle their affections; and Learned
men.
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any thing that discovereth their errours, and therebylesseneth their Authority. ^
On the other hand, there are the gullible multitude.
The Common-peoples minds, unlesse they be tainted withdependance on the Potent, or scribbled over with the
opinions of their Doctors, are like clean paper, fit to
receive whatsoever by Publique Authority shall beimprinted in them. (Leviathan, p. 379.)
Worst of all, the minds of the ordinary people are tainted
precisely that way. Overgrown throughout ages with thick
weeds of error and superstition, they are anything but clean
paper receptive to the rational imprinting of science.
Hobbes compares men to "stones" to be assembled into an
"AEdifice." Some of them "by the asperity, and irregularity
of Figure, takes more room from others, than it selfe
fills." Therefore it must be "cast away as unprofitable, and
troublesome" ( Leviathan , p. 209) . As the human materials out
of which a commonwealth is to be constructed, we the proud
and refractory creatures, fearless of death, must first be
shaped to conform to the architect's requirements:
For men, as they become at last weary of irregular
justling, and hewing one another, and desire with all
their hearts, to conforme themselves into one firme and
lasting edifice; so for want, both of the art of making
fit Lawes, to square their actions by, and also of
humility, and patience, to suffer the rude and
combersome points of their present greatnesse to be
taken off, they cannot without the help of a very able
architect, be compiled, into any other than a crasie
building, such as hardly lasting out their own time,
must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity.
( Leviathan , p. 363.)
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It is in religion in general, and Christianity in
particular, that Hobbes finds one of the principal forms of
superstition, a formidable block subversive of his agenda to
prepare the founding "matter" of the commonwealth. Ignorant
men "are enclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves,
severall kinds of Powers Invisible; and to stand in awe of
their own imaginations." And this fear of things invisible
"is the naturall Seed of that, which every one in himself
calleth Religion; and in them that worship, or feare that
Power otherwise than they do. Superstition" ( Leviathan , pp.
167-168). "In these foure things," Hobbes maintains,
"Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second causes. Devotion
towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casual 1 for
Prognostiques, consisteth the Naturall seed of Religion"
( Leviathan , p. 172) . In short, the foundation of religious
belief consists of ignorance and irrational fear. "The
greatest part of the Religion of the Gentiles in time past,"
including Christianity, is practically nothing more than a
form of superstition. Hobbes assents that God can make
unnatural apparitions, but he is quick to reject the claim
that God does it so often that men need to fear the spirits
more than they fear the course of nature. What Hobbes is
arguing is that in the prevailing modes of collectivity,
those who possess power have deliberately taken advantage of
this kind of excessive and irrational fear to maintain
control over the actions of the impotent. "Evill men under
pretext that God can do any thing, are so bold as to say any
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thing when it serves their turn, though they think it
untrue" ( Leviathan , pp. 92-93)
.
In "Of Power Ecclesiasticall , " the longest chapter of
Leviathan (Chapter 42), Hobbes gives his account of such
willful and wanton manipulation of people's ignorance and
superstition in the name of religious faith. In the
beginning there was no unitary Christian church. The faith
was maintained by a series of independent congregations with
no strict organization nor coercive power. The fourth-
century conversion of the Emperor Constantine to
Christianity, however, transformed the Christian churches in
a fundamental way. Christian sovereigns became the supreme
pastors of their peoples, and, more importantly, the crucial
event created the ecclesiastical power when an organized
hierarchy came into being to function as the structure of
such power. No longer men of service and devotion, the
clergy acquired a taste for power. By willful
misinterpretation of the Scriptures, the ambitious
priesthood since then deliberately makes use of the old
Greek belief in an immortal soul to convince the ignorant
and superstitious men that the priests are the magistrates
of God's kingdom on earth, capable of performing magical
marvels beyond the reach of any civil power.
Emerging from such doctrinal scheming is the Catholic
church, an independent "Kingdome of Fairies," with its own
"sovereign," viz., the Papacy which is "the Ghost of the
deceased Romane Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave
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thereof," and which claims spiritual dominion over all
Christians (Leviathan, p. 712). As a structure of authority
unto itself, this ecclesiastical power is every bit as real
as that of any commonwealth. With its own officials, laws,
and revenues, it declares clerical exemption from the yoke
of civil sovereign control. Over the centuries, the church
has turned itself into a mortal enemy to civil
commonwealths, threatening everywhere to "reduce all Order,
Government, and Society, to the first Chaos of Violence, and
Civill warre" ( Leviathan , p. 469) . On the other hand, the
foundation of the Catholic church's weighty power is never
entirely secure, for its ultimate cornerstone "consisteth
onely in the Fear that Seduced people stand in, ... upon
hearing of false Miracles, false Traditions, and false
Interpretations of the Scripture" ( Leviathan , p. 714) . It is
the Achilles' heel of papal power to propagate fantastic
myths and obscure scholasticism so as to keep Christians in
ignorance, confusion, and superstition, to "make men mistake
the Ignis fatuus of Vain Philosophy, for the Light of the
Gospell" (Leviathan, p. 708) . The ultimate purpose of this
calculated and active schematization, Hobbes believes, is to
"take from young men, the use of Reason," to make them "good
for nothing else, but to execute what they command them,"
and thereby to maintain the basis of the church's own power
( Leviathan , p. 713). Still, since the whole skein of the
church's power is founded ultimately upon superstition and
deception, it can never rid itself of its inherent weakness
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and ensure its permanent survival. With the arrival in
sequence of the Reformation, the triumph of presbyterianism
over episcopacy, and the tumult of the English Civil War,
the entire edifice of organized ecclesiasticism begins to
crumble. Freedom of religious beliefs re-emerges when
the Power was taken also from the Presbyterians: And so
we are reduced to the Independency of the Primitive
Christians to follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every
man as he liketh best. ( Leviathan , pp. 710-711.)
Yet such radical liberty of conscience paradoxically is the
last condition Hobbes would like to see.
I. A Rational Cast of Mind
On Hobbes 's account, reason alone cannot be relied upon
to perpetuate itself without, first, the right intellectual
state and, second, active political institution. As the
ultimate sources of religion, irrationality and superstition
lie deeply imbedded in the nature of man. It is far easier
to remain ignorant than to become informed and enlightened
by the acquired reason. Real men are essentially irrational,
ignorant, and gullible. As the seeds of the entire existing
modes of moral and social life, ignorance and superstition
are in their core "an opinion of a Deity, and Powers
invisible, and supernaturall . " They stem naturally from the
ripe ground of our mind, and "can never be so abolished out
of humane nature." Therefore, Hobbes warns, "new Religions
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may againe be made to spring out of them, by the culture of
such men, as for such purpose are in reputation" ( Leviathan ,
p. 179) . Given the nature of the imagination and the
gullibility of most men, clerical power in a larger sense
will never be destroyed for good. The collapse of the
ecclesiastical hierarchy does not mean that the danger to
commonwealths posed by superstition and irrationality could
be considered a matter of the past. Though its mechanisms of
clerical control over human imagination are in a state of
disarray, religious faith itself remains as strong as it has
ever been, and the seeds of superstition out of which it has
arisen will never be wholly eliminated. The difference made
by the emergence of virtually complete freedom of beliefs in
his own time lies not so much in a triumph of reason as in a
return to a primordial condition of cultural and
intellectual chaos, a far more thorough evaluative state of
nature. There is none in such ill condition to prevent new,
ambitious clerics, of one type of faith or another, from
arising in the future and drawing upon such a state of mind
again, as the Catholic church had done in the past, to pose
new and constant threats to civil authority. This grave,
ever-disquieting concern runs throughout Leviathan , and
appears explicitly in the closing paragraph of the last
chapter:
It was not therefore a very difficult matter, for
Henry 8. by his Exorcisme; nor for Qu. Elizabeth by
hers, to cast them out. But who knows that this Spirit
of Rome, now gone out, and walking by Missions through
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the dry places of China, Japan, and the Indies, thatyeeld him little fruit, may not return, or rather anAssembly of Spirits worse than he, enter, and inhabitethis clean swept house, and make the End thereof worsethan the Beginning? For it is not the Romane Clergy
onely, that pretends the Kingdome of God to be of thisWorld, and thereby to have a Power therein, distinctfrom that of the Civill state. ( Leviathan
, pp. 714-715.)
With the irrational and superstitious state of mind
remaining intact, an enlightened, rational cast of mind is
not necessarily self-sustaining. Even if the forces of
reason won the repeated trials of strength between
enlightenment and superstition, their victory will never be
so secure that their mortal foes could be forgotten. For the
Hobbesian conception of political society to be put into
practice, the task is formidable, if not impossible. For all
his scathing attacks upon the Catholic and Presbyterian
clerics and their Christian doctrines, therefore, Hobbes in
the Scriptural and historical argumentation of Leviathan is
not aiming exclusively at the clerical power and its
theological claims. The true object is more fundamental. The
single crucial factor in the institution of any commonwealth
is the character of the cultural and intellectual
foundations upon which it is constructed. Men's state of
mind determines from the very outset whether in the long run
the Leviathan will succeed or fail. As Hobbes insists, "the
grounds of these Rights, have the rather need to be
diligently, and truly taught; because they cannot be
maintained by any Civil Law, or terrour of legal punishment"
( Leviathan , p. 377) . What Hobbes needs to be proposing is
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therefore nothing less than a transformation of the
subjects' frame of mind to recast the human psyche into his
mold of rational egoism, an uprooting of the "Weeds, and
common Plants of Errour and Conjecture" that had hitherto
held men's imagination in their tight, almost hypnotic grip
(Leviathan, p. 683) . The only way to ensure against the
calamity of clerical comebacks is to root out, as thoroughly
as possible, the ignorance, superstition, and, in short,
irrationality, of the ordinary multitude.
In Hobbes's view, the disintegration of clerical power
amid the state of absolute cultural flux of his time
presents not only a return to the evaluative state of war,
but also a rare historic opportunity that would "openeth the
eyes" of men to the raw ambitions behind the hierarchic
structure of ecclesiastical authority. It is high time, he
believes, to "offer New Wine, to bee put into New Cask," to
reshape the subjects' most deeply held beliefs about
themselves and their past, and to reinterpret the entire
webs of relationships they inherit ( Leviathan , pp. 709,
726) . This readiness for reinterpretation could last,
however, only as long as their memories of history remained
vivid:
There be few now (in England,) that do not see,
that these Rights [of the sovereign] are inseparable,
and will be so generally acknowledged, at the next
return of Peace; and so continue, till their miseries
are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar be
better taught than they have hetherto been. ( Leviathan ,
p. 237.)
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The possibility of fundamental reinterpretations of men's
collective existence could not long remain open unless their
entire outlook be transformed. The wild, unbridled
imaginations of "the vulgar" have to be controlled, and
their pride, ignorance, and superstitious fears of spirits
be calmed. Hence the overriding concern which underlies the
entirety of Leviathan :
If this superstitious fear of Spirits were taken
away, and with it, Prognostiques from Dreams, false
Prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by
which, crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple
people, men would be much more fitted than they are for
civill Obedience. (Leviathan, p. 93.)
J. History and Its Abuse
Evaluative schemes by which "crafty ambitious persons
abuse the simple people," — this in Hobbes's view is the
quintessence of the Aristotelian paradigm of historia. It
is, as we have assumed above, precisely the two groups of
men, the potent and the impotent, the crafty and the
gullible, who inhabit Hobbes's state of nature. Ingrained in
the existing spheres of collectivity, such ill condition
bears a strong resemblance to Aristotle's ethos and
historia . Only when men break away from the distorting grips
of myths and superstitions, and are moved purely
by reason
and their rational self-interest, could a new
civil power of
truly secure and rational design emerge
from the ruins of
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the conceptual and political collapse. With such moral
recasting achieved, the commonwealth Hobbes envisages stands
for a new mode of collective existence, a fundamental break
with the past, a thorough cleansing of the Augean stables of
history.^' How then does Hobbes treat the concept of
"history?" Leviathan provides a definition:
The Register of Knowledge of Fact is called
History. Whereof there be two sorts: one called
Naturall History; which is the History of such Facts,
or Effects of Nature, as have no Dependance on Mans
Will; Such as are the Histories of Metals, Plants,
Animals, Regions, and the like. The other, is Civill
History; which is the History of the Voluntary Actions
of men in Common-wealths. ( Leviathan , p. 148.)
History as the general form of knowledge registers facts
which already took place. Neutral in character, facts are
independent of man's will. The concept of "history" in
ethical theory and political thought deals with human
affairs, however. The subject matter of this particular form
of knowledge, "civil history" as Hobbes calls it, is
voluntary actions of men in their collective life. No longer
neutral but dependent on human will, it involves men's
interests and values. In other words, history is evaluative
in nature; it provides no authentic truth. What took place
in the past did take place objectively, but memories may
As Hobbes 's former employer Francis Bacon puts it:
"Atheism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural
piety, to laws, to reputation; all which may be guides to an
outward moral virtue." The Essays of Francis Bacon, ed.
Clark Sutherland Northup, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1936)
,
pp. 54-55.
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fail, experience may be deceptive, the evidence may point in
differing directions, and, most important, too much
subjectivity has been involved ever since. From the
historical account which has come down to us we can never
expect to learn the truth of what took place in its
objective entirety. When we believe an account to be true,
we must be aware, Hobbes reminds us, that our belief is
derivative "not from the thing it selfe, or from the
principles of naturall Reason, but from the Authority, and
good opinion wee have, of him that hath sayd it." It is not
the authentic truthfulness of the account, but "the speaker,
or person [that] we believe in or trust in." "And so it is,"
Hobbes concludes,
also with all other History. For if I should not
believe all that is written by Historians, of the
glorious acts of Alexander, or Caesar; I do not think
the Ghost of Alexander, or Caesar, had any just cause
to be offended; or any body else, but the Historian. If
Livy say the Gods made once a Cow speak, and we believe
it not; wee distrust not God therein, but Livy. So that
it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no
other reason, then what is drawn from authority of men
onely, and their writings. ( Leviathan , pp. 133-134.)
Given such arbitrariness inherent in historical account,
beliefs in the Scriptures is merely beliefs in the Church;
beliefs in history, in the historian. They are only faith in
"Words that passe (like gaping) from mouth to mouth," viz.,
voluntary interpretations made by men in accordance with
their own private moral values and biased interests.
Interpretation operates on the locus of language; language
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supplies no positive access to any larger order of nature or
truth. Instead, in Hobbes's words.
Words are wise mens counters, they do but reckonby them: but they are the mony of fooles, that value
them by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a
Thomas, or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.(Leviathan, pp. 727, 106.)
Language is but "counters" by which men of potency, to
advance their own private turns, hoodwink the minds of the
superstitious and gullible multitude, and thereby manipulate
their moral action. So interpretation of history is taken by
Hobbes as "vain reports" which "the most sincere men,
without great knowledge of naturall causes, ... are commonly
the most subject to: For naturally, the best men are the
least suspicious of fraudulent purposes." Proceeding from
such dismissal of linguistic interpretation as utterly
random and arbitrary, Hobbes categorically rejects the
relevance of history as an authentic, intelligible source of
justice, virtue, or truth. On the contrary, he charges
"Fabulous Traditions" with the guilt of being the prime
culprit responsible for the shaping of the "Kingdome of
Darknesse:
"
For the Errors brought in from false, or uncertain
History, what is all the Legend of fictitious Miracles,
in the lives of the Saints; and all the Histories of
Apparitions, and Ghosts, alledged by the Doctors of the
Romane Church, to make good their Doctrines of Hell,
and Purgatory, the power of Exorcisme, and other
Doctrines which have no warrant, neither in Reason, nor
Scripture; as also all those Traditions which they call
the unwritten Word of God; but old Wives Fables?
( Leviathan , pp. 702-703.)
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Ethical theories and schools of learning all the way
back to ancient Greece have taken part in the making of the
den; they have "corrupted the Text of the Law with their
false Commentaries, and vain Traditions." In doing so, as
Hobbes sees it, they as the principal accomplices behind the
scheme have contributed actively to the perpetuation of the
state of conceptual chaos.
Their morall Philosophy is but a description of
their own Passions. For the rule of Manners, without
Civill Government, is the Law of Nature; and in it, the
Law Civill; that determineth what is Honest, and
Dishonest; what is Just, and Unjust; and generally what
is Good, and Evill: whereas they make the Rules of
Good, and Bad, by their own Liking, and Disliking: By
which means, in so great diversity of taste, there is
nothing generally agreed on; but every one doth (as far
as he dares) whatsoever seemeth good in his owne eyes,
to the subversion of Common-wealth. (Leviathan, pp.
686-687 . )
Presumably such interpretative arbitrariness and pernicious
disorder are to a large extent what Hobbes has in mind when
he conceives of the paradigmatic state of nature.
Aristotle's ethical thesis holds that social disintegration
and political upheaval stand for a moral chaos to which
there is no political solution, for, as he insists, "the law
has no power to command obedience except that of habit,
which can only be given by time." Accordingly Aristotle
formulates his position which inscribes collective life upon
sedimental encumbrances of ethos and historia. Unveiling,
through his invention of the state of nature, the sheer
direness that such Aristotelian formulation implies,
Hobbes
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argues that the root of the entire trouble lies precisely in
that compelling line of ethics. The bane, he further points
out, is the willfulness and arbitrariness (vis-a-vis clarity
and precision) with which private men (vis-a-vis public law)
rule and manipulate the scheme in the name of ethicallity
(vis-a-vis politics)
. Accordingly he counters the
Aristotelian position by proposing that the route to
evaluative agreement and public tranquility can only be
found through politics. As he maintains in the lengthy
passage we quoted from the Elements of T,aw
,
moral conflict
"shall not be decided by Aristotle, or the philosophers, ...
but by the laws." Given, presumably, Aristotle's importance
and influence, Hobbes throughout Leviathan not only
unleashes relentless attacks on Aristotelian teachings, but
vents his wrath specifically upon the Philosopher himself.
"Aristotle, and other Heathen Philosophers," he charges,
define Good, and Evill, by the Appetite of men; and
well enough, as long as we consider them governed every
one by his own Law: For in the condition of men that
have no other Law but their own Appetites, there can be
no generall Rule of Good, and Evill Actions. But in a
Common-wealth this measure is false: Not the Appetite
of Private men, but the Law, which is the Will and
Appetite of the State is the measure. And yet is this
Doctrine still practised; and men judge the Goodnesse,
or Wickednesse of their own, and of other mens actions,
and of the actions of the Common-wealth it selfe, by
their own Passions.
"And," Hobbes concludes,
this private measure of Good, is a Doctrine, not onely
Vain, but also Pernicious to the Publique State.
( Leviathan , p. 697.)
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Willful and arbitrary imposition of private appetites as
moral measures, abusive of the gullible multitude and
pernicious to public tranquility — this is the way Hobbes
sees the Aristotelian paradigm of historia, and this is also
the reason why he puts forward his ethical and political
construct drawing on "the Principles of Nature onely."
Hobbes is fully aware of
how different this Doctrine is, from the Practise of
the greatest part of the world, especially of these
Western parts, that have received their Morall learning
from Rome, and Athens. (Leviathan, p. 4 07.)
"In these westerne parts of the world," he writes in another
passage,
we are made to receive our opinions concerning the
Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths, from
Aristotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and Romanes,
that living under Popular States, derived those Rights,
not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them
into their books, out of the Practice of their own
Common-wealths, . . . And by reading of these Greek, and
Latine Authors, men from their childhood have gotten a
habit (under a false shew of Liberty,) of favouring
tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of
their Soveraigns; and again of controlling those
controllers, with the effusion of so much blood; as I
think I may truly say, there was never any thing so
deerly bought, as these Western parts have bought the
learning of the Greek and Latine tongues. (Leviathan,
pp. 267-268.)
A "deerly bought" scheme of ethicality "with the effusion of
so much blood" — this is the way Hobbes reads the
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chronicles of history and, accordingly, characterizes the
evaluative bellum omnium contra omn<^g -20
In moral matters that "every man ought to meditate for
the steerage of his life, it necessarily happens that not
only from errors, but even from ignorance itself, there
arise offences, contentions, nay, even slaughter itself"
(Man and Citizen , p. 96). Not only that historia has been
encumbered with entrenched statuses and servile
dependencies, Hobbes sees it as a matter of virtually saving
lives. To identify "who they may be, that have possessed the
People so long" in the Kingdom of Darkness, Hobbes in the
last chapter of Leviathan introduces from the Roman criminal
justice system a rule of " Cui bono " which says that "Amongst
Praesumptions, there is none that so evidently declareth the
Author, as doth the Benefit of the Action" ( Leviathan , p.
704) . After an application of this test to a chain of
"erroneous Doctrines," including "the Metaphysiques,
Ethiques, and Politiques of Aristotle," Hobbes pronounces
"for the Authors of all this Spirituall Darknesse, the Pope,
The "effusion of so much blood" refers, presumably
and in part, to the magnitude of the fundamental evaluative
conflict and the warfare between religious fanatics across
Europe in the sixteenth century, and the shock caused by
them. Which can be seen in the lines of a contemporary,
Justus Lipsius: "Good Lord, what firebrands of sedition hath
religion kindled in this fayrest part of the world? The
chiefe heads of our christian common wealths are at strife
amongst them selves, and many millions of men have bin
brought to ruine and do dayly perish, under a pretext of
piety." Justus Lipsius, Sixe Bookes of Politickes or Civil
Doctrine . Done into English by William Jones, (At London:
Printed by Richard Field for William Ponsonby, 1594), p. 63.
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and Roman Clergy" who, among other charges, "take the Cream
of the Land, by Donations of ignorant men, that stand in aw
of them" (Leviathan, pp. 708, 714). Drawing on the
hodgepodge of anthropological and historical
particularities, the ambiguous and mysterious terrain of
ethicality throughout ages has exempted itself from rational
vindication as to its fairness and impartiality, and
entrenched with violence and wrongs. Power may not be
visible in the packed space of unrequitable ethical and
social obligations. But invisibility implies arbitrariness;
this is precisely where the problem is. As Hobbes remarks,
unrequitable obligation means "perpetuall thraldome"
(Leviathan, p. 162) . It is one thing to be a Homeric
warrior, quite another to be a Homeric slave. What was the
past, as our forebears knew it? Nothing but poverty,
supersition, and grief. In the name of criteria of identity
and intelligibility of collective existence, what ethical
schematization has actually been delivering is but bigotry,
hierarchy, exclusion, subordination, and horrific violence
and destruction. Historicity, in a word, stands for the
thickness of social injustice wrought in the past. Crowded
with too much passion and discordance to be intelligible,
too many ultimate claims and exclusive values to be
commensurable, history is but a linguistic farrago. Memories
are always diverse, ugly, and painful. Appeal to the past
can only yield a recipe for civil war. Therefore, we
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suggest, by "state of nature" Hobbes first of all refers to
historia, Aristotle's paradigm of collectivity.
Secondly, the state of nature stands not merely for the
ill condition of the chronologic past. As Hobbes 's treatment
of the root cause of religion implies, it is instead
primarily a hierarchic mode of collectivity, or a perpetual
threat of such mode, not only historical but rather
universal, not merely real but also ever-present. Aristotle
maintains that those who are "by nature" better than others
should rule. His solution is grounded on the "natural"
inequalities and differences inherent among men. "I know,"
charges Hobbes,
that Aristotle in the first booke of his Politiques,
for a foundation of his doctrine, maketh men by Nature,
some more worthy to Command, meaning the wiser sort
(such as he thought himselfe to be for his Philosophy;)
others to Serve, (meaning those that had strong bodies,
but were not Philosophers as he;) as if Master and
Servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by
difference of Wit: which is not only against reason;
but also against experience.
Human inequalities take shape only by convention:
The question who is the better man, has no place
in the condition of meer Nature; where, ... all men are
equall. The inequallity that now is, has bin introduced
by the Lawes civill.
Here Hobbes betrays the extent to which he employs the term
"state of nature" with slipperiness . The "condition of meer
Nature" in this passage seems to be referring not to the
evaluative chaos of historia but to "nature," to a pre-
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societal anarchy antithetic to convention. At the same time,
nevertheless, the ambiguity also reveals Hobbes's overriding
purpose in his invention of the state of nature. It is in
the final analysis a theoretical necessity:
If Nature therefore have made men equal 1, that
equal it ie is to be acknowledged: or if Nature have made
men unequal 1; yet because men that think themselves
equall, will not enter into conditions of Peace, but
upon Equall termes, such equal it ie must be admitted.
( Leviathan . p. 211.)
Hobbes knows that men are unequal in the real world. Whether
the inequalities are by convention or by nature is in a
sense not really important. The Hobbesian necessity is
simply to "acknowledge," to "admit," that men are equal by
nature so as to prepare the human material indispensable to
the dismantling of the Aristotelian construct of historia
and the installation of the Leviathan.
Upon conclusion of "Of Man," Part I of Leviathan .
Hobbes summarizes, in accordance with the "Principles of
Nature onely," his doctrine of the human species in plainly
ahistorical and universal terms:
The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who
naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in
the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in
which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the
foresight of their own preservation, and of a more
contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting
themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre,
which is necessarily consequent ... to the naturall
Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep
them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the
performance of their Covenants, and observation of
those Lawes of Nature. (Leviathan, p. 223.)
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When Hobbes wrote Leviathan in seventeenth century England,
the audience he intended to address was those who were
already in a commonwealth under a sovereign authority. The
central message he intended to communicate was unlikely to
show them a way out of the uncomfortable primitive condition
and persuade them to go political, but rather to convince
them of the ever-present danger of the "Warre of every man
against every man." "It may be perceived," he warns in
Chapter 13,
what manner of life there would be, where there were no
common Power to feare; by the manner of life, which men
that have formerly lived under a peaceful 1 government,
use to degenerate into, in a civill Warre. (Leviathan,
p. 187.)
That is to say, the social covenant by which men quit the
pre-political plight does not put an end to that plight once
and for all. The danger of "degenerating" back to the
condition of war will forever stay just round the corner.
Without, for example, credible performance and fulfilment,
"Covenants are in vain, and but Empty words; and the Right
of all men to all things remaining, wee are still in the
condition of Warre" ( Leviathan , pp. 201-202). So "long time
after men have begun to constitute Common-wealths," the
civil society will remain "imperfect, and apt to relapse
into disorder" ( Leviathan , p. 378) . By the state of nature
Hobbes invents a sword of Damocles, threatening perpetually
to inundate our collective existence with all its injustice
and desolation. The state of nature, that is to say, is an
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underlying reference for us to "read and re-read. "21 with
this reference in place, what Hobbes is suggesting is a
fundamental break, a constant reshuffling of the old
hierarchic orders, so as to keep at bay all fearful tales,
prior claims, cumulative inequalities, pernicious self-love,
and wilful significations. Short of such sustained severance
of the alleged intelligible links between the past, the
present, and the future, we could never possibly escape the
entrenched encumbrances of history. In this sense, Hobbes
implies a hidden orientation not so much from social anarchy
to social order as the other way round. Ethics and politics
should not be a posteriori but man's a priori creation (Man
and Citizen, pp. 42-43). The crux is to find a way to switch
the fundamental mode of collective existence from ethos and
historia to a universal milieu "tribeless, lawless,
hearthless." The moment of the Leviathan initiates such a
grand rupture, sealing off the prior orders of historicity,
and embracing the abstract, eternally contemporary scheme of
reason and nature. Indifferent to diversity and differences
in locality, anthropology, culture, tradition, religion, and
ethics, Hobbes 's paradigm of nature assumes the standing of
a new ethical theory; it prescribes "an Universall rule"
which, in his words, "discharges our mentall reckoning, of
time and place; ... and makes that which was found true
21. "The Autobiography of Thomas Hobbes," trans.
Benjamin Farrington, The Rationalist Annual, 1958. pp. 22-
31. p. 27.
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here, and now, to be true in all times and places"
(Leviathan, p. 104).
K. The Fool^s Question and Hobbes^s Politics
Aristotle believes that human experience and rational
common sense can tell us all truths about the world.
Equipped with the crucial phronesis, human logos is capable
of delivering a full theodicy in the most perfect life of
theoria and attaining harmony with a larger cosmic order.
Proceeding from such optimism about the immediacy and
sufficiency of man's capacity, Aristotle defines his
position on ethical and political matters in terms of the
human ergon and eudaimonia
,
insisting on a compelling moral
solution to the evaluative conflicts in our stubborn and
dangerous world. Nevertheless, the eternal question of moral
and political philosophy, if there is one, is not exactly
how we human beings ought to lead our life. Even those of us
who are most often unredeemable may well agree that we ought
to strive to live up to the highest human good. The Sphinx,
instead, asks the question "Why is it foolish, imprudent,
irrational, or against one's self-interest to choose not to
do so?" The problem is to prove that man is immanently
justice-oriented, and that the human eudaimonia is not
drudgery but rather desirable for its own sake without any
reliance upon external coercion of consequential
153
punishment. We the egoists could possibly be convinced
only by a satisfactory answer to a question formulated in
those sober, cold, and practical terms. To this question, as
we have noted at the end of Chapter II, Aristotle stops
short of supplying an answer this way. Paradoxically enough,
an ethical and political position designed to be based on
the way it should be ends up eventually with historia
. with
the real world in the way it has been.
For Hobbes, Aristotle perpetrates absurdity when he
assumes the authentic and positive connection between
convention and nature. Hobbes invests in no confidence in
man's capacity to reach a higher order of being and achieve
his "flourishing," for men and institutions can never know
how divine purposes are represented in their sublunary
collective experience. Hobbes constructs his paradigm of
"nature" not in terms of its "final cause," so as to shape a
consensus on moral correctness or metaphysical
accessibility, but merely and solely in terms of its
"efficient cause," so as to provide an ethical basis for
common political action, the action, that is, of the
sovereign. He takes it that
there is no other way to know any thing, but by
naturall Reason; that is, from the Principles of
naturall Science; which are so farre from teaching us
any thing of Gods nature, as they cannot teach us our
own nature, nor the nature of the smallest creature
living, f Leviathan , p. 404.)
22. This question is articulated by Glaucon and
Adeimantus in Book II of Plato's Republic.
154
such epistemological scepticism denies the existence of
moral properties in any independent, objective, or
metaphysically authentic way. And this relativistic denial
places Hobbes in a renewed position to deal with the puzzle
"why it is irrational not to be good." Specifically, it
makes it possible for him to redefine the question in the
negative terms of (in) security of performance of a promise
or covenant, and reduce the essential attributes of justice
or the human good to the most basic, viz., men's self-
preservation in a hostile world.
In elaboration of his laws of nature, Hobbes addresses
the age-old conundrum by putting forward "the Fool's
Question:
"
The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such
thing as Justice; and sometimes also with his tongue;
seriously alleaging, that every mans conservation, and
contentment, being committed to his own care, there
could be no reason, why every man might not do what he
thought conduced thereunto: and therefore also to make,
or not make; keep, or not keep Covenants, was not
against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit. . .
.
he questioneth, whether Injustice, taking away the
feare of God, (for the same Foole hath said in his
heart there is no God,) may not sometimes stand with
that Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good;
and particularly then, when it conduceth to such a
benefit, as shall put a man in a condition, to neglect
not onely the dispraise, and revilings, but also the
power of other men.
To act immorally or unjustly is not against reason so long
as one can get away with it. This argument of the Fool
virtually asserts that "Succesfull wickednesse hath obtained
the name of Vertue." But for Hobbes it is "neverthelesse
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false." Framing his answer, Hobbes presupposes that men have
already accomplished the crucial move from the state of
nature into a commonwealth, where either some of them
already make themselves the first to perform their
obligation, or the civil power is already in place to
enforce mutual performance. With this precondition of
"Confederation" met, everyone receives protection not, as in
the "warre of every man against every man," by his own
strength or wit, but by that of the common power. Therefore
he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those
that help him, can in reason expect no other means of
safety, than what can be had from his own single Power.
He therefore that breaketh his Covenant, . . . cannot be
received into any Society, that unite themselves for
Peace and Defence, but by the errour of them that
receive him; nor when he is received, be retayned in
it, without seeing the danger of their errour; ... and
therefore if he be left, or cast out of Society, he
perisheth; and if he live in Society, it is by the
errours of other men, which he could not foresee, nor
reckon upon; and consequently against the reason of his
preservation. (Leviathan, pp. 203-205.)
In other words, the Fool's position very possibly will cast
him back in the dangerous state of nature. He cannot, merely
in order to get away unpunished, reasonably and prudently
base his calculation on unforeseeable, accidental errors on
the part of the others and thereby run the high risk of his
own obliteration. At stake is his very ultimate good of
self-preservation. To act unjustly, therefore, is indeed
foolish, imprudent, irrational, and against one's self-
interest. If men by the social contract promise each other
to respect the sovereign, and if some of them already
commit
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themselves to keeping their word, the others have no good
reason whatsoever not to keep theirs, because, in the final
analysis, only the reasons of self-preservation are good
reasons
.
Hobbes's answer to the Fool's Question contains,
nevertheless, two obvious problems. First, justice consists
in keeping one's word either if the others have done
likewise or one has reason to anticipate that they will do
so. We may ask though what can possibly motivate someone in
the state of nature into being the first to act. Hobbes
seems to be saying that there can be no such rational
motive:
For he that performeth first, has no assurance the
other will performe after; because the bonds of words
are too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger,
and other Passions, without the feare of some coerceive
Power; which in the condition of meer Nature, where all
men are equall, and judges of the justnesse of their
own fears cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore he
which performeth first, does but betray himselfe to his
enemy; contrary to the Right (he can never abandon) of
defending his life, and means of living. (Leviathan, p.
196.
)
Fundamentally speaking, man is of such a refractory nature
that "it is impossible that all the same things should
alwayes cause in him the same Appetites, and Aversions: much
lesse can all men consent, in the Desire of almost any one
and the same Object" ( Leviathan , p. 120) . As Hobbes says
explicitly in the previously-quoted reflection on language,
in the linguistic state of nature "there had been amongst
men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract." So
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arises a question: given such condition of utter distrust,
how is the covenant, and thereby the Leviathan, possible in
the first place? After all, Hobbesian politics and a
rational enlightenment of our ignorant, superstitious, and
proud mind-set presuppose the presence of each other. How
could we the gullible creatures possibly break the vicious
circles of historia? Hobbes in his texts gives no clear
answer to this question. At some most rationally reflective
moment, we can only assume, someone might realize that he
could afford being the first to entrust the sovereign with
"judges of the justnesse of their own fears." From the point
of view of self-preservation, no evil could be greater than
death, and therefore no scenario could possibly be more
unbearable and worse than doing nothing and staying in the
"warre of every man against every man." One's time left is
"short;" he for sure will "perish" soon; he has nothing more
to lose. Amid a plight as such, therefore, one might be
willing to consider taking the risk, act first, and then see
what the others do. If, by any chance, they do likewise, he
who goes first will be better off in committing himself than
he would have been in the state of nature; even if, on the
other hand, the others do not follow suit, he presumably
will not be worse off anyway. In the latter case, the risk
taker will effectively remain where he was before,
surrounded by hostile men with disparate judgments about the
threat in doubtful cases. Then all he needs to do is to
switch back to looking after himself in all instances.
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The second problem hiding in Hobbes's reply to the Fool
rests with the fact that the answer remains entirely silent
on the human good for its own sake beyond the level of
physical survival, depends wholly upon the negative coercion
of punishment, and therefore will be unpersuasive to those
of us who choose to live dangerously. For Hobbes, however,
this is not a very grave concern. For what the Hobbesian
position is all about is precisely and essentially to give
up the attempt to solve the insoluble Sphinx's riddle by
finding an authentic moral solution to evaluative conflicts.
Hobbes does not, as Aristotle does, want to test our
theodicy. Plato believes that a genuine science of the good
is possible, but that it will not be accessible to everyone;
Aristotle explains that phronesis could be acquired by most
of us, but that there can be no exact science of the good.
Hobbes contrives to have it both ways. He argues that it is
possible for ethics to achieve the exactitude of science,
and that such science of the good can be made available to
practically everyone. In pursuit of his argument, however,
he has to boil down the ultimate ethical test to men's self-
preservation, and thereby move the attributes of the summum
bonum from the maximum, concerning which there can be no
doctrine acceptable to all, to the minimum, which "crosses
no mans ambition, profit, or lust." Hobbes would never seek,
as Aristotle does, any goal "finer and more sublime" than
the political safety valve of public justice. Nor does he
harbor any illusion as to human "flourishing." Aristotle
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speaks of our ethical collectivity as "greater and more
perfect," as "not only a necessary thing but a splendid
one," yet he feels the necessity to appeal to the theistic
solution and to the private criteria of historia . Hobbes
does not believe in the "perfectibility" or "splendor" of
politics. He admits that the political solution he
formulates implies the absolute rule of power unlimited,
discretional, and distasteful. Hobbes 's central argument is:
The Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man, as
in Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular,
and Aristocraticall Common-wealths, is as great, as
possibly men can be imagined to make it. And though of
so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill
consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it,
which is perpetuall warre of every man against his
neighbour, are much worse.
The bottom line is, he goes on to make clear and plain, that
"The condition of man in this life shall never be without
Inconveniences" ( Leviathan . p. 260) . There has been too much
history, too much of the grubby boneshop, the odor of the
abattoir, emanating from it. To find the truth is a
troublesome, if not impossible, undertaking; it is a given
that men, with their motives forever locked inside, rarely
tell it. Bad habits will be repeated and, worse, taught
anew. They would succumb, each of them in some measure, to
human folly, to the grasp of unwanted portions of the dark,
indomitable past. Not that we are evil; for we are not. But
that, by whatever name — impulse, lust, anger, pride,
greed, or self-interest — we are inclined that way. It is
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our tragedy to know that the soul is condemned forever to be
a slave to its private fetishes. Politics, Hobbes knows, is
therefore doomed often to be a nasty business. But, with
self-preservation recognized as our single agreed-upon
standard of good and evil, that nasty business supplies the
sole universally recognized system of telling wrong from
right. Politics also is a thin business, conceived from its
genesis to assume infinite risk and reckon upon
unforeseeable chance. Without any backup of derivation from
underneath, the political institutions verge perpetually on
the precarious precipice of relapsing into the thicknesses
of history. But that thin business at least seeks to govern
misfortune, the slights and injuries of our collective moral
existence that are otherwise wholly wanton, random, and
unexamined. Given the refractory nature of man, we cannot
live together without the "Inconveniences" of power.
Hobbes 's object is to switch the power possessive of us from
the invisible to the visible, to bring us onto the "highway
to peace," and to "avoid the close, dark, and dangerous by-
paths of faction and sedition" (Man and Citizen , p. 98) . The
choice is a stark one: either violent oblivion, or
controlled violence. To break away with the sink of
arbitrary manipulation and bleak plight, in the name of
whatever grandeur it may be, politics attempts to let the
seas engulf only those who have been selected for drowning
on a most impartial, most orderly possible basis. Aristotle
shows us that in human affairs reason often is a myth; it
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will never fully triumph. Hobbes knows that Aristotle is
essentially right. But he seeks to show us that there is no
better course to tread.
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CHAPTER IV
HEIDEGGER: MAN THE ANIMAL INTERPRETATUS
"History" signifies the totality of
those entities which change "in time",
and indeed the transformations and
vicissitudes of men, of human groupings
and their "cultures", as distinguished
from Nature, which likewise operates "in
time"
.
Here what one has in view ... is
that realm of entities which one
distinguishes from Nature by having
regard for the way in which man's
existence is essentially determined by
"spirit" and "culture", even though in a
certain manner Nature too belongs to
"history" as thus understood.
"Nature" , as the categorial
aggregate of those structures of Being
which a definite entity encountered
within-the-world may possess, can never
make worldhood intelligible.
Martin Heidegger"*-
Politics in the Hobbesian sense of the term is
therefore conceived of to counteract the Aristotelian
paradigm of collectivity which, with its evaluative
schematizations entrenched in the thicknesses of the past,
has commanded a firm hold on us. In its bid to recast the
multitude's "formed habit of mind" wrought in the
essentially private milieu of ethicality so as to effect a
fundamentally distinctive mode of linguistic convention, the
Leviathan appeals to a timeless, universal cosmos of reason
and nature. To this extent, Hobbes heralds the Enlightenment
^. Being and Time (BT. hereafter), pp. 430-431, 94.
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movement of the eighteenth century, although he by no means
shares the philosophes^ optimistic confidence in progress,
metaphysical accessibility, and human perfectibility.
G.W.F. Hegel echoes Hobbes when he sees the schemes of
ethics or religion as a "realm of error" from which
priestcraft or despotism draws "for itself the advantage of
undisturbed domination and the fulfilment of its desires and
caprices." And Hegel likewise identifies the quintessence of
historia with superstition, prejudice, immediacy, and
foreclosure on rational examination. Just as the
Enlightenment takes religious faith
to be a tissue of superstitions, prejudices, and
errors, so it further sees the consciousness of this
content organized into a realm of error in which false
insight, common to the mass of people, is immediate,
naive, and unreflective.
^
Nevertheless, Hegel is far more suspicious of the "simple,
inflexible cold universality" of reason and nature.
Presumably due to his witnessing the appalling destructions
unleashed by the French Revolution, he cautions against the
moral and political implications of the Enlightenment
project. On Hegel's account, sentimentality, intuition, and
superstitious faith stand opposed to reason or "pure
insight" as he calls it. Pure insight, in turn, realizes
itself in clean "utility" which gives expression to the
ultimate truth of the Enlightenment. Hegel takes this truth
^. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit , trans. A.V.
Miller, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 330.
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as such that the emerging scheme of utility is "immediately
without support" and therefore "not an intrinsic being." The
advent of the thin, supportless scheme separates "self-
consciousness from possession," from "all existence and
validity of the specific members of the organization of the
actual world and the world of faith." Hence enters "absolute
freedom," the deceptively attractive landscape of Rousseau's
General Will. As the traditional mode of collectivity, the
Aristotelian historia at least involves "the moment of
difference in it whereby it divided itself into stable
spiritual ^masses' or spheres and into the members of
various powers." These organic, subsistent spheres of
received order rest not on rational deliberation and
calculating choice but on immediate allegiance, private
affection, and finite prejudice. They possess what
"intrinsically" matters in men's character disposition and
moral action, viz., "the real essences we found in the real
world of culture." Once absolute freedom breaks into the
scene and increasingly assumes the throne of the world,
explains Hegel,
it comes into existence in such a way that each
individual consciousness raises itself out of its
allotted sphere, no longer finds its essence and its
work in this particular sphere, ... In this absolute
freedom, therefore, all social groups or classes which
are the spiritual spheres into which the whole is
articulated are abolished; the individual consciousness
that belonged to any such sphere, and willed and
fulfilled itself in it, has put aside its limitation;
its purpose is the general purpose, its language
universal law, its work the universal work.
( Phenomenology . pp. 353-357.)
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Once will becomes general and freedom absolute, all pre-
assigned estates of ethical possession are annihilated, all
organized differences of rank and function eliminated, and
all private spheres of certitude and limitation gone. When
the particularity of history is out, the universality of
"nature" sets in.
Universality, however, "hovers over the corpse of the
vanished independence of real being, or the being of faith,
merely as the exhalation of a stale gas, of the vacuous Etre
supreme . " This vacuous Etre supreme frees itself from the
realms of particularity and plurality, and excludes
Aristotle's essential principle of differentiation necessary
for moral action and political life. Since all deeds
necessarily are the deeds of those definite individuals who
live in concrete linguistic and historical contexts, the
Etre supreme with its utter vacuousness can perform nothing
positive. Absolute freedom will only be a negative state,
absolute, unmediated, and predicateless . As the result,
Hegel warns, "the Enlightenment will taste the fruits of its
deeds," and "universal freedom ... is merely the fury of
destruction" ( Phenomenology , pp. 354, 358-359). With the
destruction of "the actual organization of the world," the
absolute negativity no longer has any "content, possession,
existence, or outer extension." What is more, it must seek
the flattest obliteration of its particularistic predicates.
"The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore
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death,
... the coldest and meanest of all deaths, with no
more significance than cutting off a head of cabbage or
swallowing a mouthful of water" ( Phenomenology
, pp. 355,
359-360). An ethical and political system based solely on
the principle of self-preservation could ironically engender
the most direct, brutal, and senseless fashion of what it is
designed primarily to avoid, "the terror of death. "^ On the
other hand, Hegel believes, the absolute negativity cannot
help generating particularistic predicates within itself.
Purely self-identical though it is, the universal will still
needs matter of subsistence to further its agenda of
utilization. Therefore it of necessity involves and develops
actual differences in the form of particularistic social
estates and distinctive linguistic conventions. In other
words, not even the sheer terror on Hegel's account can
stamp out the Aristotelian mode of collectivity; the scheme
of reason and nature can hardly hold historia from renewing
itself;
. Phenomenology
. p. 361. Hegel wrote these lines in
the aftermath of the French Revolution. That we may need to
take his warning seriously is attested though by the fact
that Edmund Burke, in his attacks on Rousseau along a
comparable line of persuasion, virtually predicted the
Jacobin Terror of the 1790s: "On the scheme of this
barbarous philosophy, which is the offspring of cold hearts
and muddy understandings, and which is as void of solid
wisdom, as it is destitute of all taste and elegance, laws
are to be supported only by their own terrors, and by the
concern, which each individual may find in them, from his
own private speculations or can spare to them from his own
private interests. In the groves of their academy, at the
end of every visto, you see nothing but the gallows." Edmund
Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France . (New York:
Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 90-91.
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The organization of spiritual "masses" or spheresto which the plurality of individual consciousnesses
are assigned thus takes shape once more. Theseindividuals who have felt the fear of death, of their
absolute master, again submit to negation anddistinctions, arrange themselves in the various
spheres, and return to an apportioned and limited taskbut thereby to their substantial reality.
The "fear of death" is the core Hobbesian denominator; but,
with its heavy bent toward plurality, finitude, certitude,
and substantiality, the fundamental mode here clearly
remains Aristotelian. "Out of this tumult," Hegel believes,
"Spirit would be thrown back to its starting-point, to the
ethical and real world of culture" ( Phenomenology
, p. 361) .
Thus what Hegel is essentially saying is that, first,
Hobbes' project to redress Aristotle could be dangerously
distasteful as well, and second, it will be practically
futile at any rate. Even Hobbes himself is acutely aware
that his "labour" would most likely turn out to be
"uselesse" to transform "the Practise of the greatest part
of the world" ( Leviathan , p. 407) . As we have seen in the
previous two chapters, the true essence of what is
Aristotelian rests not so much with the Philosopher's
insistence on a positive connection between convention and
nature as with historia, the real and recurrent mode of
collective existence. Being the sole source of ethical
identity, the "ethical and real world of culture" stands not
only for the way it has been all along, but also, as Hobbes
has admitted, for the way it will ever be. Whether we like
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it or not, historia will not bow out in any easy manner;
Aristotle deserves to be taken seriously. Bearing Hegel's
stark account in mind, therefore, this chapter reads
Heidegger, primarily Being and Time
,
to further examine the
set of concepts such as interpretation, language, community,
logos, and history. Throughout we assume that the antithesis
between the two Heideggerian modes of existence corresponds
to that between the concepts of historia and nature, and we
take it that Heidegger shows what Aristotle, if one pushes
it to the extreme, might imply for ethics and politics.'*
This chapter differs from other Heideggerian
commentaries mainly in our assumption that there could be an
Aristotelian interpretation of Heidegger in moral and
political reflection, and that that interpretation could be
considered as a critique of Hobbesian politics of "reason"
and "nature." We also assume, as some others do likewise,
that Heidegger's existential philosophy is not so much
existentialist nor individualistic as it is historicist and
communitarian. In Karl Lowith's words, "the ^ potential ity-
for-Being-a-whole ' of individual authentic existence is
transposed to the ^totality' of the authentic state, which
is itself always particular." The Heidegger Controversy ,
ed., Richard Wolin, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1993),
pp. 173-174. We base our treatment of Heidegger's concepts
of community and historicity directly on a reading of Being
and Time . It is thus another basic assumption of this
chapter that there are underlying continuities between the
early Heidegger of Being and Time (1927) and his later
periods. Heidegger himself spoke of a "turn" or "reversal"
(Kehre) in his thought, in which, from 1930 on, he had to
abandon the incomplete ontological project of Being and
Time . In the "Letter on Humanism" (1947), Heidegger
concedes: "The adequate execution and completion of this
other thinking that abandons subjectivity is surely made
more difficult by the fact that in the publication of Being
and Time the third division of the first part, ^Time and
Being,' was held back. Here everything is reversed [Hier
kehrt sich das Ganze um l . The section in question was held
back because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this
turning [Kehre] and did not succeed with the help of the
language of metaphysics." In other words, the shift which
eventually took place was not exactly the projected "turn
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but rather the result of its failure. The " Kehre "
notwithstanding, Heidegger goes on to insist, "This turning
is not a change of standpoint from Being and Time
,
but in it
the thinking that was sought first arrives at the location
of that dimension out of which Being and Time is
experienced, that is to say, experienced from the
fundamental experience of the oblivion of Being." Martin
Heidegger, Basic Writings , ed. David Farrell Krell, (New
York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 207-208. He also affirms the
basic continuity of his thought, despite the "turn," in the
Preface to the seventh German edition of Being and Time
(1953) : "After a quarter of a century, the second half could
no longer be added unless the first were to be presented
anew. Yet the road it [the published part of Being and Time ]has taken remains even today a necessary one." BT. p. 17.
For distinctive interpretations of this famous
autobiographical event, see also Hannah Arendt, The Life of
the Mind
.
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), Vol.
Two, pp. 172-194; and Robert J. Dostal, "Beyond Being:
Heidegger's Plato," Journal of the History of Philosophy
.
January 1985, pp. 71-98. To a considerable extent, we owe
our understanding of Being and Time to Robert Brandom's
essay "Heidegger's Categories in Being and Time ." See The
Monist, July 1983, pp. 387-409. Among the secondary
literature, we find Robert Dostal 's essay "The Public and
the People: Heidegger's Illiberal Politics" particularly
relevant to our concerns. See Review of Metaphysics
. March
1994, pp. 517-555. Dostal focuses on the Heideggerian term
"das Volk " (the authentic, historically rooted "people") in
opposition to the inauthentic, alienating "public." The
basic structural features of Heidegger's "historicity," as
Dostal reads it, include notions such as poetry, hearkening,
destiny, death, futurity, heritage, repetition, generation,
hero, and so forth. Accordingly, human existence as
Heidegger sees it is emphatically non-natural, and common
life, dangerously antipolitical . We in the present work
share all these views. And Dostal confirms our impression
that the term "the Volk " appears only once in Being and
Time . and it occurs however in a crucial passage on the
issue of historicity. Dostal cites two definitions of the
Volk from Heidegger's work Beitrage zur Philosophie (ed.
Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main:
Klostermann, 1989), of which there is still no English
translation. First, "The essence of the people is ... its
Woice' ( Stimme ) . This voice speaks precisely not in the so-
called immediate outpour of the common, natural,
unsophisticated, and uneducated ^man.' For this tongue, so
appealed to, is already very sophisticated and is no longer
motivated in originary relationships to beings. The voice of
the people seldom speaks and only in a few. Are they still
able to be brought to ring out?" Second, "The essence of a
people is grounded in the historical ity of belonging to
itself out of a relationship to the god." Largely proceeding
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herefrom, Dostal suggests that it is such access to the godby way of the rare voice of the poet that constitutes a
Yolk. By contrast, we in the present work take it that
Heidegger's "das Volk" is not so much religious as it islinguistic. We pay more attention to the extent to which theterm can also mean "nation." And we take more seriously
Heidegger's claim to the "special qualification" of the
German Volk and to its "special inner kinship" to the Greeklanguage. Therefore, we read Heidegger's "the people" more
in terms of his obsession with a volkisch nationalism, with
the linguistic constitution of national identity, and with
the spiritually privileged status of "the German people."
Further, we realize that no one who reads Heidegger can
ignore his Nazi entanglements in the early 1930s. Although
the issue is not central to the present work, we have paid
attention to the literature in this regard. Among which are:
"Symposium on Heidegger and Nazism" (with essays contributed
by Arnold I. Davidson, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jurgen Habermas,
Jacques Derrida, Maurice Blanchot, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe,
and Emmanuel Levinas)
, ed. , Arnold I. Davidson, Critical
Inquiry
.
Winter 1989, pp. 407-488; The Heidegger
Controversy ; Richard Rorty, "Taking Philosophy Seriously,"
The New Republic
. April 11, 1988, pp. 31-34; and Thomas
Sheehan, "Heidegger and the Nazis," The New York Review of
Books, June 16, 1988, pp. 38-47. As is clear from the
debate, the point at issue is neither if Heidegger is an
important thinker nor if his "miscue" is inexcusable.
Rather, it is whether or not there exists any immanent
connection between these. To this question we assume an
answer in the affirmative. And we see Heidegger's obsessive
pursuit of particularistic authenticity the kernel of the
matter. Put otherwise, we read Heidegger not in spite of the
1933 episode but, in a certain sense, because of it. As Karl
Lowith gives testimony to it, "Heidegger understood his
political ^decision' of the early 1930s as an ^ existentiell '
(or ^ontic') realization of the existential analytic of
Being and Time . Or, ... one need only transpose the
existential solipsism of Heidegger's 1927 work ... from an
* individual' to a ^ collectivist ' frame of reference, and it
is now German Dasein that must choose its Mestiny, stake a
claim toward ^authenticity,' and so forth." The Heidegger
Controversy , p. 141. That the entire matter carries real and
disturbing moral and political implications is attested by
Jacques Derrida 's suggestion that had Heidegger been
consistent, he would have been, to use one of our terms
today, a "cultural relativist." Heidegger's assertion of the
Graeco-German axis, Derrida points out, is provisional,
arbitray, and violent. He "cannot ask for the Greek's
approval," or, even if he had, the Greek would not have
dreamed for a moment of sharing the prerogative with German,
"not even provisionally." At the end of the day (and this is
precisely what Heidegger is claiming in the Spiegel
interview of 1966) , only one of the two twinned languages.
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A. Existence and Essenn^
Martin Heidegger addresses an obvious, basic, yet
fundamental fact; that is, things already exist in the
world. Proceeding from this pre-given reality of existence,
his central concern is "the question of the meaning of
Being". Can those existing things be intelligible to human
understanding and significant for human action, and,
supposing they can, to what extent and in what way do they
have intelligibility and significance? In Aristotle's words,
this question about how "Being" signifies had been, "both
now and of old," "the subject of doubt." "So we also must
consider chiefly and primarily and almost exclusively what
that is which is in this sense. "^ For "being," the ultimate
problematic of metaphysics, Aristotle uses the Greek noun
ousia . Derivative from the verb "to be," ousia refers to the
namely, German, is authentic enough to name the "Spirit" par
excellence. What then appears to be a Heideggerian version
of Eurocentrism is by no means Eurocentric. It is rather,
argues Derrida, an insolent "central-europo-centrism.
"
Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question ,
trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby, (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 68-72.
^. Metaphysics
.
1028b3-7, The Complete Works of
Aristotle , p. 1624. See also Plato's Sophist . 244a: "We are
completely puzzled, then, and you must clear up the question
for us, what you do intend to signify when you use the word
*real.' Obviously you must be quite familiar with what you
mean, whereas we, who formerly imagined we knew, are now at
a loss." The Collected Dialogues of Plato , p. 987. In Ludwig
Wittgenstein's words, "Not how the world is, is the
mystical, but that it is." Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus
Looico-Philosophicus . trans. C.K. Ogden, (London: Routledge,
1990)
,
p. 187.
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essential property of existing things, and has been
translated, in contrast to "existence," into essentia ,
"substance," or "essence." Addressing the age-old, ever-
puzzling question of "what that is which is," Heidegger
seeks to show that the distinction between essence and
existence is itself phenomenological
, and that man existing
in the world is essential to the problematic.
Ir» Being and Time, Heidegger first finds that Being is
not self-evident but " a priori an enigma," and that the fact
we ask "what is Being" implies that the state of perplexity
already makes up a scheme of pre-understanding of the "is"
(Being) (BT. pp. 23, 25). Secondly, Heidegger's Being is not
"the ^most universal' concept" in reference to a natural,
metaphysical, or theological super-entity. Instead, the
concept should be defined in terms of a "unity of analogy."
According to Plato's theory of Forms, a universal good
exists on its own as the supreme reality, and in this sense
Being has been perceived as the "most universal" concept.
Aristotle uses his doctrine of the Categories to reject
Plato's assumption of such a super-entity: "Things are
called good in as many senses as they are said to exist; ...
there cannot be a single universal common to all cases,
because it would be predicated not in all the categories but
in one only" (EN- 1096a24-31) . Along a comparable line of
reasoning, Heidegger questions the Platonic doctrine of
universality, and views Plato's concept of Being as "the
darkest of all:"
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The "universality" of "Being" is not that of a
class or genus. ... Aristotle himself knew the unity of
this transcendental "universal" as a unity of analogy
in contrast to the multiplicity of the highest generic
concepts applicable to things. (BT. pp. 22-23.)
As a purely ontological term, he further explains, God is to
be taken as an infinite ens perfectissimum ; i.e., it needs
no other entity in order to "be." On the other hand, all
finite entities other than God need to be created and
sustained. "Being" has been understood as covering all these
entities, yet between them
there is an infinite difference of Being; ... This
positive sense in which "Being" signifies is one which
the Schoolmen took as a signification "by analogy", as
distinguished from one which is univocal or merely
homonymous. (BT. p. 126.)
Thus there are two views of "Being:" essence ( res cogitans )
and existence ( res extensa ) . "Being" signifies not
univocally but "by analogy." Things are alike in that they
all "exist" and thus they all have a "Being," while they are
otherwise entirely different from one another. Being is in
this sense analogical in character; it stands for the
analogically unified meaning of Being in all existential
phenomena.^ Heidegger accordingly asserts the primacy of res
extensa and the derivativeness of res coaitans; he is not
after something univocal that subsists on its own. Beyond
^. As Aristotle in the Metaphysics , 1038bl0-12 has it,
"The universal is common, since that is called universal
which naturally belongs to more than one thing." The
Complete Works o f Aristotle, p. 1639.
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the significance (Being) of man, nature, history, language,
artworks, etc., there can be no metaphysical order of "Being
itself.
"
Third, the Being of entities on the other hand is not
itself any of such entities. Instead, "Being is that which
is an issue for every such entity" (BT. p. 67) . "What is
asked about is Being — that which determines entities as
entities, that on the basis of which entities are already
understood" (BT. pp. 25-26) . In other words, "Being" is
essentially a matter of understanding and interpretation.
Heidegger concerns himself with what he sees as the a priori
hermeneutic scheme which precedes and facilitates the
natural sciences:
The question of Being aims therefore at
ascertaining the a priori condition not only for the
possibility of the sciences which examine entities as
entities of such and such a type, and, in so doing,
already operate with an understanding of Being, but
also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves
which are prior to the ontical sciences and which
provide their foundations. (BT. p. 31.)
Given the infinite difference of "being," Heidegger
goes on to suggest, only the being that exists in such a way
that its Being is at issue for it, that is to say, only the
being that understands Being, can raise the question of its
meaning in the first place. This is a being which, to put it
in one word, interprets. To choose such a point of
departure, Heidegger conceives that there exists a special
type of entity which, with such a hermeneutic priority.
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shall thereby be interrogated beforehand. "Thus," he
introduces his core concept of "Dasein,"
to work out the question of Being adequately, we must
make an entity — the inquirer — transparent in his
own Being. The very asking of this question is an
entity's mode of Being; and as such it gets its
essential character from what is inquired about —
namely, Being. This entity which each of us is himself
and which includes inquiring as one of the
possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term
"Dasein". (BT. p. 27.)
Literally meaning "being-there," Heidegger's "Dasein" refers
to human Being or human existence in the emphatic sense of
the word. For Heidegger, the long-standing definition of man
as the animal rationale is a long cry from the last word
that exhausts the essence of man and gets closest to the way
the Being of man functions. The Heideggerian man is not a
substance, not an object. Residing in "a peculiar phenomenal
domain," "the unity of the person must have a Constitution
essentially different from that required for the unity of
Things of Nature" (BT. pp. 68, 73, 94). Moreover, Dasein is
not a "subject" existing vis-a-vis or side-by-side with the
"object" either. "Subject and Object do not coincide with
Dasein and the world" (BT. pp. 87). The basic state wherein
Heidegger's Dasein exists lies instead in what he calls
"Being-in-the-world. " As the existential expression for the
Being of Dasein, the term "Being-in" signifies what the
Aristotelian habitare denotes, which implies "to reside,"
"dwell alongside," "I am accustomed," and so forth (BT. p.
80) . on the other hand, the term "world" in the
Heideggeriai
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vocabulary can be understood in the ontical sense "as that
^wherein' a factical Dasein as such can be said to Uive.'"
In other words, Heidegger's "world" belongs neither to the
ontical totality of the entities within the world as we
commonly understand it, nor to the ontological
interpretation of those entities. It stands for a third,
more primordial milieu of presupposed existentiale
^ "a
characteristic of Dasein itself" (BT. pp. 93, 92). Living in
this "world," the Heideggerian nature of man is defined in
terms of Dasein' s quintessential faculty of self-
understanding. As compared with other entities, the entity
of Dasein (human being) possesses its peculiarity by the
fact that "in its very Being, that Being is an issue of it."
Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.
We are "thrown" into the world as beings who understand and
interpret. Put otherwise, man is not the animal rationale ;
man is the animal interpretatus ; "Understanding of Being is
itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being" (BT- P-
32) . Primordial to all other ontologies, therefore,
Heidegger's "fundamental ontology" must be hermeneutic,
aware of Dasein 's own historical formation and attentive to
the problem of interpretation. Dasein' s Being needs to be
interpreted, and the interpretations must address the
primordial milieu of existentiality
.
So far as existence is the determining character
of Dasein, the ontological analytic of this entity
always requires that existentiality be considered
beforehand. By "existentiality" we understand the stat
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of Being that is constitutive for those entities that
exist. (BT. pp. 33, 34.)
B. Readv-to-Hand and Present-at-Hand
The entities within the world ("houses, trees, people,
mountains, stars"), Heidegger tells us, are "Things —
Things of Nature, and Things ^invested with value'" (BT- P-
91) . Accordingly he bases his fundamental ontology of Dasein
on an underlying distinction between what in his view are
the two basic modes of existence: "presence-at-hand" and
"readiness-to-hand." Whereas the former category of Being
refers to the objective, person-independent areas of natural
scientific inquiry, the latter stands for the more
"primordial" domains which for ages has been imbued with
human values and significances. Casein's Being should be
defined in terms of "existentialia . " which, Heidegger
emphasizes
,
are to be sharply distinguished from what we call
"categories." ... Existentialia and categories are the
two basic possibilities for characters of Being. ...
Any entity is either a "who" (existence) or a "what"
(presence-at-hand in the broadest sense). (BT- PP- 70-
71.)
The "what" category of presence-at-hand, he maintains,
belongs to "a kind of Being which is essentially
inappropriate to entities of Dasein's character" (BT. p.
67). The question of "what is man?" should be
reformulated
into "who is man?". Throughout Being and Time,
Heidegger
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asserts a clear ontological primacy of the world of
readiness-to-hand to the sphere of presence-at-hand
.
Furthermore, criterion and authority are social in nature.
Dasein within the world ready-to-hand is ontologically self-
adjudicating. The distinction between the two basic modes of
existence can be intelligible only in Dasein' s view, and,
more importantly, Dasein is given the epistemic privilege to
interpret its own authority over both.
On Heidegger's account, the primordial world ready-to-
hand, amidst which Dasein finds itself, is a received world
of "equipment." This world consists of entities which are
experienced "as" something and thereby become intelligible
to man the animal interpretatus . The entities which we
concern ourselves with as the closest to us are not objects
for theoretical knowledge. When I open the door, I use the
latch. Without invoking anything subjective on our part, the
entities are what gets used ( "with-which" ) and what gets
produced ( "towards-which" ) . "We shall," says Heidegger,
"call those entities which we encounter in concern
^equipment' . " It is by virtue of Dasein' s "concernful
dealings" and appropriate social performances ("in-which")
of using and producing entities that those entities acquire
their significances. "Taken strictly," he further reflects,
"there Us' no such thing as an equipment. To the Being of
any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment"
(BT. p. 97). Equipment makes sense only in its totality
and
with the view of specific purpose. The totality of
equipment
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is constituted by a multitude of serviceability,
conduciveness, usability, or manipulability
. The inhabitant
of a Heideggerian world is aware of that world as composed
of significant equipment ready-to-hand; this awareness is
practical and social, in accordance appropriately with the
differential responsive dispositions of the community. We
get access to these purposeful significances not by looking
at the entities theoretically as objective occurrences, but
by the experience of using and producing them in an
appropriate manner. Therefore, the concernful dealings have
their own kind of sight, "circumspection" as Heidegger calls
it. Hence his definition of the basic mode of existence:
"The kind of Being which equipment possesses — in which it
manifests itself in its own right — we call ^ readiness-to-
hand'" (BT- P- 98). The concernful dealings in the world
ready-to-hand must be carried out "appropriately." The
appropriateness of a particular experience has a structure
of reference or assignment. That structure in turn implies
an involvement. The totality of equipment therefore is a
totality of involvements. Anything ready-to-hand is such
only by virtue of the role it plays in a referential
totality of significance or involvements. The pre-existing
totality of involvements makes the primordial "world"
wherein Dasein already "is." This a priori milieu of direct
experience, Heidegger makes it clear, is the place wherein
interpretation takes place and significance originates:
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These relationships are bound up with one another
as a primordial totality; they are what they are asthis signifying in which Dasein gives itself beforehand
Its Being-in-the-world as something to be understood.
The relational totality of this signifying we call
"significance". (BT. p. 120.)
The meaningful referential totality implies that
Dasein' s Being is social in nature. So far as Dasein exists
at all, it possesses Being-with-one-another as its kind of
Being. This social nature of Dasein is essential to the
practical experience constitutive of significance. In
Heidegger's words, "Dasein in itself is essentially Being-
with," and "Dasein-with remains existentially constitutive
for the Being-in-the-world" (BT. pp. 156-157) . Individuals
exist only in the context of such social schemes of Dasein-
with, and individuality should be defined only in terms of
its sociality: "In Being with and towards Others, there is
thus a relationship of Being from Dasein to Dasein. But it
might be said that this relationship is already constitutive
for one's own Dasein" (BT. p. 162) . Identity, then, is
collective in essence. Dasein' s social nature involves
mutual recognition. To live in a community we must recognize
each other's recognizing. It is communal responsive
dispositions that constitute the community and sustain
significance. What existentially does it take to be a member
of the community?
In that with which we concern ourselves
environmentally the Others are encountered as what they
are; they are what they do. (BT. p. 163.)
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How specifically do the others "do" and thereby they acqui
their identity as members of one's own community?
By "Others" we do not mean everyone else but me —
those over against whom the "I" stands out. They are
rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not
distinguish oneself — those among whom one is too.
(BT. p. 154.)
Those whose doings one does not distinguish from one's own
become other members of one's own community. Their responses
and dispositions one rather treats as one's own. What they
take to be appropriate performances of experiencing
equipment one also takes as such. Not everyone is a communal
Other, but only those whom one recognizes as such. The
community members are such only when they are each
recognized and at the same time recognizing in a certain
way. They must treat one another's responses as equally
authoritative as their own in determining appropriatenesses.
Whereas Aristotle's slogan is "particularity," Heidegger's
watchword here is "appropriateness." The constitutive states
of reference or assignment are not attributes of entities.
They are significances peculiar to specific purposes. As
Heidegger puts it.
The "indicating" of the sign and the "hammering"
of the hammer are not properties. ... Anything ready-
to-hand is, at the worst, appropriate for some purposes
and inappropriate for others; and its "properties" are,
as it were, still bound up in these ways in which it is
appropriate or inappropriate. (BT. pp. 114-115.)
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The primordial world of readiness-to-hand therefore is a
primitive scheme of appropriatenesses. Amidst that world,
Dasein appropriates a piece of equipment "as" having a
certain significance and responds to it with the appropriate
behavior. Appropriation is thus Heidegger's epistemic
activity. Yet the act of appropriation is not mental or
psychological in character. It is rather communal and
social. In other words, appropriateness must be instituted
by social practice of reference or assignment. It takes
compliance with the criterial dominion or authority over
boundaries of what is appropriate to be a member of the
community. Made up by the experience of using and producing
entities appropriately, social practice is the locus of
intelligibility and its ultimate court of appeal. The
community, "Mitdasein" as Heidegger calls it, is the domain
of, and constituted by, social co-appropriateness.
C. Interpretation
Heidegger avowedly seeks to dismantle the entire
Western philosophical tradition from Plato through
Nietzsche, and to discredit any metaphysical grounding of
meaning. This notwithstanding, he by no means denies the
existence of meaning itself. An obvious question arises
herefrom: if Heidegger rejects the metaphysical tradition
altogether, how does he explain man's drive for a meaningful
existence? How does a life that is fundamentally
existential
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assume intelligibility? Heidegger answers this question
about the source of "meaning" in terms of an immanent
connection between hermeneutic pre-understanding,
intelligibility, and language. To be specific, meaning
derives not from any natural, metaphysical, or theological
entity, but rather exclusively from what Heidegger calls a
"hermeneutical Situation" on a particularistic linguistic
locus. According to Heidegger's account, the fundamental
existentialia of readiness-to-hand take the form of
understanding. As the agent of understanding, Dasein
projects its Being upon possibilities. It is possible for
understanding to appropriate and develop what is understood.
The appropriation and development of understanding are
"interpretation" fAuslequnq . literally "laying out"), viz.,
working-out of the possibilities projected in understanding.
The experience understood beforehand comes to be
interpreted. Interpretation appropriates the equipment
ready-to-hand by making what is understood beforehand one's
own. The act of appropriation moves in the a priori
interpretative structure:
Circumspection operates in the involvement-
relationships of the context of equipment which is
ready-to-hand. ... What is essential to it is that one
should have a primary understanding of the totality of
involvements. In one's current using and manipulating,
the concernful circumspection . . . brings the ready-to-
hand closer to Dasein, and does so by interpreting what
has been sighted. This specific way of bringing the
object of concern close by interpreting it
circumspectively, we call "deliberating". The scheme
peculiar to this is the "if - then". (BT. P- 410.)
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The deliberative scheme of the "if ~ then" presupposes the
contextual totality of equipment and involvements.
Interpretation involves a pre-thematic hermeneutic
"structure of something as something."
Concern must already have "surveyed" a context of
involvements and have an understanding of it. That
which is considered with an "if" must already be
understood as something or other. This does not require
that the understanding of equipment be expressed in a
predication. The schema "something as something" has
already been sketched out beforehand in the structure
of one's pre-predicative understanding. (BT. pp. 189,
411.
)
First there exists a particularistic environment, and
we have already understood it in its totality. Then the
circumspective question as to what this particular
experience ready-to-hand may be receives the circumspective
answer in terms of such and such a purpose. What is
designated here is already understood "as" something, and we
the concernful are to take it accordingly. We "see" it "as"
a hammer, a table, a door, and so forth. The "as"
constitutes the interpretation. But one cannot simply take
something as a hammer; rather, one takes a hammer as one of
the set of tools required for a certain practical project.
Furthermore, the interpretative "as-structure" in all
probability remains linguistically unexpressed throughout.
Interpretation moves primordially not in any theoretical
statement but "in an action of circumspective concern, ...
From the fact that words are absent, it may not be concluded
that interpretation is absent" (BT. p. 200). A thematic
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assertion is not necessary; even if an assertion does occur,
it takes place only and always on the basis of the a priori
scheme of understanding the experience ready-to-hand in
terms of the totality of involvements. An interpretation
therefore is never a presuppositionless apprehending by
which we throw a signification on some entity present-at-
hand. We deal with the experience interpretatively
, which
already has a constitutive state of understanding in the
background. Already understood, the totality of involvements
makes a specific "fore-structure" of its own. The
interpretation is grounded, that is to say, in something we
have in advance (a "fore-having")
, we see in advance (a
"fore-sight")
, and we conceive in advance (a "fore-
conception")
. Heidegger calls this fore-structure
"presupposition," and defines the "hermeneutical Situation"
as the totality of the interpretative presuppositions:
Every interpretation has its fore-having, its
fore-sight, and its fore-conception. If such an
interpretation, as Interpretation, becomes an explicit
task for research, then the totality of these
"presuppositions" (which we call the "hermeneutical
Situation") needs to be clarified and made secure
beforehand. (BT. p. 275.)
Thus interpretation must in each case already operate in the
experience understood beforehand, and the "hermeneutical
Situation" refers to the totality of the particularistic
"fore-structure" in which the interpretation operates. In
other words, a proper explication of Dasein in such a fore-
structure necessarily involves a "circle:" "In working out
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our question, have we not ^presupposed' something which only
the answer can bring" (BT. p. 27)?
Dasein is not a worldless "I" moving amid the
"categorial aggregate" present-at-hand ; it is the animal
interpretatus living under the "hermeneutical Situation." It
has already understood itself, however mythical the
primordial understanding may be. The existential ontology of
Dasein must move in such a "circle," that is, we have to
have "presupposed" the pre-existing hermeneutic scheme. Yet
the business of historiological interpretation is
excluded a priori from the domain of rigorous
knowledge. ... historiology must then be resigned to
less rigorous possibilities of knowing. Historiology is
permitted to compensate for this defect to some extent
through the "spiritual signification" of its "objects".
But even in the opinion of the historian himself, it
would admittedly be more ideal if the circle could be
avoided and if there remained the hope of creating some
time a historiology which would be as independent of
the standpoint of the observer as our knowledge of
Nature is supposed to be.
But, Heidegger emphasizes, to see this crucial hermeneutic
"circle" as "a circulus vitiosus " to be avoided, or even
just to see it as an inevitable imperfection to be
tolerated, is a misunderstanding "from the ground up" (BT.
p. 194) . The circularity comes from the core of Dasein'
s
Being. The hermeneutic "presupposing" of Being has nothing
to do with prepositional deduction; the "definite ideal of
knowledge" cherished in the "derivative ways of
understanding and interpretation" belongs within the range
of scientific knowledge and positive proof. This
scientific
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mode of knowing, Heidegger explains, "is itself only a
subspecies of understanding" (BT. p. 194)
.
Here Heidegger seems to be giving his reading of
Aristotle's treatment of the different modes of
"intellectual virtues" by which truth is reached. Aristotle
begins his analysis of those modes in "Book Six" of the
Nicomachean Ethics ;
The attainment of truth (aletheia) is the task of
both the intellectual parts of the soul; so their
respective virtues are the states that will best enable
them to arrive at the truth. ... Let us, then, discuss
these states again, making a start further back; let us
assume that there are five ways in which the soul
arrives at truth by affirmation or denial, viz. art
( techne ) , science (episteme) , prudence ( phronesis )
,
wisdom ( sophia ) , and intuition ( nous ) . (EN. 1139bl2-
18. )
The central argument Aristotle makes in his ensuing
discussion, as we have seen in Chapter II, is that phronesis
has a clear primacy over all the other intellectual modes of
aletheia , including both man's rational faculty and his
practical action. In his words, "prudence must be a true
state, reasoned and capable of action in the sphere of human
goods" (EN- 1140b20) . Heidegger likewise argues that, first,
reason and science do not have human cognition all under
their coverage; they only make up part of it. Second and
more crucially, among the multiple modes of knowledge there
does involve a relationship of subordination, but it is not
that phronesis is subordinated to episteme but precisely
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that eMsteme is a "subspecies" to phronesis . m the circle
of hermeneutic understanding, therefore,
vfr^H^"^^^? ^
positive possibility of the most primordialKind of knowing.
... the ontological presuppositions of
nistoriological knowledge transcend in principle theIdea of rigour held in the most exact sciences.
Mathematics is not more rigorous than historiology
, butonly narrower, because the existential foundations
relevant for it lie within a narrower range. (BT. p.195
.
)
—
Involved in the circular "hermeneutical Situation" is "the
most primordial kind of knowing," to which scientific
exactitude only makes up a "subspecies," The basic
structures of the natural sciences, as Heidegger sees it,
"have already been worked out after a fashion in our pre-
scientific ways of experiencing and interpreting" (BT. p.
29).® As phronesis covers all the intellectual states of
7
.
This, interestingly, reminds us of Hobbes's argument
that geometric propositions arouse no guarrels not so much
because they are authentically correct as because they
simply "cross no mans ambition, profit, or lust." Leviathan ,
p. 166.
. Heidegger cites the ontological genesis of
mathematical physics to describe the way in which the pre-
scientific interpretation of science operates: "What is
decisive for its development does not lie in its rather high
esteem for the observation of ^facts', nor in its
^application' of mathematics in determining the character of
natural processes; it lies rather in the way in which Nature
herself is mathematically projected. In this projection
something constantly present-at-hand (matter) is uncovered
beforehand, and the horizon is opened so that one may be
guided by looking at those constitutive items in it which
are quantitatively determinable (motion, force, location,
and time). Only ^ in the light' of a Nature which has been
projected in this fashion can anything like a ^fact' be
found and set up for an experiment regulated and delimited
in terms of this projection. The ^grounding' of 'factual
science' was possible only because the researchers
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truth, understanding and interpretation underlie all modes
of knowing and activities. Proceeding from such a
recognition of the ontological primacy and universality of
particularistic hermeneutics
,
Heidegger believes that "In no
science are the ^universal validity' of standards and the
claims to ^universality' ... less possible as criteria of
^truth' than in authentic historiology" (BT. p. 447) .
With its own Being an interpretative issue, Dasein
"has, ontologically, a circular structure," and this
structure "belongs to the structure of meaning" (BT. p.
195)
.
What then is "meaning?" First, says Heidegger,
"Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something
maintains itself. That which can be Articulated in a
understood that in principle there are no ^bare facts'. In
the mathematical projection of Nature, moreover, what is
decisive is not primarily the mathematical as such; what is
decisive is that this projection discloses something that is
a priori . Thus the paradigmatic character of mathematical
natural science does not lie in its exactitude or in the
fact that it is binding for ^Everyman'; it consists rather
in the fact that the entities which it takes as its theme
are discovered in it in the only way in which entities can
be discovered — by the prior projection of their state of
Being." BT. pp. 413-414. To the same extent, Heidegger also
argues, progress of science first of all involves
reinterpretation of the constitutive conceptual schemes:
"The real ^movement' of the sciences takes place when their
basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision . .
.
The level which a science has reached is determined by how
far it is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts. In such
immanent crises the very relationship between positively
investigative inquiry and those things themselves that are
under interrogation comes to a point where it begins to
totter. ... Mathematics, which is seemingly the most
rigorous and most firmly constructed of the sciences, has
reached a crisis in its ^foundations'. In the controversy
between the formalists and the intuitionists, the issue is
one of obtaining and securing the primary way of access to
what are supposedly the objects of this science." BT. PP-
29-30.
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disclosure by which we understand, we call ^meaning'."
Second, "Meaning is the ^upon-which' of a projection in
terms of which something becomes intelligible as something;
it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and
a fore-conception." Third, "Meaning is an existential of
Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, lying ^behind'
them, or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate domain'"
(BT. p. 193). The "hermeneutical Situation" makes up the
existential state of Dasein. Meaning is the function of that
particularistic scheme of pre-understanding. Therefore,
intelligibility can have no existence or sphere of its own
but that of the animal interpretatus
. and the source of
meaning is exclusively hermeneutic-linguistic. The
"hermeneutical Situation" constitutes the only source of
9meaning.
^
D. Lancfuaqe and Collective Identity
Language is founded existentially on discourse.
Equiprimordial with understanding, discourse in the
Heideggerian sense of the word is the Articulation of
intelligibility. Dasein's Being-in-the-world makes sense of
itself in discourse which, in turn, finds expression in
It is in this sense that Heidegger, on the one hand,
argues that "'Being' is indefinable" as presented in
traditional logic. And on the other hand, he maintains that
"the indefinability of Being does not eliminate the question
of its meaning." BT. p. 23.
191
language. "To significations, words accrue." Here Heidegger
provides his definition of "language," and so he does in
terms of a distinction between the two ways in which we can
look at it:
The way in which discourse gets expressed is
language. Language is a totality of words — a totality
in which discourse has a "worldly" Being of its own;
and as an entity within-the-world , this totality thus
becomes something which we may come across as ready-to-
hand. Language can be broken up into word-Things which
are present-at-hand. (BT. p. 204.)
Within the ontologico-existential structure of
discourse, the essence of language however rests with "the
connection of discourse with understanding and
intelligibility" (BT^ p. 206) . Heidegger exposes this
connection between the "hermeneutical Situation," language,
and meaning by considering the existential possibility of
"hearkening." On his account, speaking presupposes the
ability to hear; hearing in the structure of discourse
stands for the more intelligible and more authentic way in
which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentials and
possibilities
.
What we "first" hear is never noises or complexes
of sounds, but the creaking waggon, the motor-cycle. We
hear the column on the march, the north wind, the
woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling. ... The fact
that motor-cycles and waggons are what we proximally
hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case
Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already dwells alongside
what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; it certainly
does not dwell proximally alongside "sensations"; nor
would it first have to give shape to the swirl of
sensations to provide the springboard from which the
subject leaps off and finally arrives at a "world .
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Dasein, as essentially understanding, is proximally
alongside what is understood. (BT. p. 207.)
We hear what we understand in advance. Both hearing and
talking are based upon the a priori interpretation of the
proximal experience ready-to-hand. What we proximally hear
in this sense is never a multiplicity of sound- or tone-data
transmitted in the linguistic utterance, nor, as Heidegger
has it, the "word-Things which are present-at-hand. " We are
in our mentality already with those who utter alongside the
experience which the discourse is about. When discourse
communicates, "a co-state-of-mind gets ^shared'," and
"Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a co-state-
of-mind and a co-understanding" (BT. p. 205) . In this sense,
he who is able to keep silent "authentically" can advance
understanding even better; "authentic" reticence as a mode
of discoursing often articulates Dasein's intelligibility
even more primordially
.
Therefore, language above all makes the linguistic
domain of readiness-to-hand and Being-in-the-world. "As an
existential state in which Dasein is disclosed," Heidegger
is convinced, "discourse is constitutive for Dasein 's
existence" (BT. P- 204). Things "reveal" their meaningful
"being" only to men of language as Heidegger takes it;
language constitutes the only realm of truth. In Heidegger's
view, man is not an animal endowed with a mere property of
speech or faculty of reason which distinguishes him from
other animals. Nor is language merely one of the many
tools
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at man's disposal, a system of conventionally agreed-upon
signs or names to express and communicate objectively pre-
existing things. On the contrary, language "disposes of the
supreme possibility of human existence."
Man acts as though he were the shaper and master
of language, while in fact language remains the master
of man. When this relation of dominance gets inverted,
... language becomes the means of expression.^®
In other words, language ready-to-hand as the hermeneutic
scheme precedes not just language present-at-hand as a mere
medium of expression but also man himself; it virtually
constitutes the very given form in which we exist. Human
existence is taken to be thoroughly shaped and defined by
the possession of language.
Ethical and political implications inevitably arise.
The recognition of the fundamental linguisticality of human
existence implies an assertion of the fundamentally
linguistic constitution of human collectivity. Discourse
constitutes Dasein's existence. "Being-in-the-world" implies
"being-with-others ; " social association is possible and
actual only on the locus of conversation. Therefore
collective existence is necessarily linguistic; language
constitutes the matrix of human collectivity. Language
though is by no means incorruptible. Its abuse or
Martin Heidegger, "Holderlin and the Essence of
Poetry," trans. Douglas Scott, Existence and Being.
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1949), p. 300. Martin
Heidegger, Poetry. Language. Thought , trans. Albert
Hofstadter, (New York: Perennial Library, 1975), p. 215.
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vulgarization destroys men's authentic relation to things.
The shape of the language is determinative of the fate of
the collectivity; corruption, poverty, or peril of the
former indicates decay, destitution, or danger of the
latter. In this sense, Heidegger sees language as man's
"most dangerous of possessions."
Danger is the threat to existence from what is
existent. ... It is language which first creates the
manifest conditions for menace and confusion to
existence, and thus the possibility of the loss of
existence. ("Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry," p.
298. )
The state of our language is synonymous with none less than
the "state of our being-there," and it has a vital bearing
upon the existence, the life, it constitutes. The word
"state," explains Heidegger in An Introduction to
Metaphvsics .
means our entire constitution, the way in which we
ourselves are constituted in regard to being. Here we
are not concerned with psychology but with our history
in an essential respect. ... Because the destiny of
language is grounded in a nation's relation to being.
Specifically, the fundamental dwelling of man in
his linguisticality is "prone to succumb to the danger of
commonness:" "The place of language properly inhabited, and
of its habitual words, is usurped by common terms. The
common speech becomes the current speech. We meet it on ail
sides, and since it is common to all, we now accept it
as
the only standard. Anything that departs from this
coLonness, in order to inhabit the f-^-l^^^^^^^^fi^f°f
"
speaking of language, is at once considered a violation
of
the standard." R^c^ic Writings, p. 365.
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the question of being will involve us deeply in thequestion of language . -^-^
At stake in language then is the ultimate meaningfulness of
a nation's being, of an already existing historical people's
existence. What Heidegger is advancing here, therefore, is
his theme of the linguistic constitution of a "nation," a
"people," or national identity. The term "Vglk" (nation,
people, race, or tribe) is practically invisible in Being
and Time; it asserts itself most conspicuously in the
"Rector's Address" of May 27, 1933. "The spiritual world of
a Volk," Heidegger tells his audience in that ill-famed
speech.
is not its cultural superstructure, just as little as
it is its arsenal of useful knowledge and values;
rather, it is the power that comes from preserving at
the most profound level the forces that are rooted in
the soil [Erde] and blood [ Blut ] of a Volk .
It is in those dim, mysterious areas of "soil and blood,"
Heidegger claims, that the identity of a Volk ("who we
ourselves are") is shaped and its "fate" and "historical
mission" get informed in the first place. By the same token,
an organic German "Volkqemeinschaft " ("ethnic and national
community") would owe its own spiritual renewal essentially
to those darksome "forces." In the "Rector's Address"
Heidegger does not explain explicitly what he means by "soil
and blood of a Volk." But he does attribute the rise of the
Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics ,
trans. Ralph Manheim, (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1987)
,
pp. 50-51.
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German nation's privileged spiritual standing as a Volk to
"the culture of one Volk [the Greeks]" and "the power of
that Volk's language. "^3 In other words, Heidegger seems to
be thinking not of biology but primarily in linguistic
terms. Elsewhere, Heidegger claims that "as a historical
nation," the German Volk "is the most metaphysical of
nations." Germanic grammatical forms are primordially not
scientific but spiritual, not just linguistic but also
metaphysical. They "have not from all eternity stood there
like absolutes, dissecting and regulating language as such,
. .
.
quite on the contrary they grew out of a very definite
interpretation of the Greek and Latin languages." The
"historical spiritual mission of the German Volk" to
"forestall" the coming "peril of world darkening," Heidegger
then makes it unequivocal and plain, derives ultimately from
its language. For, as his etymological investigation of the
word "being" supposedly shows, the German language, with a
peculiar, mystic inner kinship to the Greek, is "at once the
most powerful and most spiritual of all languages . "^^ What
can we make of these assertions?
. The Heidegger Controversv . pp. 29-39.
. "What gives this development its entire meaning is
that Western grammar sprang from the reflection of the
Greeks on the Greek language. For along with German the
Greek language is (in regard to its possibilites for
thought) at once the most powerful and most spiritual of al
languages." An Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 38, 50, 53,
56-57.
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According to Aristotle's classical account, man is
endowed with a natural impulse toward political association
("political animal"), and among the various forms of human
collectivity the state (the polls) ranks highest and
ultimate. Whereas the household exists to satisfy man's
daily wants and the village supplies a wider range of needs,
the state functions to achieve eudalmonia, the ultimate end
of human existence. Aristotle opens the Politics with the
following statement:
Every state is a community of some kind, and every
community is established with a view to some good; for
everyone always acts in order to obtain that which they
think good. But, if all communities aim at some good,
the state or political community, which is the highest
of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good
in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest
good. ( Politics . 1252al-6.)
Only as a member of such a genuine political community can
man become self-sufficing, achieve his "flourishing," and to
live well as truly a man. Man owes his disposition for
political association, Aristotle further suggests, to his
unique property of speech. Sufficient both for metaphysical
accessibility and for linguistic persuasion, language
enables us to exercise our distinctively human capacity for
moral sensibilities and political life. In Aristotle's
words
:
Man is the only animal who has the gift of speech.
And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure
or pain, and is therefore found in other animals
the power of speech is intended to set forth the
expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the
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Dust and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of manrnar he alone has any sense of good and evil, of iustand unjust, and the like, and the association of livingbeings who have this sense makes a family and a state.
( Politics
,
1253al0-18.)
We may infer that the state stands for the supreme human
good, as Aristotle sees it, precisely because it is the only
form of collective life wherein a language in the full sense
of the term can take shape. On the other hand, as we have
seen in Chapter II, Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics
maintains that the cohesive polls must be limited in scope
so as not to let it "proceed to infinity." Informed by an
essentially private ethical vocabulary and supported by a
shared commitment to the good in its entirety, the political
association necessarily takes place within a relatively
local, emphatically particularistic setting of historia.
That is to say, the political community must have the right
size, extensive enough to be the highest form of
collectivity, and cohesive enough to ensure criterial
15
consensus and moral action. It is in terms of this
Aristotelian imperative that we read Heidegger's conception
of the linguistic constitution of national identity. The
crux of the matter, for Heidegger as well as for Aristotle,
lies in language, the supreme event of human existence. To
be specific, a historical locus, an anthropological
existence, must be identified. It makes the highest,
ultimate form of human collectivity wherein a real language
See also the Politics . 1325b33-1326b25
.
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in the full sense of the term can and does take shape and
function. Meanwhile the language arising therefrom must
possess every necessary source in all its historical
primordiality and particularistic authenticity. In
Heidegger's view, we accordingly assume, the "Volk" is the
only form of human grouping in the modern era that meets
this twofold Aristotelian criterion. Therefore, the source
of collectivity resides most accountably in language, and
the "language" here refers not to the vehicle of expression
on a universal platform but to the real national tongues.
National identity (the Volk ) is constituted exclusively by
linguistic means.
Heidegger's conception of language in terms of an
already existing "Volk " then serves the necessity he feels
of a switch of emphasis from "language" as such to
particular "national" languages . "'^ As our foregoing reading
suggests, the order of the cosmos could become intelligible
only to human beings living in their "ownmost" schemes of
language, and, at the same time, those linguistic schemes
alone inform the collective identities. To such an extent,
intelligibility must be associated with, if not embodied in.
"National" languages come into being in men's
particularistic experience ready-to-hand within their
ownmost hermeneutic schematizations. Heidegger sees
"language" as such (thematic assertion) , on the other hand,
as the leverage present-at-hand by which men turn such
particularistic experience into something linguistically
definite and thereby universally accessible. The way in
which Heidegger explains this relationship will be examined
in the next section of this chapter.
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the concrete forms of collectivity held together by the
particularistic conceptual and linguistic conventions. Put
otherwise, there exists an inherent connection between
intelligibility, community, and language, yet it is the
"national" languages in their real locality and historicity,
not "language as such," that constitute the locus of the
other two legs of the tripod. Since Aristotle after all
makes the attempt to support his system metaphysically and
rationally, he still defines the ethical and political
association based on man's linguistic faculty in universal
terms. Heidegger seeks to cast aside the last vestiges of
the metaphysical and rational tradition of Western thought,
yet he, as we have seen, has no intention to discard the
pursuit of "authentic" accessibility itself. He deconstructs
rational universality, but obsesses himself still with
particularistic authenticity. It follows that his concept of
collectivity is not only emphatically historicist and
particularistic but also hard to demonstrate and even
mysterious. Community for millennia has been inscribed not
rationally nor scientifically but, according to him,
"poetically." "Primitive language is poetry," "our existence
is fundamentally poetic," and "poetically, dwells Man on
this earth." This mystic concept of "poetry" at its core
undergirds a highly particularistic ("appropriate") mode of
collective existence and linguisticality ; it makes it
possible for men, in Heidegger's words, "to stand in the
presence of the gods and to be involved in the proximity of
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the essence of things." The poet is exposed to the "divine
lightnings;" he is the "divine gift to the people." The poet
attends to the gods; the people hearken to the poet. At the
outset the poet names the gods and the essence of things. In
doing so, poetry perforins the unmediated founding of the
collectivities, inaugurates their intelligible existence by
hermeneutic-linguistic means, and at the same time makes the
particularistic languages possible. As Heidegger puts it,
poetry is "the foundation which supports history" and thus
"the primitive language of a historical people" ("Holderlin
and the Essence of Poetry," pp. 304-309). Along this line of
assertion, Heidegger even rejects the conventional rendering
of the Greek polls as the city-state. The Greek polls is
magnificent precisely because it is fundamentally
apolitical. "The polls," he insists,
is the historical place, the there in which, out of
which, and for which history happens. To this place and
scene of history belong the gods, the temples, the
priests, the festivals, the games, the poets, the
thinkers, the ruler, the council of elders, the
assembly of the people, the army and the fleet. All
this does not first belong to the polls, does not
become political by entering into a relation with a
statesman and a general and the business of the state.
No, it is political, i.e. at the site of history,
provided there be (for example) poets alone, but then
really poets, priests alone, but then really priests,
rulers alone, but then really rulers. (An Introduction
to Metaphysics , p. 152.)^^
. If Heidegger's explication here of the poetic
constitution of the polls only implies the linguisticality
of community, Wittgenstein's following remarks imply
collectivity: "The limits of my language mean the limits of
my world." Tractatus Loaico-Philosophicus , p. 149. And, "Our
language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little
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Men dwell "poetically" in this "historical place" wherein
all the human experience and work are grounded and
preserved. Entrenched as it is in the most deep-seated
forces of "the soil and blood of a Volk," the hermeneutic-
linguistic "as-structure" of the animal i nt^rpretatus is
necessarily "ownmost" and therefore exclusive. Poetry, and
language, differ from place to place, time to time, and
people to people. There is no reason that can explicate why
this is the case. All that the poet does is to present the
mystery of existence as such. It follows that there can be
no universal standard of rational arbitration overarching
across the plurality of the determinate poetic and
linguistic schemes. Instead, the historical communities and
anthropological peoples find and preserve their respective
ultimate identity or "fateful destiny" in what is most
proximally, distinctively, and mysteriously their own.
In the Spiegel interview, which was given in 1966 and
published posthumously in 1976, Heidegger makes the
unburdened claim, once more, to "a special qualification" of
the German Volk and "the special inner kinship" between the
streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses
with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by
a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets
and uniform houses. ... To imagine a language means to
imagine a form of life." Interestingly, Wittgenstein
likewise seems to view science as a mere "subspecies" to the
more primordial linguistic scheme when he allots chemistry
and the infinitesimal calculus to the "suburbs" of the
"ancient city." Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations , trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, (New York:
Macmillan, 1968)
,
p. 8e.
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German and Greek languages. Only that, for all its
apparently Eurocentric undertone, the emphasis now has
shifted from the Graeco-German axis to German alone:
I am thinking of the special inner kinship between
the German language and the language of the Greeks and
their thought. This is something that the French
confirm for me again and again today. When they begin
to think, they speak German. They assure [me] that they
do not succeed with their own language.^®
Then he asserts the proposition of ultimate
incommensurability. Linguistic schemes stand for "ownmost"
identities, incompatible ways of thinking, and inharmonious
forms of life. The "great rationality" can no longer make a
go of it today when it comes to understanding the world in
its primordial essence. Heidegger goes on to suggest:
One can no more translate thought than one can
translate a poem. At best, one can paraphrase it. As
soon as one attempts a literal translation, everything
is transformed. . . . Business letters can be translated
into all languages. The sciences, i.e., even for us
today the natural sciences (with mathematical physics
as the fundamental science) , are translatable into all
the languages of the world — or, to be exact, they are
not translated but the same mathematical language is
spoken [universally].
A decade earlier (1953), Heidegger finds the German
nation residing "in the center of the Western world:" "Our
own historic being-there proves to be the center for Europe
itself." An Introduction to Metaphysics , pp. 50, 42.
"The Spiegel Interview (1966)," trans. William J.
Richardson, Heidegger; The Man and the Thinker , ed. Thomas
Sheehan, (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1981), pp.
62-63. Presumably drawing on Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer
has formulated his "hermeneutical principle of translation."
A conversation in two languages is possible by translation.
Yet each language has behind it the entire milieu of its own
particularistic experience and mentality. What the
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Ancient Greek thought had undergone a portentous
metamorphosis since translated into the Latin of Rome; this
appropriation of Greek experience into a different way of
thinking was in Heidegger's view a fundamental event the
unfortunate impact of which we still feel today. The
rootlessness of Western thought began with this
appropriation. Like "business letters," on the other hand,
natural sciences are translatable into all tongues; to be
more accurate, science itself stands as one universally
spoken language. Nevertheless, as Aristotle and Heidegger
have argued, that universal language is only a much narrower
"subspecies," a far more recent and derivative event. With
their "ownmost" as-structures ("the soil and blood") , in
translator does then is at best rendering the meaning to be
understood into a different linguistic world, while the
fundamental gulf between the spirits of the two contexts
"can never be completely closed." Nor can the subject matter
be separated from the original language. In this sense, to
translate a text is not to reproduce the original process in
the writer's mind but necessarily to recreate the text in
the way the translator understands what it says. "Language
as such" is supposed to be the universal medium in which
hermeneutic experience occurs, yet what a translation
actually takes as its medium is the interpreter's own tongue
in which its speakers linguistically live their lives. "As
if impelled by a higher force, one of the languages always
tries to establish itself over the other as the medium of
understanding." That is to say, interpretation is possible;
the possibility of genuine translation, problematic. There
is simply too much history involved. In Gadamer's words,
"every translator is an interpreter," and "every translation
is at the same time an interpretation." The extent to which
poetry is translatable is such, therefore, that "the more
the lyric approximates the ideal of poesie pure, the less
translatable it is." "In fact," Gadamer accordingly
suggests, "any translation seems impossible." Hans-Georg
Gadamer, Truth and Method , trans, and revised. Joel
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, (New York: Crossroad,
1991), pp. 384-389, 527-528, 575.
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contrast, the primitive, ultimate languages of the
historical peoples (the Volks) are necessarily and
profoundly incommensurable.^®
E. Logos
Heidegger's thesis of the linguistic constitution of
human existence and collectivity directs our attention to
Aristotle's classical definition of man in terms of his
unique faculty of logos and reminds us of Hobbes's notion of
speech. The Greek word " logos " has a wide connotation to
convey a broad range of concepts such as, as Heidegger
observes, speech, reason, ground, concept, definition,
judgment, assertion, etc. It is in terms of the problematic
of logos that the Greeks had defined the essence of man as
the animal rationale ( zoion logon echon ) . When logos is
defined as pure thematic assertion, it remains oriented to
the demand of "objective validity." In such a rational and
universal sense, assertion has been perceived since ancient
Greece as the primary "locus" of truth. On Heidegger's
account, a "principle of ground" (principium rationis ) has
been prevalent throughout the history of Western thought,
which claims to determine what is allowed to make sense of
an existence, viz., "the Being of a being." Since its
express formulation in the seventeenth century, this
This section is mainly an outcome of conversations
with Professor Nicholas Xenos, to whom I am very grateful.
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proposition has become the supreme principle of reason
(principium reddendae rati onis suf f icientis ^ . Nothing exists
unless the ground of its existence can be sufficiently
presented. An assertion or judgment attains the status of
truth only if its ground ( ratio ) can be correctly rendered
in a correspondence of the subject with the predicate, a
positive link of what is asserted to that about which it is
asserted, or an "agreement" of the judgment with its object.
Further, the ground must be expressly rendered by and
sufficiently presented to man as the representing ego.
Appealing to such completeness of the calculable
certification and foundation, the underlying yet powerful
principle of rational ground has unfolded a previously
unforeseen domination of all representational thought and
become the innermost character of the modern age.
In Heidegger's view, however, the definition of the
animal rationale has proceeded from the false assumption of
man as a pure subject present-at-hand and thereby covered up
the phenomenal basis of Dasein as the animal interpretatus .
It is precisely the metaphysical relationship between
language and truth that he seeks to reverse. The Greek word
for "truth" or "reality" of the pre-existing entity is
" aletheia . " Treating logos and "truth," Heidegger calls
attention to the primordial meaning of aletheia as
unconcealment or uncovering, namely, "taking entities out of
their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their
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unhiddenness (their uncoveredness) " (BT. p. 262) .^^ Truth
understood as aletheia, Heidegger argues, bears primordially
not even so much on its being "uncovered" by assertion as on
its "Being-uncovering." What makes truth understood as such
possible is not rational and thematic representation. The
agency of the authentic mode of knowing cannot be a
representing subject moving in an abstract sphere present-
at-hand; it can only be Dasein, the animal interoretatus
living in the existentialia ready-to-hand.
Uncovering is a way of Being for Being-in-the-
world. Circumspective concern, or even that concern in
which we tarry and look at something, uncovers entities
within-the-world. These entities become that which has
been uncovered. They are "true" in a second sense. What
is primarily "true" — that is, uncovering — is
Dasein. (BT. p. 263.)
Clearly, Heidegger's rendering of truth not exactly as the
pre-existing entity being "uncovered" involves an
ontological rejection of the notion of correspondence,
agreement, and correctness. Hence his definition of truth:
To say that an assertion "is true" signifies that
it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an
assertion asserts, points out, "lets" the entity "be
seen" in its uncoveredness. The Being-true (truth) of
The term "truth" itself implies representation and
correctness, and therefore veils the original connotations
of aletheia as the pre-philosophical Greeks understand it.
BT . p. 262. In his later writings Heidegger discards the
term "truth" altogether. In its place he adopts words such
as "clearing," "lighting," or "opening" to render the Greek
aletheia as unconcealment which grants the primordial
possibility of truth. See, for instance, "The End of
Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," Basic Writings, pp.
373-392 .
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the assertion must be understood as Being-uncovering,inus truth has by no means the structure of an
agreement between knowing and the object in the senselikening of one entity (the subject) to another(the Object). (BT. p. 261.)
Defined as such, Heidegger goes on to maintain, truth is not
rooted in thematic language as such. Rather, truth
is in turn ontologically possible only on the basis of
Being-in-the-world. This latter phenomenon, which we
have known as a basic state of Dasein, is the
foundation for the primordial phenomenon of truth. (BT.
p. 261.) —
And,
Being-true as Being-uncovering, is a way of Being
for Dasein. What makes this very uncovering possible
must necessarily be called "true" in a still more
primordial sense. The most primordial phenomenon of
truth is first shown by the existential-ontological
foundations of uncovering. (BT. p. 263.)
Laid bare here is the authentic source and primordial
condition of truth. Truth is possible only insofar as, and
so long as, Dasein "is" in its constitutive world made up of
understanding and discourse. There can be no truth either
before there is any Dasein or after Dasein is no more.
Before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, though
the entities uncovered by those laws had already been there.
Through Newton the entities became accessible and the laws
became true. Put otherwise, "Being" should be perceived not
as some self-sustaining entity "out there" but rather as the
intelligible accessibility of things in a certain relation
to the interpreting man. Being and truth and man exist
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together in the disclosive bond of logos , yet the crucial
link of the problematic rests not with logos but with
Dasein. The uncoveredness of entities belongs at botttom to
the Being of Dasein within-the-world. Like meaning or
intelligibility, truth has its source in Dasein' s world,
viz., the "hermeneutical Situation." It precedes any
discernible rational explication and thematic articulation.
Proceeding from the treatment of truth as Dasein 's
Being-uncovering, Heidegger moves on to explain his thesis
that logos as assertion primordially "lets something be
seen" and "make[s] manifest what one is ^talking about' in
one's discourse" (BT. pp. 55-56). The primordial experience
ready-to-hand "must be made accessible by a positive
characterization," and assertion or logos "is accepted as a
way of access to them" (BT. pp. 69, 70) . Thematic assertion
"is derived from interpretation, and is an extreme case of
it" (BT* P- 203) . Heidegger exposes this derivative
character of logos through his notion of "language as such"
which is "a pointing-out which gives something a definite
character and which communicates" (BT. p. 199) . The truth of
assertion reaches back to the hermeneutic existentiale of
understanding. Dasein uncovers; assertion asserts and
2 2
communicates the uncovered thematically
.
Robert Dostal finds this distinction between the
originary experience of truth as unconcealment and the
derived level of truth as thematic expression not only
crucial but also fatal to Heidegger's ontological project of
Being and Time . In his view, Heidegger was never able to
work out an explanation, with the conceptual rigor and
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As a derivative mode of interpretation, "language" in
the universal sense of the term always maintains itself on
the a priori basis of particularistic linguistic schemes,
and therefore necessarily takes the fore-structure of the
"hermeneutical Situation" as its existential foundation.
Upon the moment of thematic assertion, however, a change-
over has taken place:
The relation itself now acguires the character of
presence-at-hand by getting switched over to a
relationship between things which are present-at-hand
.
The uncoveredness of something becomes the present-at-
hand conformity of one thing which is present-at-hand
— the assertion expressed — to something else which
is present-at-hand — the entity under discussion. . .
.
then the relation shows itself as an agreement of two
things which are present-at-hand, an agreement which is
present-at-hand itself. (BT. p. 267.)
What Heidegger means to suggest here is that, first, the
category of the present-at-hand is an event which derives
later in sequence from the more primordial experience ready-
to-hand. Second, it is "language as such" that gives
occasion to the genesis of the mode of presence-at-hand.
Linguistic and thematic assertion, that is to say, sets
going the move from the particularistic experience of
appropriate equipment and concernful dealings to the realm
clarity that he himself demanded, of the way in which the
two modes of truth interact. It was the awareness of this
failure to find scientific thematization for his project of
Rpina and Time . Dostal suggests, that compelled Heidegger to
execute the "turn" in his thought, and to abandon not
3ust
the incomplete project itself but also, eventually, rational
philosophy in its entirety. See Robert J. Dostal, "Beyond
Being: Heidegger's Plato," Journal of the History_of
Philosophy , January 1985, pp. 92-95.
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of universal accessibility. "Language as such" stands for
the moment when the "what" sphere is precipitated out of the
more basic "who" dominion. When in concernful circumspection
an assertion (for instance, "The hammer is heavy") is made,
the constitutive fore-having and as-structure involved in
understanding and interpretation have been modified
ontologically
. Again as Heidegger describes it.
The entity which is held in our fore-having — for
instance, the hammer — is proximal ly ready-to-hand as
equipment. If this entity becomes the "object" of an
assertion, then as soon as we begin this assertion,
there is already a change-over in the fore-having.
Something ready-to-hand with which we have to do or
perform something, turns into something "about which"
the assertion that points it out is made. Our fore-
sight is aimed at something present-at-hand in what is
ready-to-hand. . . . Within this discovering of presence-
at-hand, which is at the same time a covering-up of
readiness-to-hand, something present-at-hand which we
encounter is given a definite character in its Being-
present-at-hand-in-such-and-such-a-manner . Only now are
we given any access to properties or the like. (BT. p.
200. )
So what assumes a definite character in the assertion
(asserting something "as" something) is no longer the
experience ready-to-hand within its own hermeneutic
environmental ity but some property present-at-hand on a
uniform plane. This change-over delivers accessibility,
wherein the "as" no longer reaches into but rather has been
cut off from its primal totality of involvements. The pre-
predictative, hermeneutic "as" of circumspective
interpretation, which has been existentially and
ontologically first and closest to us, is veiled; it becomes
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the predictative "as" of the thematic assertion, which ranks
derivative in the order of things. The primordial experience
of aletheia, reflects Heidegger, "now becomes homoiosis and
mimesis
, ...
it becomes a correctness of vision, of
apprehension as representation" ( An Introduction to
Metaphysics, p. 185) . Therefore, it is essence (res
coqitans) that covers up existence (res__extensa)
, not
existence that veils essence. On this account.
Truth as disclosedness and as a Being-towards
uncovered entities — a Being which itself uncovers —
has become truth as agreement between things which are
present-at-hand within-the-world
. And thus we have
pointed out the ontologically derivative character of
the traditional conception of truth. (BT. pp. 267-268.)
With the advent of truth as correctness, on the other
hand, the implicit hermeneutic experience ready-to-hand
acquires accessibility by a positive characterization, and
the significations become definitely thematized in explicit
linguistic terms. This is the function of "language as such"
as Heidegger perceives it.
This levelling of the primordial "as" of
circumspective interpretation to the "as" with which
presence-at-hand is given a definite character is the
specialty of assertion. Only so does it obtain the
possibility of exhibiting something in such a way that
we just look at it. (BT. p. 201.)
Upon this switch of the basic modes of existence from that
of primordial hermeneutic experience to that of thematic
exhibition emerges universal accessibility. This is the
"^emergence' of the theoretical attitude." Nevertheless,
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argues Heidegger, theoretical undertaking necessarily
involves circumspection, the use of equipment ready-to-hand,
and other practical dealings of its own (BT. p. 409)
.
Holding back from the direct use of equipment is far from
sheer theory; and scientific pursuits, far from practical
indifference. The undergoing modifications upon the moment
of assertion attest to the a priori fact: universal
linguisticality arises not from any theoretical statement
but from the experience of circumspective concern. Since
therefore understanding and interpretation necessarily and
always go before thematic logos . it is the category of
presence-at-hand that has its ontological source in that of
readiness-to-hand, not the other way round. An independent
nature-in-itself has no priority. Its discovery is owed
exclusively to an authentic possibility of Dasein's Being.
Heidegger sees Dasein's self-adjudicating social behavior as
generating both the category of equipment ready-to-hand and
the sphere of things "objectively" present-at-hand. By
virtue of the social genesis of the criterial authority, the
Heideggerian "fundamental ontology" is but the regional
ontology of Dasein.
Only because Being ... is understandable in Dasein
... can Dasein also understand and conceptualize such
characteristics of Being as independence, the "in-
itself", and Reality in general. Only because of this
are "independent" entities, as encountered within-the-
world, accessible to circumspection. (BT. p. 251.)
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It is in proceeding from such an ontological position
that Heidegger seeks to unveil the derivativeness and
secondariness of the princioium r^^^ionSc, eradicate the myth
°^ animal rationale, and remove the basis of logos and
language from the questionable ontology of presence-at-hand
to the authentic pre-ontology of Dasein as the animal
interpretatus
. Aristotle appeals to theodicy, and believes
in the accessibility of nature by linguistic means. Hobbes
rejects the sufficiency of language to get to a higher
metaphysical reach, and thereby asserts the pure
linguisticality of truth. Heidegger takes Aristotle's ethos
and historia seriously. He exposes the "hermeneutical
Situation," and thereby affirms the intelligibility of
language not as "language as such" (thematic assertion) but
as particular languages. This "still more primordial"
dominion of Dasein's Being, Heidegger insists, is "in the
mode of authenticity" (BT. p. 264) . Whereas Hobbes has no
interest whatsoever in any type of metaphysical
authenticity, Heidegger merely moves the search for it from
the universal cosmos to the particularistic and even
mysterious spheres. As we have seen, Heidegger's project is
based on the conclusion he draws from his treatment of logos
and truth:
Assertion is not the primary "locus" of truth. On
the contrary, ... assertion is grounded in Dasein's
uncovering, or rather in its disclosedness . The most
primordial "truth" is the "locus" of assertion; it is
the ontological condition for the possibility that
assertions can be either true or false — that they may
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uncover or cover things up. Truth, understood in themost primordial sense, belongs to the basic
constitution of Dasein. The term signifies an
existential P. (bt. p. 269.)
F. History
Now we turn to Heidegger's concept of history. Man is
not the animal rationale; man is the animal interoretatus
,
the historical custodian of Being. The movement of being is
not the motion in the spheres present-at-hand ; it is
definable only on the locus of history. The term "history"
has various significations. What is philosophically primary
for Heidegger though is neither the historiological
knowledge nor what actually happened in the past
("historical actuality")
. The primacy goes instead to "the
Interpretation of authentically historical entities as
regards their historical ity" (BT. p. 31) . The authentic
"historicality" in turn needs to be understood ontologically
in terms of Dasein's "connectedness of life." This esoteric
movement of existence "in which Dasein is stretched along
and stretches itself along, we call its ^historizing' .
"
Since historicity has these existential-temporal sources, it
is "prior to what is called ^history'" (BT. PP- 41, 427).
Put otherwise, as Heidegger has it elsewhere,
"historicality" refers to an essential yet historical
relation between history and "the historical being-there of
a wise people," and the derivative knowledge of historiology
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cannot supply but always presupposes such a relation (An
Introduction to Metaphyy^^i
, pp. 43-44).
"History," Heidegger suggests, pre-eminently signifies
"something past." The past is either irretrievably "no
longer present-at-hand" or, in spite of that, "still having
effects" on the present in the same way in which a household
gear preserved in the museum or the remains of a Greek
temple remain present-at-hand today. Secondly, history means
"derivation" of the past as "a ^context' of events and
^effects', which draws on through ^the past', the ^Present',
and the ^future'." On this view, he explains, history is the
context of a becoming without special priority to the past.
The third signification of history that Heidegger gives
involves the theme of "history versus nature. "^^ In contrast
to "Nature," "history" stands for "the totality of those
entities which change ^ in time', and indeed the
transformations and vicissitudes of men, of human groupings
and their ^cultures'." "History" is comparable to the
Aristotelian milieu of historia , the way in which "man's
existence is essentially determined by ^spirit' and
* culture'." Even Nature itself belongs to history understood
as such. This is the case not in the sense of "natural
history" but rather in the sense, he further explains, that
"secondarily" nature serves as "the very soil of history."
2"^. Since the theme touches on the central concern of
the present work, we have cited the two passages of Being
and Time as the epigraph to this chapter.
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The "environing Nature" is historical "as a countryside, as
an area that has been colonized or exploited, as a
battlefield, or as the site of a cult" (BT. pp. 433, 440).
As Heidegger's doctrine of assertion implies, nature, as the
"categorial aggregate" of entities, derives itself from
history, and is therefore derivative in character vis-a-vis
the existential-ontological primordiality of Dasein's world.
"History" possesses primacy to "nature." Fourth, we hold as
"historical" whatever has been handed down to us, either
through knowledge or taken over self-evidently (BT. p. 431)
.
Taken together, Heidegger goes on to point out, the
four significations of history all relate to Dasein as the
primary "subject" of history. But, in what way does history
understood as such belong to Dasein? Does Dasein as the
neutral atom "become" historical at a certain point by
getting intertwined with events and circumstances? Or, as
Heidegger argues, "is the Being of Dasein constituted first
of all by historizing, so that anything like circumstances,
events, or vicissitudes is ontologically possible only
because Dasein is historical in its Being?" (BT. p. 431) If
moreover Dasein is primarily historical, and history is
constitutive of one's identity, "to what extent and on the
basis of what ontological conditions, does historicality
belong, as an essential constitutive state, to the
subjectivity of the ^historical' subject?" (BT- P- 434)
Heidegger answers these questions in terms of a theme
of temporal historicity. He maintains an underlying
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distinction between the rational understanding of "Being" as
of an unchanging "nature" and a historicist conception of
the present collectivity in connection to what it had been
in the past and what it may become in the future. Proceeding
herefrom, Heidegger pinpoints "temporality" as the meaning
of Dasein's Being and as the condition which makes
historicity possible, and he aims accordingly at an
"Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any
understanding whatsoever of Being" (BT. pp. 38, 41, 19). On
Heidegger's account, human beings may exist either
authentically or accidentally. To ward off the "cruelty of
accidents," Dasein chooses and finds its authentic
possibilities of existence in a fashion which Heidegger
characterizes as "anticipatory resoluteness." To be plain,
Dasein exists authentically by anticipating its death as its
"ownmost potentiality-for-Being" (BT. pp. 436, 372, 373).
Heidegger first distinguishes anxiety, the authentic
state of mind according to him, from fear, an inauthentic
one. He cites Aristotle's definition of fear with approval
as "a kind of depression or bewilderment."^* Then he relates
the bewilderment to the way in which one "forgets" about the
authentic end of mortality and "clings to those
possibilities of self-preservation and evasion" (BT. p.
392) . Therefore self-preservation asserts itself only after
2*. See Aristotle's Rhetoric , "Fear may be defined as a
pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some
destructive or painful evil in the future." Rhetoric and
Poetics, 1382a21-22.
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one contracts the amnesia of fear. Fear, on Heidegger's
account, is always occasioned by some entity detrimental or
threatening within-the-world, which comes necessarily from a
definite region of the totality of involvements. That entity
may close in on one, yet it may also stay away and pass by.
In other words, it has no necessity.
Anxiety in the face of death must not be confused
with fear in the face of one's demise. This anxiety is
not an accidental or random mood of "weakness" in some
individual; but, as a basic state-of-mind of Dasein, it
amounts to the disclosedness of the fact that Dasein
exists as thrown Being towards its end. (BT. p. 295.)
The "fear in the face of one's demise" reminds us of
Hobbes's rational fear of violent and untimely
("accidental") death, the sole cornerstone of the Hobbesian
system with self-preservation as the ultimate evaluative
principle. The way Hobbes interprets the event of death and
the human condition, Heidegger would charge, could transform
the authentic and courageous anxiety into the inauthentic
and cowardly fear. The public scheme maintains in us an
indifferent tranquillity to that uttermost necessity of
death, and thereby "alienates Dasein from its ownmost non-
relational potentiality-for-Being" (BT- P- 298). Whereas, on
the other hand, Heidegger dismisses Hobbes's fear of death
as "an accidental or random mood of ^weakness'," Hobbes
would in all probability categorize Heidegger's authentic
state of mind, anxiety, as "superstitious fear of Spirits."
Arising entirely from men's ignorance and stupidity, this
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type of irrational mood concerning the fateful "thrownness"
has for ages been evoking among the gullible multitude a
"contempt of life." "Fear not," it says, "those that kill
the body, but cannot kill the soule." Motivated by their
private turn, Hobbes charges, the "Potent men," "Learned
men," and "crafty ambitious persons" abuse and manipulate
this irrational fearlessness of death, and "induce simple
men into an obstinacy against the Laws and Commands of their
Civill Soveraigns even to death." In doing so, they turn it
into the most pernicious and dangerous threat to Hobbes 's
project. For the Leviathan is utterly impossible when there
haunts an invisible power of "giving greater rewards than
Life; and of inflicting greater punishments, than Death."
From such a Hobbesian point of view, Heidegger's "anxiety"
accords with the category of irrational fear of things
incorporeal, which is capable of complicating our crucial
disposition of rational fear of death. Possessed thereof, we
stray adventurously from Hobbes 's egoistic and rational
model, and become fearless creatures. This is precisely the
way in which Hobbes 's "Warre of every man against every man"
2 5perpetuates itself.
25. As Hannah Arendt reads it, Heidegger's theme of
death has two facets: first, "a conceptual clarification of
death as the shelter for the essence of human existence,
whose temporal, transitory presence is understood as the
lingering between two absences and a sojourn in the realm of
errancy;" and second, the "denunciation of the instinct of
self-preservation (common to all living things) as a willful
rebellion against the ^order' of Creation as such." The Life
of the Mind , Vol. Two, pp. 193-194. For Hobbes's bellum
omnium contra omnes, we can find a horrendous footnote m
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In contrast to Hobbes's fear of death, Heidegger's
anxiety arises from Dasein's innermost self. As he has it,
"That in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-
world as such" (BT. p. 230). The threat comes, that is to
say, not from any definite entity but rather from "the world
in its worldhood" itself, what oppresses us then is
something not only completely indefinite but also
emphatically authentic. In anxiety one feels "uncanny,"
"not-being-at-home." Upon the disclosive moment of anxiety,
the world sinks away, and the environment with which we have
concerned ourselves becomes starkly insignificant and
irrelevant. In such a process of "individualization," Dasein
is snatched back to its ownmost condition from the
absorption in the public world, the supplier of the
inauthentic self-assurance.
The "world" can offer nothing more, and neither
can the Dasein-with of Others. Anxiety thus takes away
from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as
it falls, in terms of the "world" and the way things
have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws Dasein
back upon that which it is anxious about — its
authentic potential ity-for-Being-in-the-world. . .
.
Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being towards its
ownmost potentiality-for-Being — that is, its Being-
Heidegger's following remarks: "Hundreds of thousands die en
masse. Do they die? They succumb. They are done in. Do they
die? They become mere quanta, items in an inventory in the
business of manufacturing corpses. Do they die? They are
liquidated inconspicuously in extermination camps. And even
apart from that, right now millions of impoverished people
are perishing from hunger in China. But to die is to endure
death in its essence. To be able to die means to be capable
of this endurance. We are capable of this only if the
essence of death makes our own essence possible." Thomas
Sheehan, "Heidegger and the Nazis," The New York Review of
Books, June 16, 1988, p. 42.
222
free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold
of Itself. (BT. pp. 232-233.)
Revealed by anxiety are Dasein's potentiality- for-Being and
Being-free, namely, the impending death. Dasein is
inevitably dying; it has already been "thrown" onto this
ultimate fate, which is non-relational and can never be
outstripped. We do not necessarily persist unless we choose
to; we could in all likelihood simply desist at any time.
Upon a moment of "vision" and in a certain mood of general
"angst" or "equanimity," Dasein looks at the authentic
finitude of its existence, and brings itself into the
"simplicity of its fate" (BT. pp. 434-436) . In Heidegger's
terms, death is Dasein' s "uttermost" potential ity-for-Being,
the "possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there" (BT.
p. 294) . For Heidegger, the thrownness of Being-towards-
death can be repeated. The authentic possibilities of
existence repeat themselves as the "heritage" which comes
down to us. Dasein' s ownmost potentiality-for-Being will
return to its thrown "there" as something futural.
Therefore, "the character of having been is constitutive for
the state-of-mind of anxiety; and bringing one face to face
with repeatability is the specific ecstatical mode of this
character" (BT. PP- 394, 435).
By the term "futural" Heidegger does not mean "a ^now'
which has not yet become 'actual' and which sometime will be
for the first time." Rather, "future" refers to the
primordial phenomenon of "coming in which Dasein, in its
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ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards itself" (BT.
p. 373)
.
A Dasein which is not around anymore is not "past"
in Heidegger's ontological sense; it is rather "having-been-
there .
"
Can Dasein be past at all, if we define "past" as
"now no longer either present-at-hand or ready-to-
hand"? Manifestly, Dasein can never be past, not
because Dasein is non-transient, but because it
essentially can never be present-at-hand. Rather, if it
is, it exists. A Dasein which no longer exists,
however, is not past, in the ontologically strict
sense; it is rather "having-been-there" . (BT. p. 432.)
Authentically historical, Dasein is not like the gear in the
museum; it remains what it was and can never be present-at-
hand. The gear becomes worm-eaten with the passage of time.
But what in the museum maintains the equipment as a piece of
history does not lie in this sense of temporal transience.
Even a heirloom which remains in use in a household today is
already history. Whether the equipment is in use or out of
use, it is no longer what it was. What, then, is "past" in
the entity which today "is" no more?
Nothing else than that world within which they
belonged to a context of equipment and were encountered
as ready-to-hand and used by a concernful Dasein who
was-in-the-world. That world is no longer. But what was
formerly within-the-world with respect to that world is
still present-at-hand. ... A world is only in the
manner of existing Dasein, which factically is as
Being-in-the-world. (BT. p. 432.)
Thus the piece of equipment which remains present-at-hand
is
no longer ready-to-hand. Gone is the "ownmost"
as-structure
or fore-structure, viz., the "hermeneutical
Situation" of
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the total interpretative presuppositions. The historical
character of the antiquities that are still preserved is
grounded in the past of that Dasein in whose "world,"
"context," or "manner" they as equipment had appropriately
belonged. The gear or the heirloom is a piece of history,
therefore, not simply by having been moved off into a
temporal past but rather by the fact that it had derived
from a contextual hermeneutic scheme. That hermeneutic
situation has a historical Being only because it constitutes
the ontological locus of Dasein, the only entity which
renders the world intelligible. In other words, "what is
primarily historical is Dasein" (BT. p. 433) . Dasein is
unique in that it never recedes into the "past." As "having-
been-there," it remains authentically ready-to-hand. This
uniqueness of "having-been-there , " Heidegger insists, is
possible only by virtue of death.
Only in so far as Dasein is as an "I-am-as-having-
been" , can Dasein come towards itself futurally in such
a way that it comes back. As authentically futural,
Dasein is authentically as "having been". Anticipation
of one's uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming
back understandingly to one's ownmost "been". Only so
far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as
having been. The character of "having been" arises, in
a certain way, from the future. (BT. pp. 372-373.)
Hence Heidegger's rendering of "the basic constitution of
historicality :
"
Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially
futural so that it is free for its death and can let
itself be thrown back upon its factical "there" by
shattering itself against death — that is to say, only
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Droc^^i n/h ' f^tural, is equiprimordially in thep ess of having-been, can, by handing down to itselfthe possibility It has inherited, take over its ownthrownness and be in the moment of vision for "itstime" Only authentic temporality which is at the sametime finite, makes possible something like fate ~ thatis to say, authentic historicality
. (BT. p. 437.)
Or, in short, "Authentic Being-towards-death — that is to
say, the finitude of temporality — is the hidden basis of
Dasein's historicality" (BT. p. 438). Death, Heidegger seems
to be saying, creates "having-been-there ; " "having-been" in
turn sees to it that human beings maintain their authentic
mode of existence ready-to-hand. In other words, if we stay
alive infinitely, we would, as the gear or the heirloom
does, stay out our ownmost linguistic authenticity, lose our
"connectedness of life," and slide into the accidental state
of presence-at-hand. Death makes it possible for Dasein
ecstatically to repeat itself ("come back," "hand down,"
"take over") and to be "stretched along and stretches itself
along." What gets "understandingly inherited" in this
movement of existence is the animal interpretatus ^s
primordial particularity and authentic historicity. In An
Introduction to Metaphysics
,
Heidegger provides his
definition of history in terms of a basic world-preserving
and world-building attitude which "stands and maintains
itself in happening, inquiring out of happening for the sake
of happening"
:
History is not synonymous with the past; for the
past is precisely what is no longer happening. And much
less is history the merely contemporary, which never
happens but merely "passes," comes and goes by. History
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as happening is an acting and being acted upon which
pass through the present, which are determined from out
of the future, and which take over the past. It is
precisely the present that vanishes in happening. (An
Introduction to Metaphysics , pp. 44-45.)
History will not "vanish," not sink into oblivion; it keeps
"happening" in an ecstatic unity of the past, the present,
and the future. Historicity means not the past as such but,
at bottom, utter impossibility to make a break with the past
and start anew. What is authentic and divine and great stays
upon the earth in an intractable manner inscrutably beyond
rational explication. If and when properly attended to, the
esoteric "Being" mystically will be "dispensed" to human
beings and, at some historical moments of truth, make its
presence, power, and greatness felt. All this having been
said, nevertheless, the authentic mode of human existence
based on the "anticipatory resoluteness" makes sense only
within a larger collective context, namely, "the historical
being-there of a wise people." Only in terms of the
"generation" of a poetically constituted community (the
Volk) , as the following remark implies (the "hero"), can
Heidegger's obscure notion of "repeatability" be possibly
conceivable:
The authentic repetition of a possibility of
existence that has been — the possibility that Dasein
may choose its hero — is grounded existentially in
anticipatory resoluteness. (BT. p. 437.)
Historicity then involves the authentic way in which a human
collectivity, a people, realizes its historical potential
by
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fashioning its future out of the essential power concealed
within its past. Understood as such, history opens up for an
ultimate community its authentic, Being-related existence to
unasked future possibilities, and at the same time binds it
back to its past primordiality
. In doing so history gives
life weight in its present.
"Individualization" notwithstanding, that is to say,
human beings on Heidegger's account never actually
experience themselves, as Hobbes assumes they do, as
abstract, isolated, or neutral "subjects" influenced by
sensory impressions of external objects. Nor is community a
mere external conglomeration of such subjects. Instead, the
individuals become aware of their own existence not only in
relation to other things but more importantly in dealing
with other beings like themselves. We have been "submitted
to a ^world'." We understand ourselves and seize upon our
chosen possibilities in terms of "the way of interpreting
Dasein which has come down to us" (BT. p. 435) . Dasein is by
definition "Dasein-with" (Mitdasein) ; "the world of Dasein
is a with-world" (BT. p. 155). The individual leads a
meaningful existence only in the constitutive context of an
ownmost scheme of communal responsive disposition and a
particular "Mitdasein" of criterial dominion and social co-
appropriateness. The defining character of one's life
therefore is not just a product of its own finite
temporality but also pre-determined by the finitude of its
historicity, viz., his birth, at a concrete place and a
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certain time, into a received group, an organic "Volk" of
"soil and blood." From generation to generation, this
cohesive community has been ultimate enough to sustain an
intelligible extent of primordial authenticity and to harbor
historical greatness. In Heidegger's words, "we obey what
the beginning of our spiritual-historical existence decreed
in the distant past" ( The Heidegger Controversy
, p. 36) . We
are in no position to choose or determine our identities; we
are thrown into our finite, historically situated existence
by powers beyond our individual control:
Thrownness ... is constitutive for Casein's
disclosedness
.
In thrownness is revealed that in each
case Dasein, as my Dasein and this Dasein, is already
in a definite world and alongside a definite range of
definite entities within-the-world. (BT. p. 264.)
The existence an individual chooses to perpetuate in the
face of the ever-present necessity of his own mortality,
therefore, must be defined in terms of a cohesive,
particularistic "world" which is itself essentially a
linguistico-social phenomenon. One does not simply embrace
his "fate" as an individual; he has to recognize his
unavoidable involvement in the pre-given "destiny" of his
historical "community" or anthropological "people."
Heidegger summarizes his view of historical collectivity in
an important passage, the only place in Being and Time where
we find him mentioning the crucial term "a people" (des
Volkes)
:
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If fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists
essentially in Being-with-Others
, its historizing is a
co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny[Geschick]. This is how we designate the historizing of
the commmunity ( der Gemeinschaf
t
^ , of a people (des
Volkes)
.
Destiny is not something that puts itself
together out of individual fates, any more than Being-
with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring
together of several Subjects. Our fates have already
been guided in advance, in our Being with one another
in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite
possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggling
does the power of destiny become free. Dasein 's fateful
destiny in and with its "generation" goes to make up
the full authentic historizing of Dasein. (BT. p.
436.
Things are preserved in the world. History is relevant. The
world makes sense only to Dasein, yet the terms of one's
existence are by no means under his own complete control.
Nor is anything the way it is "by nature." The essence of
life rests mystically beyond the individual. Identity is by
definition finite, collective, and historical. Inexorably
rooted in the animal interpretatus 's "connectedness of life"
within its real contextual setting, it must be defined in
terms of "the historical being-there of a wise people" and
its authentic, fateful destiny of "co-historizing."
G. Heidegger's Eschatology
Heidegger draws his ethical outlook from his
emphatically historicist conception of man and community.
The ontology of Casein's historicity addresses the areas
2^. See also Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit.
(Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1986), p. 384.
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"invested with value" and therefore can be seen as a
fundamental ethics. 27 m the "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger
explains that "the thinking that inquires into the truth of
Being and so defines man's essential abode from Being and
toward Being is neither ethics nor ontology" ( Basic
Writings
, pp. 235-236). 28 Nevertheless, Heidegger is not
dismissing "ethics" outright, for there remains "man's
essential abode" to define. The question is to carry through
the ethical interpretation of Dasein within the framework of
the primordial existential ia . By "man's essential abode"
Heidegger means "ethos." Heraclitus once says something so
concisely, he explains, "that from it the essence of the
ethos immediately comes to light." He elaborates on this
"essence of the ethos:"
The saying of Heraclitus (Frag. 119) goes: ethos
anthropoi daimon . . . . Ethos means abode, dwelling
place. The word names the open region in which man
27 •
*
. Heidegger's conception of "the good" relates, for
instance, to his death theme: "If everything ^good' is a
heritage, and the character of ^goodness' lies in making
authentic existence possible, then the handing down of a
heritage constitutes itself in resoluteness." BT. p. 435.
2®. Ever since Plato, the idea of the good ( idea tou
agathou) has been conceived as the criterion ("the ought"),
the self-sufficient super-entity opposed to Heidegger's
Being. Toward the close of the eighteenth century, the
Being-Good distinction assumed the form of an apartheid
between fact and value. Both dominated by the principium
reddendae rationis sufficientis of the modern era, "science
waxed and thinking waned." Basic Writings , p. 232. What
Heidegger is arguing here is that values cannot "be" on
their own. The idea tou agathou needs Being to bolster it
up: "At bottom this being meant neither more nor less than
the presence of somethng already-there . " An Introduction to
Metaphvsics . pp. 196-198.
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dwells. The open region of his abode allows whatpertains to man's essence, and what in thus arriving
resides in nearness to him, to appear. The abode of man
contains and preserves the advent of what belongs to
man in his essence. According to Heraclitus' phrase
this is daimon, the god. The fragment says: Man dwells,insofar as he is man, in the nearness of god.
To support his interpretation of the fragment, Heidegger
draws on the story about Heraclitus at a stove saying "For
here too the gods are present." The abode with a stove where
one can warm oneself is reminiscent of Aristotle's
"tribeless, lawless, hearthless" remark in the Politics . For
all its ordinariness and intimacy, "the gods are present"
there. Accordingly Heidegger renders Heraclitus' three words
as
The (familiar) abode is for man the open region
for the presencing of god (the unfamiliar one)
.
So ethos, as "man's essential abode," is the dwelling place
where man has access to his god(s) . Heidegger concludes:
If the name "ethics," in keeping with the basic
meaning of the word ethos . should now say that "ethics"
ponders the abode of man, then that thinking which
thinks the truth of Being as the primordial element of
man, as one who eksists, is in itself the original
ethics. ( Basic Writings , pp. 232-235.)
The Greeks contrasted phusis (nature) with ethos which,
observes Heidegger, denotes "not mere norms but mores, based
on freely accepted obligations and traditions; it is that
which concerns free behavior and attitudes, the shaping of
man's historical being" (An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.
16) . On such a view, historicity, language, truth, poetry.
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community, the Volk, and ethics are, to an extent,
essentially synonymous. These terms all relate to Hegel's
"allotted spiritual spheres" and "real world of culture."
They stand for Aristotle's historia, and Heidegger's
authentic existential i a of the "hermeneutical Situation." In
the Spiegel interview, Heidegger reflects upon the core of
his ethical view: "According to our human experience and
history, everything essential and of great magnitude has
arisen only out of the fact that man had a home and was
rooted in a tradition" ("The Spiegel Interview," p. 57).
Aristotle's historia harbors "sublimity" and
"splendor;" Heidegger's original ethics claims "great
magnitude." The tradition of a people, Heidegger likewise is
fully aware, necessarily involves a built-in foreclosure on
rational examination and free choice. When "tradition thus
becomes master," it provides accessibility yet
equiprimordially blocks it by rendering what has come down
to men self-evident. The animal interpretatus is essentially
a pre-rational animal; interpretation and rational
examination do not always accommodate each other easily. The
"fundamental ontology" shows, concedes Heidegger,
not only that Dasein is inclined to fall back upon its
world (the world in which it is) and to interpret
itself in terms of that world by its reflected light,
but also that Dasein simultaneously falls prey to the
tradition of which it has more or less explicitly taken
hold. This tradition keeps it from providing its own
guidance, whether in inquiring or in choosing. (BT. pp.
42-43.
)
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The heavy gravitation toward tradition involves certain
"principia" which undergird this mode of ethical and
political collectivity. These principia
. as Heidegger has it
elsewhere, "are such as stands in the first place, in the
most advanced rank. The principia refer to rank and order.
...We follow them without meditation. "^^ The finite domain
of the authentic collectivity, wherein we are thrown, is by
no means a realm of "truth" in the rational sense of the
term. Whereas the "as~structure" implies incommensurability,
the "fore-structure" involves unmediated foreclosure.
Entrenched prejudice underlies the authentic community. More
often than not, this is a milieu wherein reason passes into
silence. Heidegger's view of the "original ethics" does not
prescribe specific ethical values. It instead lays bare the
a priori state and authentic soil wherein identity,
morality, and community take shape in the first place. This
Heideggerian "open region" accords with ethos, the realm
wherein Aristotle locates the primary source of ethicality,
and with historia, the domain whereupon Aristotle inscribes
linguistic and ethical collectivity. In other words,
Heidegger takes ethics, as Aristotle does, as reflection
upon an immediate, finite, and temporal sphere, a realm of
compelling evaluation to attain access to the
29. "Die principia sind solches, was an erster stelle
steht in der vordersten Reihe. Die principia sind auf eine
Reihung und Ordnung bezogen. ... Wir befolgen sie ohne
Besinnung." Martin Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund ,
(Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), pp. 40, 42.
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intelligibility of a general soul. Parallel to the universal
cosmos of reason and nature, as we have seen, this mode of
ethical schematization relies on private influence and
intimate possession, on our "connectedness of life," on a
historical "people," to effect not only rational knowledge
but also men's identity and moral action. Compared with
Aristotle, Heidegger's ethical "thinking" appeals to the
even more mysterious, gnostic "elements" of men's existence,
and is a deed that surpasses not only theoria but virtually
all praxes.
Viewed in contrast, Hobbesian politics appears even
thinner and more inadeguate. Political institution belongs
ontologically to the mere derivative "subspecies" of the
primordial hermeneutic understanding. Asserts Heidegger:
"All law remains merely something fabricated by human
reason. More essential than instituting rules is that man
find the way to his abode in the truth of Being" ( Basic
Writings, pp. 238-239) . Dealing with moral and political
matters our "natural" faculty of reason more often than not
is a myth. In the realms of identity and ultimate
conviction, it hardly will tell us much. The strains of the
human condition are far more profound and stubborn, the
unfairness of life far more fundamental, and the reality of
existence far more complex, mysterious, and contradictory.
We fight more bitterly for what we see as moral principles
than we do for mere rational self-interest. Justice and
distribution can never be central to ethics. To guide us not
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just to know but rather to do what is "authentically" good
in an intelligible existence, we need private, intuitive,
anthropological, historical, or mysterious sources of moral
motivation and moral empathy. These sources always are more
possessive and compelling than any set of universal rules or
abstract formulae.
Heidegger's obsession with truth as "Being-uncovering"
and ethics as reflection upon "man's essential abode"
accounts for his concern with "the homelessness of
contemporary man from the essence of Being's history" ( Basic
Writings, p. 217) . Entrenched in a savagely anti-
Enlightenment position, he reads over two hundred years of
Western history as a darkening of the world in which spirit
has been emasculated and the earth destroyed. The essential
features of this darkening include: a planet-wide movement
of dislodging, uprooting, and leveling; an etcetera of
indifference; a methodical onslaught to eliminate
hierarchical distance and rank and order; the
standardization of man; the pre-eminence of the mediocre;
the corruption of language; the flight of the gods; an
amnesia of men's essential dwelling in the proximity of
divinity and Being. As the result of these catastrophic
decay and declines, what modern civilization presents today
is but a wasteland of technology, the worst nightmare of
Heidegger. Whereas the traditional peasant "places seed in
the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its
increase," "agriculture is now the mechanized food
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industry." Whereas the old windmill "does not unlock energy
from the air currents in order to store it," the
hydroelectric plant "sets the Rhine to supplying its
hydraulic pressure." Whereas, in other words, under the pre-
modern schemes human beings do not challenge but rather stay
more attuned to nature, modern technology unlocks, extracts,
transforms, stores, distributes, switches about, and, in one
word, orders "standing-reserve" ( Basic Writings , pp. 296-
298) . Moreover, Heidegger further asserts in the 1954 essay
"The Question Concerning Technology," human beings are
posed, challenged, and claimed by modern technology and
thereby become a source of standing-reserve themselves.
Accordingly, the essence of peculiarly modern technology
lies in what Heidegger calls "enframing" (Ge-stell ) ( Basic
Writings
, p. 3 02) . With the supreme principium rationis , the
innermost character of the modern age, as its hidden
mentality, enframing gives occasion to "an ordaining of
destining," which Heidegger perceives as "not just any
danger, but the danger." Man "comes to the very brink of a
precipitous fall." Put otherwise, "The rule of enframing
threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied
to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to
experience the call of a more primal truth" (Basic Writings,
pp. 307-309). That is to say, technology prizes us out of
our authentic mode of existence ready-to-hand, precipitates
us onto the unsheltered bleakness of presence-at-hand, and
increasingly dislodges and uproots us from our ownmost
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primordial ity and historical authenticity. At stake,
Heidegger is warning, is whether the principium rationis
will draw our lifeblood as the animal interoretatus
,
and
thwart our capacity for the truth and greatness of our being
upon the earth.
Planetary in scope though it is, the extremely
dangerous enframing is according to Heidegger not
necessarily an inextricable fate. There exists a possibility
that we be saved in a "free relationship" to the technical
world ( Basic Writings , p. 287). Technology does thrust us
into the surrender of our free essence. What is equally true
is that enframing can be turned, "most emphatically," into a
granting which generates some mystical "saving power":
It is precisly in enframing . . . that the innermost
indestructible belongingness of man within granting may
come to light, provided that we, for our part, begin to
pay heed to the essence of technology. Thus the coming
to presence of technology harbors in itself what we
least suspect, the possible upsurgence of the saving
power. Everything, then, depends upon this: that we
ponder this arising and that we, recollecting, watch
over it. How can this happen? Above all through our
catching sight of what comes to presence in technology,
instead of merely gaping at the technological. ( Basic
Writincfs . pp. 313-314.)
This being the case, Heidegger reminds us, there remains "a
more primally granted revealing that could bring the saving
power into its first shining-forth. " At the outset of the
destining of the West in Greece, art, as one of Aristotle's
intellectual modes, also bore the name techne , which brought
forth aletheia into its splendid appearance and illuminated
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the dialogue between divine and human destinings. For that
brief but magnificent age, the more primal revealing
(poiesis) as the source of truth rested with art and poetry.
In conclusion then, Heidegger presents us with a tentative
yet stark "either/or" choice:
Could it be that the fine arts are called to
poetic revealing? Could it be that revealing lays claim
to the arts most primally, so that they for their part
may expressly foster the growth of the saving power,
may awaken and found anew our vision of that which
grants and our trust in it? Whether art may be granted
this highest possibility of its essence in the midst of
the extreme danger, no one can tell. Yet we can be
astounded. Before what? Before this other possibility:
that the frenziedness of technology may entrench itself
everywhere to such an extent that someday, throughout
everything technological, the essence of technology may
come to presence in the coming-to-pass of truth. ( Basic
Writings
. pp. 315-317.)
Either poiesis or Ge-stell . Either the sublime possibility
promised in the poetic bringing-forth of art, or the
astounding implications involved in enframing as the essence
of modern technology. Technology seduces us and threatens
consuming us as raw material, yet, mystically, it also
implies the enigmatic grand saving power. This latter
eschatological possibility seems in the technological age
the only possibility plausible.
Excluded though from Heidegger's art-technology choice
are the other Aristotelian modes of aletheia, prominently
episteme and phronesis . Traditional philosophizing itself
presupposes the princioium rationi s, the underlying
mentality of enframing. Therefore rational philosophy
itself
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supplies no further possibility of responding to the
planetary thrust of modern technology. Furthermore, human
action in the modern era of necessity involves "the will to
master" and "merely gaping at the technological." It is as
well conceived on the basis of metaphysical causality and
instrumental utility ( Basic Writings , p. 193) . Therefore
phronesis and praxis can never confront the supreme peril of
enframing either: "Human activity can never directly counter
this danger. Human achievement alone can never banish it"
(Basic Writings, p. 315). To displace phronesis and praxis,
Heidegger appeals to the "original ethics" in accordance
with which we must hold ourselves to, watch over, and listen
to the "Being" expressed by our ethos . We must, that is to
say, do nothing but exercise the pure attentiveness to
reflect upon our "innermost indestructible belongingness"
which grants direct, immediate access to the otherwise
incomprehensible gods. Heidegger sees "thinking," his
paramount mode of action, as a deed, but it is neither
theoretical nor practical. Those who think ponder the
original ethos and thereby function as the guardians of our
dwelling abode, relate Being to us and thereby make sense of
our existence. Such a radical slant toward purely meditative
pondering leads on Heidegger's part to the grim distrust of
and contemptuous disdain for politics. Phronesis and praxis,
which are central to the life of Aristotle's polls, are
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dismissed as "the peculiar dictatorship of the public realm"
( Basic Writings
r p. 197).^°
In Heidegger's view, "thinking" that defines man's
essential abode "is neither ethics nor ontology." it belongs
to the "ownmost" primordial ity which resides beyond ethics
and philosophy. With the obsession of the original ethos in
response to the "true" danger in the utmost sense,
philosophical reflection is rendered, at best, futile; and
the normal ethical sensibilities, absolved. The question
. Hannah Arendt interprets the "turn" in Heidegger's
thought during the 1930s in terms of the opposition between
the two human faculties of "thinking" and "willing." Whereas
solitary "thinking" as the only relevant action sustains a
calm mood of "letting be," "willing" as the essence of
technology stands for the assertiveness and purposiveness of
man's mind-set to command, master, and subject the entire
world to its domination. Predestined to annihilate all that
was in the past, the modern age's subjectivization will only
culminate in its natural end of total destruction. "It is
against that destructiveness , " as Arendt sees it, "that
Heidegger's original reversal pits itself." And Heidegger
broke with the entire modern philosophy "precisely because
he had discovered to what an extent the age itself, and not
just its theoretical products, was based on the domination
of the Will." This Will to dominate also is the sin,
according to Arendt, "of which he [Heidegger] found himself
guilty when he tried to come to terms with his brief past in
the Nazi movement." The Life of the Mind . Vol. Two, pp. 178,
22, 173.
A visit to Heidegger in terms of the moral and
political implications of his "thinking" may account in part
for his involvement with the Nazi party in the 1930s and his
ensuing apologia of the Holocaust. A disreputable passage in
the manuscript of the essay on technology immediately
following the statement "agriculture is now the mechanized
food industry" has been deleted from the published text,
which reads: "— in essence, the same as the manufacturing
of corpses in gas chambers and extermination camps, the same
as the blockading and starving of nations [it was the year
of the Berlin blockade], the same as the manufacture of
hydrogen bombs." Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger and the Nazis,
The New York Review of Books, June 16, 1988, pp. 41-42. It
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Heidegger is asking concerns whether or not there can be
anything at all that is intrinsically shaped by human
agency, particularly by our ethical interests. We are
dealing, sometimes sensibly and nobly, sometimes foolishly
and basely, with a "primordial," mysterious, intractable
world that at most can be only partially comprehensible to
us. We follow our ethos "without meditation." Our ethical
distinctions do not derive from reason. Morality has no link
to nature. Dasein is the sole agency of meaning, yet,
paradoxical enough, the animal interoretatus by no means can
act upon the world significantly. Heidegger not just rejects
the possibility of any positive link between theory and
praxis, between philosophical reflection and moral action.
He lays aside theoria and episteme and phronesis and praxis
themselves. In his attempt to render our practical ethical
relations to the world fully intelligible, Aristotle at
least insists that virtue, the right state of character
( ethos ) , be "determined by a rational principle (logos)
"
(EN. 1107al) . Heidegger by contrast implies resignation to
the most inexplicable areas of history, to our inextricable,
is in reference to the encounter between global technology
and the modern man that Heidegger makes his notorious remark
about "the inner truth and greatness" of the "movement" of
National Socialism. An Introduction to Metaphysics
, p. 199.
In a conversation of 1936, after all, Heidegger himself
"agreed without reservation" that "his partisanship for
National Socialism lay in the essence of his philosophy" and
that "his concept of ^historicity' was the basis of his
political ^engagement.'" Karl Lowith, "My Last Meeting with
Heidegger in Rome, 1936," The Heidegger Controversy , p. 142.
In other words, Heidegger's insistence on man's dwelling "in
the nearness of god" may have contributed to his getting
well into the nearness of the devil ("the Fuhrer")
.
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unsubduable "connectedness of life," to a suspicious
apoliticism and a gnostic eschatology. In the Spiegel
interview, he gives his last testament:
Philosophy will be unable to effect any immediate
change in the current state of the world. This is true
not only of philosophy but of all purely human
reflection and endeavor. Only a god can save us. The
only possibility available to us is that by thinking
and poetizing we prepare a readiness for the appearance
of a god, or for the absence of a god in [our] decline,
insofar as in view of the absent god we are in a state
of decline. ("The Spiecfel Interview," p. 57.)
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
PLATO: THE GROUNDLESS IMPERATIVE OF REASON
If the beame of our liues had not
one scale of reason, to poise another of
sensuality; the blood and basenesse of
our natures, would conduct vs to most
preposterous conclusions. But wee haue
reason to coole our raging motions, our
carnall stings, our vnbitted lusts.
William Shakespeare
The proposition therefore contains
no criterion of truth, but an imperative
concerning that which should count as
true.
Friedrich Nietzsche^
Heidegger thus provides an emphatically historicist
reading of Aristotle's emphasis on ethos and historia
. and
at the same time gives an existential critique of Hobbes's
paradigm of nature. Proceeding from his pre-ontological
distinction between the two basic modes of Being, he insists
on the existence of an inexorable, mystic link between
linguistic hermeneutics
,
particularistic authenticity,
collectivity, and history. Interpretation underlies human
existence. Collective identity is informed, constituted, and
^. William Shakespeare, "Othello," The Complete Works ,
eds. Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986), p. 935. And Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to
Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, (New
York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 279.
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"understandingly inherited" through a particular, pre-
rational, and ultimate linguistico-ethical scheme.
Entrenched in the "hermeneutical Situation," this scheme
interprets immediate historical experience, transmits shared
memories, sets common vocabulary and customary criteria, and
thereby carries its "ownmost" intelligibility and magnitude.
Identity is by definition interpretative and collective. It
is predicated upon one's predestinate historicity. Given
man's inextricable "connectedness of life," the "historical
being-there of a wise people" gets "stretched along" through
its authentic "co-historizing. " In such an inscrutable yet
intractable fashion, the weight of the past stays actual,
potent, and vivid. Underlying the Heideggerian account then
is an utter impossibility both for man the animal
interpretatus to extricate his identity from the esoteric
destiny of the finite community and for a historical people
to sever its gnostic ties to a primordially given past.
Understood as such, human collectivity is rendered
profoundly particularistic and apolitical; the principle of
reason, derivative and subordinate; and the possibility of
rational examination and choice, diminished.
Therefore Heidegger subscribes to the core of the
Aristotelian persuasion to such a radical extent that he
virtually asserts that man can never be the animal
rationale , and ultimate values and authentic identities,
never be a matter of rational knowledge or political
institution. Aristotle essentially means two themes: theoria
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and historia
. Heidegger's reading of him is existential, not
metaphysical. What he sees accordingly as the fundamental
absurdity is only the Philosopher's pursuit of universality
and rational accessibility, not his view of the ethical
community. Standing for the Aristotelian paradigm of
collective existence, as we have seen, ethos and historia
refer to the way in which ethical identity, both individual
and collective, takes shape in the real world of finite
particularity. This in essence is a parochial milieu of
cumulative anthropological encumbrances, wherein the
historical experience of a particular human group accretes
into an ultimate ethical vocabulary. Grounded on the
interpretative narrative of what that people has undergone
collectively in the past, the ethical language constitutes
the organic community in its immediate locality and social
entirety. Distinctive from the cosmos of reason and nature,
this repository of common conceptualization makes the domain
which alone is authentic enough to be the locus of identity
and truth, and possessive enough to be the source of
linguistic sufficiency and ethical cohesion. Value is
anthropocentric, not metaphysical. Disposition of moral
character and identity takes place not through philosophy
and theory but through common experience and practical
wisdom. The human ergon and eudaimonia cannot be proved by
rational and scientific means; the ultimate significance of
life is interpreted, and the interpretations lived, within
the particularistic contexts of historia . For Aristotle,
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therefore, the polis necessarily draws on ethicality, on the
shared commitment to the general soul of the community. By
the same token, evaluative incompatibility, deterioration,
anarchy, and warfare can have their solution not in politics
but only in this packed space of received ethicality. We
make moral sense of life not by our rational faculty nor by
the universal principle of "nature." We know who we are
through doing what we do in accordance with an already clear
understanding of our particular place in the cohesive,
hierarchic ethical manors. We stay where we have been as we
have known it. Our ethos is our identity; our historia
. our
predestinate fate. Given our "formed habit of mind," we do
not deliberate about our history; nor do we choose in
ultimate terms. Rooted in the prior-claimed estates of
immediate habituation, close affection, personal allegiance,
and entrenched dependence cemented by "the tie of blood,"
the authentic community of ethos and historia implies
prejudice as well as intelligibility, exclusion as well as
cohesion, imposition of private measures as well as
construction of identity and moral character.
Whereas Aristotle's historia registers the way men have
been dealing with each other in historical reality a
posteriori , Hobbes's paradigm of nature is intent upon a way
collective life ought to become a priori . In his indictment
against the Aristotelian mode of ethical and political
collectivity, Hobbes coins the term "state of nature" to
command our serious attention and awe. However, this
dreadful, dire disorder is evaluative in essence; its true
reference goes not to a chronologically prehistoric anarchy
antecedent to society, but arguably more to a very real
condition, to what men have been undergoing together ever
since. Aristotle and Hobbes are addressing the same problem
of ethical identity, the same evaluative terrain of human
history. The one calls it ethos and historia ; the other,
"Warre of every man against every man." Essential to the
ethical schemes of historia, charges Hobbes, is invisible,
willful, and arbitrary imposition of private appetites as
ethical yardsticks, by which "crafty ambitious persons abuse
the simple people." By their fraudulent design, the crafty
and the potent deliberately take advantage of the ordinary
multitude's ignorant and superstitious state of mind so as
to advance their own insidious turn in the perpetuation of
the state of evaluative disarray. History is a senseless,
chaotic war zone, wherein men are at strife, to the point of
"even slaughter itself" and sheer obliteration, over
fundamental beliefs, allegiances, and claims. Linguistic
interpretation of history's bearings hardly ever relays what
objectively took place in the past. It more often involves
self-serving and even pernicious intents, on the part of
those who reap gain from it, to hoodwink the irrational
psyche of the stupid gullible so as to manipulate, and
maintain undisturbed control over, their moral action.
Aristotelian ethicality owes itself to a sense of "benefits
received" (EN- 1180b5) . Yet "Benefits oblige; and obligation
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is thraldome; and unrequitable obligation, perpetuall
thraldome" (Leviathan, p. 162). Chronicles of ethical
disposition and schematization betray, rather than
otherwise, bigotry, exclusion, subordination, servility,
unbridled injustice, and foul wrongs wrought in the past.
Ethical virtues and vices are merely linguistic renderings
of diverse personal appetites with no metaphysical bearing
whatsoever. Subject to beneficial biases and irreconcilable
discords, and exempt from rational examination and
vindication, possessive ethicality provides no criteria
acceptable to all. Nor can there be an ethical solution to
the evaluative contentions, quarrels, and clashes. The
problem of conceptual disarray and ultimate incompatibility
can only be solved by the intervention of politics.
Proceeding from the scathing assaults on the Aristotelian
historia
. Hobbes presents his paradigmatic inscription of
ethics and politics on the dehistoricized, universal cosmos
of reason and nature. Historia (the war of all against all)
starts with anarchic abuse of language; the cure first of
all lies in linguistic clarity and conceptual precision.
Unequivocal visibility should be in place to thwart the
arbitrariness of historicity. To search for a common test,
denied by none, so as to achieve the fundamental shift from
the insane clamors of "history" to the sobriety of "nature,"
Hobbes reduces the irreducible ethical disparateness to
men's rational fear of violent and untimely death, as the
summum malum , and to self-preservation and public
tranquility, as the sole eligible denominator of ethicality
in the dangerous world. Underlying Hobbes's political
solution is the necessity of a fundamental recast, in
accordance with the scientific proposition of natural reason
only, of the ordinary mind-set, so as to seal off the prior
boundaries, statuses, orders, and identities in their
entirety, and effect a clean and sustained break with the
past. In defiance of history, of the untidy diversity and
recalcitrant incorrigibleness ingrained deep in the core of
the human condition and experience, it is, as Heidegger has
shown, a project next to impossible. The Leviathan thus
stands for a moral necessity, a groundless one though it is.
From our reading of Aristotle, Hobbes, and Heidegger,
three themes have emerged: the fundamental linguisticality
of human existence, the radical incompatibility of ultimate
evaluative schemes, and the limits of reason. We in the rest
of this conclusion summarize the three themes through a
brief reference to Weber. Then we read Plato to explore the
imperative underlying the antithesis between the paradigms
of "history" and "nature," and assess the extent to which a
synthesis might (or might not) be conceivable.
A. Weber: Three Themes
In Max Weber's view, ethical religiosity does not arise
entirely from mundane anxieties. Seeking recourse to
rational knowledge, it is also driven "by an inner
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compulsion to understand the world as a meaningful cosmos
and to take up a position toward it" ( Economy and Society
,
p. 499). Under the grip of this metaphysical impulse, we
presuppose that the world, both cosmic and social, must be
carrying certain meanings, to the unity and coherence of
which we orient our conduct. Attempts to systematize all the
manifestations of life in accordance with this totalizing
presupposition come into conflict with reality, however. The
world, Weber makes it unequivocal, is but an obscure flow of
unintelligible contingencies without connection to any
higher design. No meanings exist objectively; they are given
by subjective human activity.
Life with its irrational reality and its store of
possible meanings is inexhaustible. The concrete form
in which value-relevance occurs remains perpetually in
flux, ever subject to change in the dimly seen future
of human culture. The light which emanates from those
highest evaluative ideas always falls on an ever
changing finite segment of the vast chaotic stream of
events, which flows away through time.
Of such a state of blind chaos, the "finite segment" stands
as the intelligible locus of meaning. It refers to "culture"
which, Weber believes, "is a value-concept." "^Culture,'" he
goes on to explain,
is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the
world process, a segment on which human beings confer
meaning and significance. . . . This is the purely
logical-formal fact which is involved when we speak of
the logically necessary rootedness of all historical
entities in "evaluative ideas." The transcendental
presupposition of every cultural science lies not in
our finding a certain culture or any "culture" in
general to be valuable but rather in the fact that we
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are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the
will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world
and to lend it significance. Whatever this significance
may be, it will lead us to judge certain phenomena ofhuman existence in its light and to respond to them asbeing ... meaningful.^
Different cultural and historical segments find expression
in Weber's "ideal types," which bring finite intelligible
order into the infinite chaotic reality. Yet as fixed
guideposts of knowledge and action the ideal types possess
neither more nor less status than the human beings who
construct them. The Weberian ideal type is rather a
"theoretically conceived pure type of subjective meaning."
"In no case does it refer to an objectively ^correct'
meaning or one which is ^true' in some metaphysical sense"
( Economy and Society , p. 4) . Therefore, human evaluative
linguisticality makes the top ceiling of intelligibility,
beyond which there are no metaphysical reaches. The
historical cultures constitute the sole locus of meaningful
identification; none of the identities harbors inherent
access to any purpose larger and intelligible. Our cultures
make sense to us only because we subjectively take it that
way . ^
^. Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences ,
trans, and eds. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, (New
York: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 76, 81.
^. Friedrich Nietzsche also asserts that the world has
no hidden meaning behind it. Even the universe itself does
not exist without the medium of a "perspective" by which
"the will to power" interprets the chaotic, unintelligible
nothing-in-itself . "It is precisely facts that do not exist,
only interpretations." "Not 'to know' but to schematize —
to impose upon chaos as much regularity and form as our
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Furthermore, cultural values rank ultimate. The ethical
criteria of history's "finite segments" assume the status of
the final appeal of evaluative arbitration:
Nothing should be more sharply emphasized than theproposition that the knowledge of the cultural
significance of concrete historical events and patterns
is exclusively and solely the final end. (The
Methodoloav of the Social Sciences
^ p. 111.)
Historically and anthropologically "culture" is plural and
diverse, and each linguistico-ethical scheme obtains and
maintains its own exclusive evaluative measures. Therefore
the cultural identities are radically incommensurable. And
their conflicts, necessarily irreconcilable.
The various value spheres of the world stand in
irreconcilable conflict with each other. ... If one
proceeds from pure experience, one arrives at
polytheism. ... I do not know how one might wish to
decide "scientifically" the value of French and German
culture; for here, too, different gods struggle with
one another, now and for all times to come. . . . The
ultimately possible attitudes toward life are
irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be
practical needs require." For Nietzsche, truth is but "a
mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms —
in short, a sum of human relations, which have been
enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and
rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical,
and obligatory to a people. ... to be truthful means using
the customary metaphors — in moral terms: the obligation to
lie according to a fixed convention." Friedrich Nietzsche,
The Portable Nietzsche , trans, and ed. Walter Kaufmann, (New
York: The Viking Press, 1976), pp. 458, 46-47. And The Will
to Power , p. 278. With its linguistic, finite, customary,
and ethical attributes, truth takes shape in the milieu of
the Aristotelian historia . Unlike Hobbes, Nietzsche seeks no
exit on the bellum omnium contra omnes : "Given the way of
men, there may still be caves for thousands of years."
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science , trans. Walter
Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 167.
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brought to a final conclusion. Thus it is necessary tomake a decisive choice.'*
As Weber sees it, the competing identities, allegiances, or
pursuits not only assert themselves between the diverse
traditions. Even the ethical terrain of a same civilization
tends to be not homogeneous but profoundly heterogeneous.
There could be no single overarching moral criterion.
Drawing on Machiavelli with approval, Weber describes the
scene as follows:
The consilia evanaelica are a special ethic for
those endowed with the charisma of a holy life. There
stands the monk who must not shed blood or strive for
gain, and beside him stand the pious knight and the
burgher, who are allowed to do so, the one to shed
blood, the other to pursue gain.^
. From Max Weber , trans, and eds. H.H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958)
, pp.
147, 148, 152.
^. Weber draws his proposition of ultimate evaluative
incommensurability from Niccolo Machiavelli, arguably the
first to philosophize the possibility of more than one
single true answer to the fundamental questions of life. As
Machiavelli observes in the Discourses , "the good and the
evil change from one country to another, as we learn from
the history of those ancient kingdoms that differed from
each other in manners." Machiavelli has been construed as a
technician of cunning power, an apologist of wickedness,
cruelty, and immorality in the name of the cold expedience
of politics. It is this "teacher of evil," after all, who
crafts the classical definition of the raison d^etat : "The
case deserves to be noted and reflected upon by every
citizen who finds himself called upon to counsel his
country. For where the very safety of the country depends
upon the resolution to be taken, no considerations of
justice or injustice, humanity or cruelty, nor of glory or
of shame, should be allowed to prevail. But putting all
other considerations aside, the only question should be.
What course will save the life and liberty of the country?"
This being the case, however, Machiavelli can also be read
as an ethicist, only being a dualistic one. The first
advocate of non-metaphysical politics, he presents, side by
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Living in such a landscape of ethical plurality and
incommensurability, one stays away from the bleak jungle of
politics if one desires to lead a morally good existence in
this world and seek salvation in an afterlife. Those who
choose to enter politics, by the same token, must prepare
themselves to bear the inner burden of holding "the
greatness of their native city higher than the salvation of
their souls." Either of the ultimate pursuits demands total
commitment heart and soul . Attempts to attend to both
simultaneously could be, in Machiavelli ' s words, "most
hazardous." As Weber reflects on what Machiavelli is saying.
Whoever wants to engage in politics at all, and
especially in politics as a vocation, has to realize
these ethical paradoxes. He must know that he is
responsible for what may become of himself under the
impact of these paradoxes, I repeat, he lets himself in
for the diabolic forces lurking in all violence. The
great virtuosi of acosmic love of humanity and goodness
. . . have not operated with the political means of
violence. Their kingdom was "not of this world" and yet
side, two equally ultimate outlooks of life, the Christian
morality of submission and the pagan virtu, with neither one
authentically superior to the other. The raison d^etat often
dictates resort to measures irreconcilably distasteful to
the Christian ethicist. "Doubtless," Machiavelli is fully
aware, "these means are cruel and destructive of all
civilized life, and neither Christian nor even human, and
should be avoided by every one. In fact, the life of a
private citizen would be preferable to that of a king at the
expense of the ruin of so many human beings. Nevertheless,
whoever is unwilling to adopt the first and humane course
must, if he wishes to maintain his power, follow the latter
evil course. But men generally decide upon a middle course,
which is most hazardous; for they know neither how to be
entirely good or entirely bad." Niccolo Machiavelli, The
Prince and the Discourses . (New York: The Modern Library,
1950), pp. 272, 528, 184. I am indebted to Professor
Nicholas Xenos for awareness of the comparability between
Weber and Machiavelli.
255
they worked and still work in this world. ... He who
seeks the salvation of the soul, of his own and of
others, whould not seek it along the avenue of
politics, for the quite different tasks of politics can
only be solved by violence. The genius or demon ofpolitics lives in an inner tension with the god oflove, as well as with the Christian God as expressed bythe church. This tension can at any time lead to anirreconcilable conflict. ( From Max Weber , pp. 124-126.)^
Radically incompatible as they are, all sources of
linguistic sufficiency and ethical identity have thus lost
(or, paradoxically, gained) their ground to claim exclusive
theodicy and rational authenticity. They are essentially a
matter of pre-rational choice (or predestinate fate, as
Heidegger has it)
.
Weber addresses a post-theological age of
"rationalization" marked by the triumphal mastery of modern
science over nature and the relentless advance of
organization and bureaucratization upon society. This age
sets out to eliminate incalculable magic as a means of moral
salvation, and disenchant the entire world by technical
means. Of the ideal types of the time, however, Weber
maintains a profound distinction between "instrumental
rationality" of science, economic efficiency, and impersonal
politics, on the one hand, and "value rationality" based on
religious, ethical, or aesthetic evaluation "for its own
sake," on the other hand. "Regardless of possible cost to
themselves," Weber points out, evaluative actions are
^. See also Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism , trans. Talcott Parsons, (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), p. 107.
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always irrational. Indeed, the more the value to which
action IS oriented is elevated to the status of an
absolute value, the more "irrational" in this sense the
corresponding action is. For the more unconditionally
the actor devotes himself to this value for its own
sake, to pure sentiment or beauty, to absolute goodness
or devotion to duty, the less is he influenced by
considerations of the consequences of his action.
So the ultimate choice of values is always irrational
because it involves the absolute, unconditional commitment
at all costs. Possessed by such causes, men will act to put
their convictions into action without rational weighing and
prudent hesitation, however unbearable the consequences that
the action may entail upon themselves ( Economy and Society ,
pp. 24-2 6) . As our reading of Heidegger has shown, modern
science deals with facts, not values. The scientific
vocation provides logical methods, errorless constructs, and
rigorous tools to gain clarity and exactitude, but by its
limitations it leaves aside the fundamental evaluative
question of whether or not it ultimately makes sense to do
so. It supplies techniques of correct imputation and
calculation of empirical data, but the technician cannot
calculate and master all the heterogeneous and mystic
spiritual forces, under the sway of which men have
interpreted their identities and lived their lives.
Therefore, as Hobbes has assented, "correctness" can only be
an attribute of "instrumental rationality," not a property
257
of "value rationality. "7 Science is meaningless beyond the
purely technical level of knowledge and action; it is in no
position to answer the fundamental Socratic questions such
as "what is good" and "how we ought to live."® To sum up,
the three Weberian themes undermine any claim to a positive
link between convention and nature. No identity furnishes
privileged avenue to the truth, no ethical truth stands
independent of language, and no particular language could be
metaphysically better than the others.^
. See Leviathan, p. 166: "The doctrine of Right and
Wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by the Pen and the
Sword: Whereas the doctrine of Lines, and Figures, is not
so; because men care not, in that subject what be truth, as
a thing that crosses no mans ambition, profit, or lust. For
I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any mans
right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have
dominion, That the three Angles of a Triangle should be
equall to two Angles of a Square; that doctrine should have
been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of
Geometry, suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was
able.
"
®. Sigmund Freud remarks: "No, our science is no
illusion. But an illusion it would be to suppose that what
science cannot give us we can get elsewhere." Sigmund Freud,
The Future of an Illusion , trans, and ed. James Strachey,
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989), p. 71.
Paradoxically enough, Freud, the staunch apologist of
science though he is, implies a concession here that science
on the other hand cannot give us everything.
The project of rationalization creates a distinctive
cosmos of natural causality. The conditions of capitalist
economy inexorably determine our outlooks, to which we, with
all other interpretations subdued, cannot but conform. In
Weber's view, nevertheless, Western culture adopts this
system of clean utility and strict efficiency in the first
place by interpretation, not by rational assessment.
Scientific rationalism looms large with its claim to be the
only reasoned view of life, and brings the tension between
intellectual knowledge and non-rational religiosity to the
fore. As the result of this development, the Christian
morality postulating "Extra Ecclesiam nulla salvatio" to
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provide theological sustenance and compensatory comfort forthe downtrodden has become increasingly unintelligible.
There emerges a need for more rational apologetics to
reinterpret the unequal distribution of fortunes among men.
In order to remodel the world, the scheme of capitalism
Itself must be rendered ideal-typically explicable in terms
of a new ethical imperative, and one's state of grace has tobe made reconcilable to the modern entrepreneurial ethos of
the here and now. On Weber's account, the conceptual
explication of capitalism is in essence a process in which
men reinterpret the annunciation and promise of their
religious sources in terms of the pragmatic impulses of a
rational "economic ethic." From Max Weber , pp. 267, 270.
God's reign is brought to the earth the moment the Calvinist
accepts the fundamental inscrutability and infinite distance
of the Divinity, and, dictated by an inward "calling,"
rationalizes life by settling himself in his mundane daily
pursuits. The correlation between a particular Protestant
ethic and capitalism is rendered intelligible only when a
rational conduct of life is so construed that it enables men
to define Calvinism as a worldly asceticism and capitalism
as the agency of rationalization. Being a pre-rational
choice of history itself, that is, rationalization at the
bottom owes its intelligibility to that choice. Modern
science, capitalist economy, and bureaucracy stand for no
more than one of the ultimate "finite segments," which does
not transcend in any metaphysical way the status of
"culture" as the fundamental locus of ethical collectivity.
There is no "correct" access still to any higher reaches of
nature. "Different gods struggle with one another, now and
for all times to come." In other words, nor will rational
disenchantment leave the radical incompatibility of ultimate
identities behind us. The triumph of modern science and
capitalism, Weber on the other hand predicts, will in the
end deliver the "iron cage" of economic necessity, till "the
last ton of fossilized coal is burnt" in "a polar night of
icy darkness and hardness." The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism , p. 181; From Max Weber , p. 128. Of
such a scene of unrelieved desolation Weber sees no need for
spiritual justification, because "fate, and certainly not
^science,' holds sway over these gods and their struggles,"
and attempts to "construe new religions" will engender
"still worse effects." The ideal-typical Scientific or
Political Man (or "Nation") "simply must choose" by vocation
or calling. "The fate of our times is characterized," as
Weber perceives it, "by rationalization and
intellectualization and, above all, by the 'disenchantment
of the world. ' Precisely the ultimate and most sublime
values have retreated from public life either into the
transcendental realm of mystic life or into the
brotherliness of direct and personal human relations." From
Max Weber , pp. 148, 151, 155. Therefore, disenchantment of
the world necessarily separates private and public spheres
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B. The Platonic Imperative
The limitation of scientific rationalism denies the
possibility of connection between morality and reason.
This denial directly confronts the question posed in Book II
of Plato's Republic (Republic . 358e-367e) . As we have
mentioned toward the close of Chapters II and III, Glaucon
and Adeimantus are challenging Socrates not precisely to
prove the desirability of justice in positive and
theoretical terms. Rather, what Socrates is expected to do
there is to demonstrate that man is by nature oriented to
of life. For the sake of linguistic unequivocalness , this
separation clears the path for the ascent of the sober
criterion of the Machiavellian raison d'etat . The retreat of
men's inner pursuits into the still Aristotelian private
realms explains why the "iron cage" assumes the image of a
spiritual vacuum. A conceptual convention, an interpretative
scheme, though that vacuum remains.
David Hume addresses this question in categorical
Aristotelian terms. There is an "immeasurable distance,"
that is to say, between knowledge and action. Arete is
independent of logos, phronesis of theoria, and ethos of
phusis . Our ethical distinctions, maintains Hume, "are
deriv'd from nothing but custom; and . . . belief is more
properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative
part of our natures." "Since morals ... have an influence on
the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be
deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone . . . can
never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and
produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly
impotent in this particular. The rules of morality are not
conclusions of our reason." "'Tis impossible, therefore,
that the character of natural and unnatural can ever, in any
sense, mark the boundaries of vice and virtue." And,
"Laudable or blameable . . . are not the same with reasonable
or unreasonable." David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature,
ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press,
1983), pp. 183, 457, 475, 458.
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justice, an intrinsic moral virtue which is by no means
drudgery but good and desirable for its own sake without any
reliance upon the external compulsion of incentive or
punishment. Socrates finds himself, to put it otherwise,
cornered into a position where he has to convince us, the
rational beings, that it is of necessity incoherent,
illogical, or, in one word, irrational not to lead a morally
good existence. Which is to say, it is necessarily foolish,
imprudent, or against our rational self-interest not to act
decently but to live as our worst desires dictate even when
we can get away with it.^^ In his undertaking to address
Glaucon and Adeimantus, Plato hence invents the brilliant
scheme of reason, and sets it going in Book IV of the
Republic
. Just as the city "created in theory" is supposed
to be populated by three social classes, viz., the
deliberative, the auxiliary, and the money-making, the
individual human soul "by nature" consists of three parts:
the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive. "The part
which relies on measurement and calculation would be the
best part of the soul." Exactly to the extent that the
deliberative upper class should rule and thereby maintain
order in the city, this rational faculty should exercise
authority over its appetitive counterparts and thereby
"The Fool's Question" poses the same challenge. And
Hobbes defends his envisioned linkage between ethicality and
"Naturall Reason," as we have seen, essentially by giving up
the attempt to find an ethical solution to the evaluative
war of all against all, and reducing the human summum bonum
to the far less polemical test of self-preservation.
ensure harmony in man's inner world. This internal harmony,
decides Plato, is justice (Republic
,
439d-442b, 369a-c,
603a, 443d, 444d)
.
As it is, however, Plato's tripartite division of the
soul remains a formal framework with no constituents of the
life most worth living specified. The rational makeup inside
is up to this point merely a necessary structure (the
Weberian "instrumental rationality") ; content-neutral as it
is, it does not suffice not to carry out purely appetitive
pursuits. Any well-calculated way of existence could
comfortably meet its requirements; it is rationally chosen,
not intrinsically valuable. That the rational faculty of the
soul by itself does operate in a certain course of action is
not enough, since it is perfectly conceivable that the given
action is engaging measured reasoning only to pursue sensual
pleasures and satisfy appetitive desires. Moreover, Plato
allows that the rational faculty is "present in every
person's soul." "Have you never noticed in men who are said
to be wicked but clever," he asks, "how sharply their little
soul looks into things to which it turns its attention? Its
capacity for sight is not inferior, but it is compelled to
serve evil ends, so that the more sharply it looks the more
evils it works" ( Republic , 518c, 519a) . That is, as
Aristotle has also argued, reason cuts both ways; it can
even become men's most dangerous weapon with regard to moral
action. More often than not, those who are morally most
unscrupulous and heinous (deinotes) are precisely those who
excel at using that peculiar equipment of "measurement and
calculation. "12 Therefore, the definition of justice in
terms of the rational order of the soul alone is merely
tautologizing Glaucon and Adeimantus, not sufficient to
address them. As a set of instrumental procedures, that
order tends to be latitudinarian as such that, in Plato's
own words, "everyone will arrange his own life in any manner
that pleases him" (Republic
. 557b).
Being aware of the insufficiency, Plato goes on to move
beyond structure and provide components. Through a treatment
of pleasure and pain in Book IX of the Republic , he asserts
specifically that a life devoted in a maximal measure to
contemplative activities ( theoria ) and scientific pursuits
constitutes the best way of rational existence. Each of the
three parts of the soul carries with it its own unique kind
of pleasure, and there are accordingly three ways of human
existence: the philosophic, the ambitious, and the
See the Politics . 1253a31-37: "For man, when
perfected, is the best of animals, but when separated from
law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed
injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth
with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and excellence,
which he may use for the worst ends. That is why, if he has
not excellence, he is the most unholy and the most savage of
animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony."
1^. See also the Gorgias . 491e-492a, where Callicles
contends that reason can serve appetitive ends flawlessly
and admirably: "Anyone who is to live aright should suffer
his appetites to grow to the greatest extent and not check
them, and through courage and intelligence should be
competent to minister to them at their greatest and to
satisfy every appetite with what it craves." The Collected
Dialogues of Plato , p. 274.
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appetitive. The three types of men all believe their own
life to be the most pleasurable. However, the philosopher is
in the best position to judge since he possesses exclusive
access to the tools of intelligence and discussion, and he
alone has experience of all the three sorts of satisfaction,
whereas the rest of us know none of his. In contrast to the
pleasures of the ordinary mortals, which are but illusory
images of genuine fulfillments, only the philosophic
gratification is "unsullied, unalloyed, and freed from the
mortal taint that haunts the frailer loveliness of flesh and
blood." By an acrobatic calculation, Plato finds that his
philosopher-king, enjoying the summum bonum pure, lasting,
and true, fares 729 times better than the completely unjust
tyrannical man ( Republic . 580c-588a; Symposium
. 211e).^^
Enslaved by the dire sting of insatiable appetites, lawless
lusts, and insolent greeds, that tyrannical man is not only
the most wicked but also, Plato emphasizes, the most
miserable of our species. The despotically possessed soul
never has a taste of abundance or freedom or friendship. It
is most miserably condemned to an infernal pit of disorder,
servitude, fear, and pain ( Republic . 576c-580a) . We are all
rational beings endowed with a dim curiosity about some
indistinct summum bonum uncorrupted and stable ( Republic ,
505d-e) . But our bodily pleasures, "leaden weights" as Plato
calls them, "draw the soul to look downward." Justice
The Collected Dialogues of Plato, p. 563.
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subordinates these "beastlike parts of our nature to the
human, or perhaps we should say to the divine"; injustice,
the other way round. If, Plato "gently" reasons with us, one
"enslaves the most divine part of himself to the most
ungodly and disgusting part and feels no pity for it, is he
not wretched and is he not accepting a bribe of gold for a
more terrible death than Eriphyle when she accepted the
necklace for her husband's life" (Republic . 519b, 589c-
590a)? "How then and by what argument can we maintain,
Glaucon," concludes Plato in clear reference to the question
raised by Glaucon and Adeimantus,
that injustice, licentiousness, and shameful actions
are profitable, since they make a man more wicked,
though he may acquire more riches or some other form of
power? ... Or that to do wrong without being discovered
and not to pay the penalty is profitable? Does not one
who remains undiscovered become even more vicious,
whereas within the man who is discovered and punished
the beast is calmed down and tamed? (Republic , 591a-b.)
Therefore, Plato in the Republic not only
conceptualizes an inner order of reason, but also fills that
formal structure with theoria as the constitutive content.
He tells us not only that theoria is the most worthwhile way
of life to pursue, but also that we will be reduced to the
hellish condition of inner enslavement and wretchedness if
we elect not to do so but to stay on our deceptively more
engaging tracks. Indeed, he has pushed as far as he possibly
can to convince his rational audience that being good
accords with their rational self-interest, and that there
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does exist an intrinsic connection between morality and
reason. He confronts our rational judgement with a choice.
Stern and stark though the choice is, it nevertheless
remains unclear how rational calculation by itself can
possibly motivate the ordinary human soul, sober and
obstinate and depraved and incorrigible as it is, to convert
to the nonutilitarian philosophic way of life, which is
self-evidently beyond the common reach. To those of us who
prefer the easier sensual pleasures to the austere
gratification of theoria, it is still incumbent upon Plato
not just to tell what his case is, but to show why it is the
case, and that it is indubitably important. All that Plato
has to say being said, we might remain unimpressed and
uninterested, and still ask why we should bother ourselves
with an unattractive, unattainable summum bonum when we
already find fulfillment in our more relevant, more exciting
way of existence. What Plato is essentially saying is that
the sublunary ascription of value to bodily pleasures is
based on a delusion arising from a fundamental deficiency of
our perspective. From our blotted and confounded point of
view we know nothing about the desirableness of the lofty
realm of "an above." In other words, only from a completely
detached viewpoint, which stands far remote from that of the
characteristic human, does Plato consider our ordinary
pursuits valueless. The appetitive way of life is rejected,
that is to say, from an outlook that has already purified
itself of appetites. Plato tells us that we are in hell, but
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what if we do not think so? If we, having weighed prudently
what Plato says, still see nothing sorry in our present
state of affairs, if the perverse, mischievous world finds
his reasoning not alluring nor compelling and therefore
chooses to go its own way, then Plato's argument is at its
wits' end. Deployed at the bottom is but a bottomless
measure of contempt, unfeigned, undisguised, and stunning:
They wander throughout their life but they never
reach beyond to what is the true above. They never look
up to it nor are carried thither; they have never been
truly filled with what truly exists, nor tasted any
stable and pure pleasure. They look down always with
their heads bent to the ground like cattle; at the
banquet tables they feed, fatten, and fornicate. To get
their fill of such things they kick and butt each other
with iron horns and hoofs and kill each other. They are
insatiable as they do not fill the real and continent
part of themselves with true realities. (Republic
,
586a-b.
)
We are told, then, that we the thriving earthworms in the
Cave are virtually abjuring our humanity for an existence
bovine, brutish, and bestial. This may seem a bit unfair
and hard to take. Hobbes purports to reshape humanity
likewise. But he has no illusion whatsovever as to "what is
See also the Philebus . 67b, where Plato ranks
sensual pleasure only fifth in his value system, "not first
place, no, not even if all the oxen and horses and every
other animal that exists tell us so by their pursuit of
pleasure. It is the animals on which the multitude rely,
just as diviners rely on birds, when they decide that
pleasures are of the first importance to our living a good
life, and suppose that animals' desires are authoritative
evidence, rather than those desires that are known to
reasoned argument, divining the truth of this and that by
the power of the Muse of philosophy." The Collected
Dialogues of Plato , p. 1150.
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the true above," and he eventually appeals to the negative
coercion of punishment provided by the dangerous world.
Aristotle constructs the theistic solution and the
hierarchic system of moral cohesion to suppress sublunary
depravity, disparateness, and incompatibility. Yet he, with
his bent toward ordinary humanity, at least draws on "what
is known to us," and takes pains to conceptualize the polls,
phronesis, and ethos to bridge the gulf between theoria and
human appetition. By contrast, Plato seems to have given up
on us altogether. Uncharacteristic for Plato, this is
already argument no more. When one argues, one is expected
to use the same language that one's audience uses. The
pursuits of a species must be assessed within that species'
experience and its vocabulary, not from an alien creature's
god's-eye perspective ("the divine") to which the reasons
for choosing those pursuits are not evident. As Machiavelli
and Weber would ask, upon what ground could the monk pass a
judgement on the burgher's choice of ultimate lifestyle?
When Plato takes on history, on the entire human experience
as we have deeply known it, when he appeals to the radical
divine solution to dismiss as sub-human the way we interpret
our identities and conduct our lives, he exposes himself to
a countercharge of being extra-human and, therefore, simply
irrelevant and unappealing.^^ On the other hand, however, it
No wonder Glaucon comments that Plato "describe [s]
the life of the majority like an oracle." Republic , 586b.
See also the Symposium . 221c-d, where Alcibiades complains
about the extra-humanity of Socrates: "Personally I think
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is unlikely that Plato would have so seriously
underestimated the recalcitrance and formidableness of what
he undertakes to overcome. As evident in the Platonic
corpus, he knows less than no one (not Aristotle nor
Heidegger) about the irreducible complexity of the human
grain and the intractability of the "leaden weights" of our
common bestiality. Plato puts up the awe-inspiring assault
on ordinary humanity, as we have seen, at the dictation of a
compulsion that he feels to relate morality to the rule of
reason. Our question is: Whence comes this compulsion?
The grand scheme of reason descends from the Republic .
Although Plato does not tell us straight out that this is a
myth, in the dialogue he does concede that the analogic
class division of the city, "as a kind of medicine," is but
a "noble fiction" and "necessary untruth" (Republic
. 389b,
414c-415a)
.
Upon the close of Book IX, Plato makes his city-
soul analogy and the fictitiousness of the whole thing more
explicit. He assures Glaucon that the "just man" he has
described will be willing to go into politics, more so
however in "his own kind of city" than back to the Cave
the most amazing thing about him is the fact that he is
absolutely unique. ... You'll never find anyone like
Socrates, or any ideas like his ideas, in our own times or
in the past — unless, of course, you take a leaf out of my
book and compare him, not with human beings, but with sileni
and satyrs — and the same with his ideas." And the Gorgias .
481b-c: "Tell me, Socrates, are we to consider you serious
now or jesting? For if you are serious and what you say is
true, then surely the life of us mortals must be turned
upside down and apparently we are everywhere doing the
opposite of what we should." The Collected Dialogues of
Plato , pp. 572, 265.
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("his fatherland"). The "city of words," Plato goes on to
explain,
is a model laid up in heaven, for him who wishes tolook upon, and as he looks, set up the government ofhis soul. It makes no difference whether it exists
anywhere or will exist. ( Republic . 592a-b.)
Therefore, the hierarchic makeup of the soul under the reign
of reason is in Plato's conception not a scientific fact to
be found, but rather an ethical state to be achieved. ^"^ The
fabrication of such a "true lie" or "verbal lie" about
reason's ultimate authority is deemed necessary and useful,
Plato makes it clear and plain,
because of our ignorance of what truly happened of old.
We then make the fiction as like the truth as we can
and so make the lie or untruth useful. ( Republic
. 382b-
d.)
In other words, the rational solution ever since its very
conception is essentially predicated upon a groundless
imperative, and this groundless imperative owes its source
to a fundamental distrust on Plato's part of the
intelligibility of history. In the Poetics , Aristotle
opposes poetry to history, asserting that the former, as
"something more philosophic," concerns itself with the
"universals, " and the latter, with the "singulars." This
. And the Republic . 533a: "It is not worthwhile
insisting that it is so in fact, but we must maintain that
one would see something of this kind." See also Leviathan ,
p. 211, where Hobbes considers it a theoretical necessity
that "Equalitie must be admitted," knowing that in the real
world men are anything but equal.
270
opposition is for the concerns of the present work somewhat
misleading, however. As we have suggested in Chapter II, it
is a category of coincidental "usual histories" that
Aristotle has in mind when he rejects the importance of
"history." He meanwhile insists on the interpretative
relevance of poetic tragedy which, on his account, imitates
men's moral action, arouses emotional reponse from the
spectator, and thereby makes sense of our life in terms of
eudaimonia
. the ultimate Aristotelian issue of human
existence. In Book X of the Republic
. by contrast, Plato
argues that "imitative poetry" must be banished from the
city first of all because it only imitates the
"particulars." Whereas Aristotle in his poetry-history
antithesis lays philosophy as the art of reason aside, Plato
points to "an ancient quarrel" between poetry and philosophy
(Republic . 607b, 596a, 597d) . Thus, the two Greeks share the
view that poetry stands for historia as the fundamental mode
of human experience and its interpretation; and we proceed
with our reading here in terms of Plato's opposition between
the rational scheme and history.^® For Aristotle, "some
historic occurrences may very well be in the probable and
possible order of things;" authentic past experience as a
locus of truth are intelligible with immanent, organic
See also, as we have mentioned in Chapter II,
Aristotle's antithesis between philosophy and experience,
with the former addressing the universal and the latter
dealing with the particular. Metaphysics . 980b26-982a2 . The
Complete Works of Aristotle , pp. 1552-1553.
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bearings upon the moral life and politics of the day.
Foreshadowing Hobbes, Plato dismisses the relevance of
history outright. And, since tragedy as a genre of poetry
imitates past events and impersonates historical figures "to
the greatest possible extent," he by the same token is
deeply suspicious of, if not hostile to, tragedy as the
source of truth in accordance with which one could "educate
Greece," "arrange one's life," and "manage human affairs"
(Republic . 602b, 606e).^^
History as our forebears knew it presents none else but
a chaos crowded with wantom reverses and accumulated
sorrows, insane strifes and costly follies. "Good things are
fewer than bad things in our life," contemplates Plato.
Being the supernatural necessity incarnate residing beyond
our world, god is responsible only for the good; "for evil
things we must find some other cause." Having no access to
. Bernard Williams's treatment of tragedy assesses an
extent to which we may relate Greek tragedies to the concept
of history: "Tragedy is formed round ideas it does not
expound, and to understand its history is in some part to
understand those ideas and their place in the society that
produced it. All the Greek tragedies we possess were written
within one century, in one city; they were performed at a
religious festival of great civic importance; their material
was drawn very largely from a stock of legends. ... The
action of tragedy helped to articulate and express conflicts
and tensions within the city's stock of concepts and guiding
images. It was a very particular historical situation in
which all this was possible, and to understand it must
involve asking what pictures of human action and experience
tragedy offered or implied." The tragic effect is such,
writes Williams, that "its possibility was related to that
same historical situation." And he quotes Walter Benjamin as
saying that "the perspectives of the philosophy of history
[are] ... an essential part of the theory of tragedy." Shame
and Necessity , p. 15.
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the truth nor worthwhile knowledge of their subjects,
charges Plato, the poetic tragedians only imitate the
appearance of particular images, that are at three removes
from the truth as regards moral matters, not the truth
itself. Drawing on the misfortunes and grievances that men
have undergone in the past, the tragedies display "tales of
gods warring and plotting and fighting against each other,"
attributing the incomprehensible evils and dilemmas of life
to the supernatural necessity as well ( Republic
. 379c,
378b)
.
The tragedians also tell "bad tales" about men in
moral action, alleging most preposterously that "many unjust
men are happy and many just men wretched, that injustice is
profitable if it escapes notice, that justice is another's
good and one's own punishment" (Republic . 3 92b) . Our
innermost world is a composite scene stuffed full of
irresistible feelings and impulses, noble and ignoble,
perpetually at odds with one another "in the civil war of
the soul" (Republic . 440e) . The tragedies not only appeal to
but also strengthen the inferior, non-intellectual elements
of it, not only distract but virtually baffle, and even
destroy, the better part of us in its pursuit of truth.
Indulging in their powerful speech, the tragedians arouse
grief or fear or pity, stir up irrational desires and wild
imagination (Tragedy "waters them when they ought to
wither." Republic , 606d) , and corrupt the minds of the
festival and gullible audience. Still worse, imitative
tragedy even threatens confounding and damaging the internal
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makeup of the best men. Plato describes as follows the
"cathartic" fashion in which men get enamored, hoodwinked,
and swayed by the imitators who pretend to be making sense
of what took place in the past:
When even the best of us hear Homer or some other
tragedian imitating one of the heroes sorrowing and
stretching out a long speech of lamentation or a chorusbeating their breasts you know that we enjoy it,
surrender ourselves, share their feelings, and
earnestly praise as a good poet the one who affects us
most in this way. ( Republic
,
605c-d.)
Recourse to the past misfortunes and wounds therefore could
be dangerous. It provokes emotional, immature, and unhelpful
responses, and sets up a bad government in the soul, where
the disrupting power of pleasure and pain will have its way.
Accordingly, insists Plato,
We shall go on repeating that such poetry must not
be taken seriously as if it had any contact with truth
and were an earnest matter, but that the man who is
anxious about the government of his soul must be
careful when he hears it. ( Republic
.
608a-b.)
Proceeding from his perception of the powerfully
negative role that poetic tragedy (history) has played in
men's moral life, Plato seeks to transcend our
particularistic experience, to engage our universal
intellect as the self-sufficient and only reliable source of
truth, and to move from the stratum of idiosyncratic
personal tales (mvthos ) onto the plane of calm conversation
and cogent argument ( logos ) . He pleads for rational mastery
of misfortune to take the place of unquestioning submission
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to our grief and lamentation under the sway of the peevish
parts of the soul, and insists on preparing first of all a
"clean draughting board" (Republic . 501a) to leave behind
the jarring farragoes of history. 2° The case for such a
rational break with the past, it is suggestive to note,
proceeds not precisely from the conviction that it is
metaphysically more authentic. Reason must control the past
spectres, Plato instead asserts, because
it is not clear whether such events are good or bad,
also because to take it hard makes the future no
better, because no human experience is worth taking
very seriously, and because grieving is an obstacle to
attaining as soon as possible that which we must attain
in the circumstances. (Republic
. 604b-c.)^^
"Haven't we seen," asks Plato in the Protagoras,
356d-e, "that the appearance leads us astray and throws us
into confusion so that in our actions and our choices
between great and small we are constantly accepting and
rejecting the same things, whereas the metric art would have
canceled the effect of the impression, and by revealing the
true state of affairs would have caused the soul to live in
peace and quiet and abide in the truth, thus saving our
life?" The Collected Dialogues of Plato , p. 347.
For a glimpse of the opposing contemporary
position, see the Symposium
.
215a, 222b, where Alcibiades
opens his speech by suggesting: "Well, gentlemen, I propose
to begin my eulogy of Socrates with a simile. ... I'm using
this particular simile not because it's funny, but because
it's true." And he concludes it advising Agathon to "learn
from our misfortunes." The Collected Dialogues of Plato , pp.
566, 573. Clearly, there is a theme here maintaining that
moral truth has its primary source in past experience,
personal history, and, as their extension, vivid narrative
account of them in their particularity.
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This grave suspicion of the comprehensibility and usefulness
of human experience underlies both Plato and Hobbes.22 The
stoic trust in reason predicates itself upon the haunting
distrust of history. Historical interpretation does render
things intelligible, but by no means will the
intelligibility emerging therefrom help much. Involved have
been too many accidental coincidences and permanent
discontinuities with no inner connection nor universal
bearing whatsoever. The premises are always faulty; the
blank spots, hardened errors, interested biases, and bitter
discords, innumerable. History is not neutral but strongly
evaluative with an enormous scale of subjectivity going on
then and there and ever since. All too often much of our
ordinary humanity supplies but a source of confusion rather
than of insight. Man's privileged faculty of reason is
necessarily confounded by his equally peculiar "priviledge
of Absurdity," namely, "senselesse Speech" ( Leviathan ^ p.
Hobbes's distrust of experience is unmistakable:
"Experience concludeth nothing universally. ... We cannot
from experience conclude, that any thing is to be called
just or unjust, true or false, or any proposition universal
whatsoever." "Human Nature." The English Works of Thomas
Hobbes . Vol. IV, p. 18.
As Nietzsche cites the instance of the French
Revolution, "Noble and enthusiastic spectators from all over
Europe contemplated it from a distance and interpreted it
according to their own indignations and enthusiasms for so
long, and so passionately, that the text finally disappeared
under the interpretation." Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good
and Evil , trans. Walter Kaufmann, (New York: Vintage Books,
1966), p. 49. For Nietzsche's rejection of the relevance of
history, see also Friedrich Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of
History , trans. Adrian Collins, (New York: Macmillan, 1985),
pp. 8, 10.
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113). Interpretation is no instructive knowledge nor serene
argument; it grounds its own power of conviction on
unburdened, unstudied assertion of truth, not on an agreed-
upon language of analytic inquiry and rational discussion. 24
Identity is inescapably interpretative and historical; yet
it is also totally fortuitous and undesigned. Practical
wisdom accumulated from what a people has undergone in the
past may well be a heritage too private, arbitrary,
fallible, and, in Hobbes's word, too "dear" to draw on.
Memories are always diverse, ugly, and painful. Appeal to
our past is less likely to shape a consensus on historical
correctness than to yield a recipe for civil war. Sometimes
it may be dangerous to listen to our unexamined preferences
and focus on incidental particularity as if they carried
some profound moral meaning. Unremitted exposure to history.
2*. See EN- 1143bll-13, where Aristotle makes his
awareness explicit that interpretation of past experience
may well be mere "unproved assertions" in contrast to
"demonstrations of fact." In the Gorgias
. Plato relates
mythos , viz., the interpretative mode of inquiry, to the
"lengthy discourses" (449b) of rhetoric which, as the source
of "dominion over others" (452d) , is "a creator of a
conviction that is persuasive but not instructive about
right and wrong" (455a) . Interpretation, Plato goes on to
argue, "has no need to know the truth about things but
merely to discover a technique of persuasion, so as to
appear among the ignorant to have more knowledge than the
expert" (459b-c) . In contrast, argument (logos) appeals to
the "brevity" (449c) of rational examination and the "method
of conversing by question and answer" (449b) . Upon closing
the dialogue, Plato maintains that the eschatological "tale"
("a very fine story," logos , 522e-523a) he presents there is
not a mere "fiction" (mythos . 52 3a) but an "argument"
(logos, 527e) , which he "shall recount as the actual truth"
(523a). The Collected Dialogues of Plato , pp^ 232, 236, 238,
242, 303, 307.
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to its capricious (mis) fortune and ultimate incompatibility,
is simply too much to tolerate. 25 If, therefore, absence of
the rule of reason is what gets us into our mire, let us be
rational; if memories hurt, let us put up the "veil of
ignorance. "26 The rational scheme is unprovable, but it to
the same extent is irrefragable also.^^ Life ig
25
.
Nietzsche, too, attributes the "Origin of Reason
and Logic" to the unbearableness of human experience and
mundane pain, to "the earthly kingdom of desires out of
which logic grew." "it is suffering that inspires these
conclusions [the metaphysical impulse and rational
imperative]: fundamentally they are desires that such a
world should exist; in the same way, to imagine another,
more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world
that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians
against actuality is here creative." Hence the "Ultimate
solution. — We believe in reason." The Will to Power , pp.
276, 311, 283.
2 6
.
John Rawls' "original position" and Heidegger's
hermeneutic "fore-structure" are by definition mutually
exclusive. For the assumption that the "veil of ignorance"
is conceived of primarily to close off the antecedent
encumbrances of history, see Rawls' explication: "The
original position, with the features I have called ^the veil
of ignorance, ' is this point of view. The reason the
original position must abstract from and not be affected by
the contingencies of the social world is that the conditions
for a fair agreement on the principles of political justice
between free and equal persons must eliminate the bargaining
advantages that inevitably arise within the background
institutions of any society from cumulative social,
historical, and natural tendencies. These contingent
advantages and accidental influences from the past should
not affect an agreement on the principles that are to
regulate the institutions of the basic structure itself from
the present into the future." John Rawls, Political
Liberalism . (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)
,
p. 23
.
2*^. That the rational scheme predicates itself not so
much upon conviction of metaphysical authenticity as upon
contention of irrefragability is attested in Plato's
Gorqias , 508e-509a: "These facts, which were shown to be as
I state them some time earlier in our previous discussion,
are buckled fast and clamped together — to put it somewhat
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fundamentally unfair. Aberration, depravity, disparateness,
and incompatibility are the kernel of the human reality.
What took place in the past does command a chock hold on
men; for us history does tell the most convincing stories
about who we are and what we do. Plato and Hobbes had
already known, therefore, that Aristotle and Heidegger are
right when they point out that the scheme of reason is a
groundless myth, and that "To dislodge by argument habits
long embedded in the character is a difficult if not
impossible task." But they on their part perceive a
distressing imperative, groundless though it is, that the
rational faculty must assume the reign, so that we can hold
our more ungovernable appetites under control, and keep
history, with all its prior claims, vested rights,
pernicious self-love, cumulative resentments, random tales,
crudely — by arguments of steel and adamant — at least so
it would appear as matters stand. And unless you or one
still more enterprising than yourself can undo them, it is
impossible to speak aright except as I am now speaking. For
what I say is always the same — that I know not the truth
in these affairs, but I do know that of all whom I have ever
met either before or now no one who put forward another view
has failed to appear ridiculous." And in the Phaedo, 85c-d:
"Although it is very difficult if not impossible in this
life to achieve certainty about these questions, at the same
time it is utterly feeble not to use every effort in testing
the available theories, or to leave off before we have
considered them in every way, and come to the end of our
resources. It is our duty to do one of two things, either to
ascertain the facts, whether by seeking instruction or by
personal discovery, or, if this is impossible, to select the
best and most dependable theory which human intelligence can
supply, and use it as a raft to ride the seas of life —
that is, assuming that we cannot make our journey with
greater confidence and security by the surer means of a
divine revelation." The Collected Dialogues of Plato, pp.
291, 68.
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and diverse significations, at bay. "By this organ alone is
the truth perceived" (Republic . 527e) , and "reason alone,
the soul's pilot, can behold it" ( Phaedrus
. 247c) .^8 Hobbes
even anticipates that his political solution will, with its
dehistoricized abstractness and threat of discretional
power, bear "evill consequences." Justice and cruelty could
be merely different names of a same single thing. But in his
perception the imperative is such that "the consequences of
the want of it ... are much worse." At the bottom, "The
condition of man in this life shall never be without
Inconveniences." The Leviathan is the best possible deal we
can ever get, Hobbes sternly assures us. We cannot but take
the "Inconveniences" that it brings with it. Otherwise our
dark, unsubduable past stays with us forever. There will be
too much passion and discordance, and too many private
scenes, exclusive identities, rival allegiances, and
irreconcilable stories. There will be, that is to say, the
"perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour"
( Leviathan , p. 260)
.
Human experience of entrenched habituation only
perpetuates, as Hobbes has shown, ignorance and prejudice,
manipulation and misery, to the point of "effusion of so
28^ The Collected Dialogues of Plato , p. 494.
280
much blood." Short of a fundamental recast of the
incorrigible human soul and a clean break of the unbreakable
link to the prior orders and ranks, men could never quit the
"close, dark, and dangerous by-paths" of history, and set
out anew onto the "highway of peace" of natural reason. On
the other hand, Plato's true lovers of theoria are confined
to a selective few who, with their alien genetic makeup and
inborn capacity to consort with the otherworldly Form, stand
aloof from the Cave of human experience, from "the
multiplicity of particular things which are the objects of
opinion." Whereas "the greater number are inevitably
wicked," admits Plato, "the best among the philosophers are
useless to the majority" (Republic . 489b-490b) . To be of use
to the wicked human, the rational part of the soul remains
merely a technical instrument for appetitive purposes; be
the reign of reason genuine and substantial, it is already
beyond the reach of ordinary humanity and thereby out of its
own relevance. It is thus the tragic dilemma of the species
that the experience it finds engaging and the vision it
hazily yearns for block out each other. In the Symposium .
Alcibiades, poetry incarnate (with "an enormous wreath of
ivy and violets sprouting on his head") , relates to those
present the rebuff he once received when he tried to seduce
Socrates the philosopher: "The mind's eye begins to see
clearly when the outer eyes grow dim — and I fancy yours
are still pretty keen." The sight of the body is in no
position to behold what the disembodied intellect sees. The
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pure light of reason either eclipses or is eclipsed by the
flickerings of our base passions and private fetishes. They
do not beam concurrently. Upon showing up at Agathon's
drinking party, Alcibiades declares his utter
irreconcilability with Socrates: "There can never be
reconciliation between you and me" ( Symposium
. 212e, 219a,
2 9213d)
.
Mutually incompatible and exclusive, poetry and
philosophy can hardly ever live together. The "ancient
quarrel" is ancient, therefore, not in the sense that it
belonged only to a remote antiquity, but in the sense that
it has been long-standing ever since. The paradigm of
"history" registers the way collective identity has been all
along and it probably will ever be; that of "nature"
contends to prescribe the way it ought to be and it should
be. Hobbes concedes that the Aristotelian rendering of
historia (and by analogy Heidegger's even stronger reading
of it) is true to "the Practise of the greatest part of the
world." He knows too well that "right reason is not
existent," and that the principles of nature "are so farre
from teaching us any thing of Gods nature, as they cannot
teach us our own nature." "I am at the point," confides
Hobbes, "of believing this my labour, as uselesse, as the
Common-wealth of Plato; For he also is of opinion that it is
The Collected Dialogues of Plato , pp. 564, 570,
565. The last citation (213d) is from the Jowett
translation. See The Dialogues of Plato , trans. B. Jowett,
M.A., 2 Vols, (New York: Random House, 1937), Vol. I, p.
337.
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impossible for the disorders of State, and change of
Governments by Civill Warre, ever to be taken away, till
Soveraigns be Philosophers" (Leviathan, p. 407). ^0 Aristotle
and Heidegger have given a convincing account of the real
condition of our history, a sad story though it rather is;
Plato and Hobbes seek an apocalyptic close of it, knowing
though that it is almost unachievable, or not too agreeable
either even if it was not. To varying extents they all know
the truth contained in the opposing positions. They argue
fundamental convictions beyond the realm of knowledge. On
that ultimate plane, as we have seen, rational
. Martha Nussbaum reminds us of the span between the
Republic 's dramatic date and its date of composition, which
reveals the ominous tensions and shocking implications
underlying the peaceful philosophical dialogue: "The year is
probably 421, during the Peace of Nicias: a time of rest and
relative stability. By the time of composition, about fifty
years later, most of the dialogue's principal characters are
dead, and few of them peacefully. Three (Polemarchus,
Niceratus, and Socrates) have been executed on political
charges; the first two were brutally murdered for their
fortunes by an oligarchic faction led by members of the
family of Plato." The Fragility of Goodness , p. 136. By
hindsight we know, as Plato did, that corruption and
diseases would shortly engulf this body politic of human
foresight, violence was about to strike, and before long the
reasonable, noble, and friendly dialogists would be
slaughtering each other in a bellum omnium contra omnes . The
moral consensus assembled through the working of man's
rational faculty had already proved, that is to say, to be a
precarious house of cards. It fell apart in a fleeting
moment upon the pull of history, of the refractory, burning,
insatiable desires of the appetitive part of the soul. No
present serenity obviously could guarantee stability. Things
relapse into the way they always were too easy. Reading the
Republic with this sense of chilling undercurrents and
impending collapse, one cannot help wondering whether Plato
is serious or ironic, and his message, optimistic or gloomy.
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commensuration and arbitration necessarily lapse into
silence, and synthesis seems conceivable no more.^^
John Stuart Mill takes note of what Samuel Taylor
Coleridge has observed: "Every man is born an Aristotelian,
or a Platonist. I do not think it is possible that any one
born an Aristotelian can become a Platonist; and I am sure
no born Platonist can ever change into an Aristotelian. They
are the two classes of men, beside which it is next to
impossible to conceive a third." Samuel Taylor Coleridge,
The Table Talk and Omniana . ed. T. Ashe, (London: G. Bell &
Sons, 1923), p. 99. See Utilitarianism and Other Essays, p.
180.
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